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Abstract 
Many firms and organizations with already-optimized business functions are under market 
pressure to protect their narrow profit margins. Their need for supplemental and reliable 
revenues calls for performance optimization beyond the core business functions. Motivated 
by applications from online social media and the airline industry, in my dissertation, I focus 
on the revenue management and pricing decisions of customer-based plans and programs. 
More formally, the research question addressed in this study is: How can firms effectively 
use customer-based pricing strategies to boost revenues? 
My dissertation consists of three essays. In the first essay, I analyze the ongoing competition 
among online social media (OSMs) to attract users. Concentrating on the importance of 
community retention and expansion to OSMs in preserving financially sustainable business 
models, I investigate whether OSMs should develop revenue sharing programs and reward 
their contributing users from their limited revenue streams. I present a duopoly OSM game 
(with a less favourable and a more favourable OSM) in which heterogeneous users choose 
their levels of contribution with respect to each OSM based on their preferences. In this 
chapter, I explore how online users’ actions and perspectives impact the outcome of the 
competition among OSMs. Furthermore, I investigate how small social media firms can 
compete with a dominant firm in the market. 
In the second essay, I study the role of ancillary revenue and its significance for industries 
such as airlines. These firms can barely survive without ancillary fees, even when their 
capacities are almost fully utilized. I consider the case in which customers-changing rates 
between flights are stochastic but decreasing with reference to the change fees. In this essay, 
I examine how firms should design change fees to manage customers’ switching behaviour. 
Specifically, I incorporate change fee revenues as a portion of total revenue structure and 
investigate how firms should update their markdown pricing strategies when they face price-
tracking customers. 
In the third essay, I focus on the dynamics between a firm and customers who are uncertain 
about their future travel plans. While the firm maximizes its revenue by imposing optimal 
change fees, customers consider their travel plan uncertainties and maximize their utilities by 
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responding strategically to these fares. In this study, I seek to answer two important policy 
questions: Although imposing a change fee could increase total revenue, does it burden the 
firm with a lower customer demand? How should the optimal monopolistic price be set with 
the presence of a change fee? Without imposing any distributional assumptions, I analytically 
derive each market player’s best reaction to the other to prescribe the characteristics of the 
firm/customer interaction equilibrium. 
 
Keywords 
Ancillary Revenue, Airline Industry, Change Fee, Customer Relationship, Revenue Sharing, 
Online Social Media, Game Theory, Revenue Management, Marketing 
 iv 
 
Co-Authorship Statement 
I declare that this thesis incorporates some material that is a result of joint research. Essay 1 
was in the International Journal of Management Science (OMEGA) co-authored with Dr. 
Fredrik Odegaard and Dr. Xinghao (Shaun) Yan. As the first author, I was in charge of all 
aspects of the project including formulating research questions, literature review, research 
design, analyzing the secondary data, and preparing the first and the following complete 
drafts of the manuscript. With the above exception, I certify that this dissertation and the 
research to which it refers, is fully a product of my own work. Overall, this dissertation 
includes 3 original papers, with the first essay already published in an academic journal. 
Essay 1 – Status: Published. 
Mirzaei, F. H., F. Odegaard, and X. H. Yan. User Reward Programs in Online Social Media, 
In Press (Published, October 12, 2015), The International Journal of Management Science 
(OMEGA) 
  
 v 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisors, Dr. Fredrik Odegaard and Dr. 
Xinghao (Shaun) Yan. I will be forever grateful for their guidance, encouragement and 
support and I truly appreciate their strong advocates for the ideas behind this work. I would 
also like to thank the supervisory committee and members of the examining board for their 
help in completing this thesis. 
I would like to thank my professors at Ivey and Western, Ivey's PhD Program, and Western 
and Ivey community in general. I acknowledge Dr. Peter Bell whose enthusiasm for 
management science inspired me to pursue a PhD at Ivey.  
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, my sister, and my wonderful wife. Without whom 
this achievement would not have been possible. 
 
 vi 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii 
Co-Authorship Statement................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... v 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Overview of Thesis and Specific Essays ................................................................ 3 
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................. 5 
2 User Reward Programs in Online Social Media ............................................................ 5 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 5 
2.2 Literature Review.................................................................................................... 9 
2.3 Online Social Media Duopoly Competition ......................................................... 11 
2.4 Analysis of Firms’ and Consumers’ Interaction ................................................... 15 
2.4.1 Users’ Reaction to Firms’ Rewards .......................................................... 15 
2.4.2 Firms’ Equilibrium Reward Decisions Under the General Case of a ....... 17 
2.5 Analysis of Asymmetry Between Firms ............................................................... 25 
2.5.1 Impact of Asymmetry in Cost: Comparison of Special Cases of a .......... 25 
2.5.2 Numerical Analysis for the General Cases of a ........................................ 28 
2.5.3 Heterogeneous Users with Respect to a .................................................... 32 
2.6 Analysis of Users’ Cost for Simultaneous Contribution....................................... 35 
2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 38 
2.8 Appendix to Chapter 1 .......................................................................................... 41 
 vii 
 
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 63 
3 Airline Switching Revenue with Price-Guarantees...................................................... 63 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 63 
3.2 Literature Review.................................................................................................. 68 
3.3 Model .................................................................................................................... 69 
3.4 Analysis of the Optimal Switching Rate in Symmetric Case ............................... 73 
3.5 Pricing with Switching Fees - Numerical Illustration........................................... 78 
3.5.1 Example 1: Optimal Switching Fee .......................................................... 79 
3.5.2 Example 2: Joint Optimal Switching Fee and Markdown Price ............... 82 
3.6 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 84 
3.7 Appendix ............................................................................................................... 86 
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................... 94 
4 Managing Change Revenue with Presence of Time-Uncertain Customers ................. 94 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 94 
4.2 Literature Review.................................................................................................. 96 
4.3 Model Description ................................................................................................ 99 
4.3.1 High Probability of Type Change ........................................................... 103 
4.3.2 Low Probability of Type Change ............................................................ 109 
4.4 The Firm’s Joint Service Pricing and Change Fee Decision .............................. 114 
4.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 118 
4.6 Appendix ............................................................................................................. 120 
Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 139 
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 139 
5.1 Managerial Insights ............................................................................................. 140 
5.1.1 Revenue Sharing programs ..................................................................... 141 
5.1.2 Ancillary Revenue .................................................................................. 143 
 viii 
 
References or Bibliography ............................................................................................ 146 
Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 152 
 ix 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Categories of Revenue sharing in OSMs (accessed October 10, 2014) ..................... 8 
Table 2: Different cases of equilibrium .................................................................................. 24 
Table 3: Equilibrium reward payments for different three-point distribution of a ................. 33 
Table 4: The first derivatives of φi. ......................................................................................... 46 
Table 5: Optimal switching fee for two cases of ε: left (ε = 0.5) and right (ε follows a 
Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5). ....................................................................................... 80 
Table 6: The set of optimal service price/change fee for different V and θ. ......................... 117 
 
 x 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Cases of Lemma 1 (Panel A), and Threshold for wa based on a (Panel B) ............. 19 
Figure 2: Comparison of equilibrium reward payments ......................................................... 30 
Figure 3: The equilibrium reward level, ri*, (white region) as well as firms' surplus, w – ri*, 
(grey region) for case of w = 5 ................................................................................................ 31 
Figure 4: Proportion of active users, φi* (left) and net revenues of firms πi* (right) at 
equilibrium .............................................................................................................................. 32 
Figure 5: Demand streams in two booking periods ................................................................ 70 
Figure 6: The sequence of events............................................................................................ 71 
Figure 7: Firm's expected revenue, E(π), left (ε = 0.5) and right (ε follows a Bernoulli 
distribution with p = 0.5). ....................................................................................................... 82 
Figure 8: Sequence of events ................................................................................................ 101 
Figure 9: Two-Period decision model................................................................................... 102 
Figure 10: Numerical illustrations of customers’ decisions based on different change fees, for 
θ = 0.4, p = $1000, Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right) ................................................. 104 
Figure 11: Firm’s expected revenue for θ = 0.3 (dashed line) and θ = 0.7 (dotted line), p = 
$1000, Δp = $400, v is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500 (left) and between 0 and 
3000 (right) ........................................................................................................................... 107 
Figure 12: Numerical illustrations of customers’ decisions based on different change fees, for 
θ = 0.15, p = $1000, Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right) ............................................... 110 
Figure 13: Numerical illustrations of optimal service price (left) and change fees (right) for 
different θ, V = 2500, Δp = $400 (solid line) and Δp = $800 (dashed line). ........................ 118 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
For most categories of products and services, global market competition is continuously 
on the rise, which leads to lower prices. Profit margins are being squeezed even when the 
prices are high because the costs of raw material and energy often peak at the same time. 
The dynamic costs of resources make it difficult to consistently meet profit targets. For 
example, according to Brian Pearce, the Chief Economist at International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), airlines’ revenue exceeded their costs by just 1% in 2012.1 This 
trend drives companies to devise new strategies to generate additional and reliable 
revenues. 
Seeking supplementary revenues is critical for another reason. For many firms, the core 
business process is not the main driver of the financial stream. For example, according to 
Reid and Sanders (2013), most of General Motors’ monetary returns apparently do not 
come from their core business functions –manufacturing and selling cars – but rather 
from post sales parts and services. For movie theatres, while the concession revenue rose 
8.8% in 2013, theatres are allegedly not making any more money on movies.2 The 
generation of higher revenues from ancillary products and services explains why, from a 
movie theatre owner’s perspective, customers are not at the movies to be entertained. 
Instead, they are there to buy soda and snacks at marked-up prices.3  
Firms develop customer-based pricing strategies to ensure a financially healthy and 
sustainable business model. In this thesis, I focus on two types of customer-based pricing 
strategies. First, firms reward customers for acting in ways beneficial to the firms. For 
                                                 
1
 URL: http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Aviation-Advocacy-Economics-2013-
July.pdf; accessed: 2015–8–8. 
2
 URL: http://business.time.com/2009/12/07/movie-theaters-make-85-profit-at-concession-stands; 
accessed: 2014–7–10. 
3
 URL: http://business.time.com/2009/12/07/movie-theaters-make-85-profit-at-concession-stands; 
accessed: 2014–7–10. 
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example, YouTube Partner Program incentivizes online users to post videos and provides 
monetary rewards if their videos generate millions of views. Rewarding video creators 
ultimately makes YouTube a more popular online social media platform and so it is more 
appealing for advertisers. Although paying active customers is costly for firms, the 
benefits it produces may exceed the costs. 
Second, firms follow an opposite pricing strategy and charge customers when they need a 
complementary service. For instance, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 
2011, ancillary revenue collected from change and cancellation fees accounted for more 
than 3% of U.S. airlines’ revenue. Higher ancillary fees can generate more revenues for 
firms, but they may significantly reduce customer demand. In this thesis, I will 
investigate how firms should optimize the design of these fees. Despite the emerging 
importance of ancillary revenue, its significance for firms’ dynamic pricing has not yet 
been fully addressed in operations management and management science literature.  
Many revenue management models are addressing the performance optimality by solely 
focusing on the core business function of a firm. Chase and Prentis (1987) call the 
problem of sub-optimization one of the major issues in the management science field, 
where the performance measure for a part of a system is optimized, but at the expense of 
total system performance. When a firm designs its core business function without 
considering the customer-based pricing strategies discussed above, it faces the same 
challenge. For instance, the introduction of a change fee affects how a firm should update 
its optimal service price. Therefore, considering customer-based pricing strategies along 
with the main business process pricing strategies is essential for the firm to prevent the 
risk of sub-optimization. Unless we optimize the design of all of these strategies together, 
our prescriptions based on sophisticated revenue management systems may not be 
beneficial for firms, and may even be misleading and harmful.  
The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the revenue management and pricing decisions of 
customer-based strategies. The results generated from this thesis lead to optimizing the 
performance beyond the core business functions. Moreover, I provide managerial insights 
for firms on how to generate supplemental revenues. Higher revenues provide 
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opportunities for firms to be competitive under the market pressure and to access more 
financial resources for future business investments. 
My dissertation consists of three essays examining how organizations can effectively use 
customer-based pricing strategies to boost revenues. Essay 1 is motivated by applications 
in online social media and focuses on the first type of customer-based strategies. In this 
essay, I investigate how a firm should share its advertising revenue with active users. The 
results from this essay present new insights on how optimal customer reward programs 
shape the market dynamics in online social media. Essays 2 and 3 are motivated by 
applications of ancillary fees in the airline industry and focus on the second type of 
customer-based pricing strategies. In Essay 2, I study customers’ monetary incentives to 
switch between resources and assess how firm can benefit from these incentives by 
offering lower service prices. In Essay 3, I study customers’ uncertainty with respect to 
their future travel plans and investigate how firms should consider this uncertainty in 
their pricing policy. Furthermore, I present that how the optimal service prices should be 
modified jointly with the change fees.  
In conclusion, I would like to highlight that I have selected online social media and the 
airline industry as the focus of this study because both industries have narrow profit 
margins. Furthermore, both industries are highly dependent on customer-based strategies 
to generate extra revenues. This thesis extends application to other industries. For 
example, in Chapter 3, I will discuss how banks and cellphone providers experience an 
identical problem when dealing with their clients, and in Chapter 4 I show that travel 
industries, such as auto rental, can benefit from our results. 
1.1 Overview of Thesis and Specific Essays 
Essay 1 analyzes the ongoing competition among online social media (OSMs) to attract 
users. Given the importance of community retention and expansion to OSMs in 
preserving financially sustainable business models, I investigate how OSMs should 
develop revenue sharing programs and reward their contributing users from their slender 
revenue streams. In this study, firms share a portion of their advertising revenue with 
active online contributors and motivate them to generate more content. I present a 
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duopoly OSM game where heterogeneous users choose their levels of contribution with 
respect to each OSM. I investigate the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and derive 
structural properties of the equilibrium reward solution. Moreover, I investigate the 
behaviour of online users and their interaction with firms at equilibrium.  
In the second essay, I study the role of ancillary revenue and its significance for firms, 
such as airlines. More specifically, I consider an uncertain changing rate between two 
resources offered by a firm. The customers’ changing rate between two resources is 
decreasing in terms of change fees. With reference to the change fees, I examine how 
firms should update its markdown pricing strategies and manage switching behaviour 
between two resources. Moreover, I investigate whether it is optimal to prevent 
customers from changing between two resources in any case, and determine how this 
decision depends on the customers’ population structure in the market. 
The third essay focuses on the dynamics between a firm and its customers. The firm 
maximizes revenue by setting the optimal change fee. In contrast to the situation in the 
second essay, I isolate time uncertainty as the different motivation behind switching fee. 
Customers are uncertain about their future travel plans and maximize their utilities by 
purchasing their tickets either earlier or later (In Essay 2 the model captures those 
customers who change regardless of switching fee, but in Essay 3, customers only change 
due to plan change). Furthermore, they are heterogeneous with respect to their 
willingness-to-pay for the service. I analytically derive each player’s best reaction to the 
other to prescribe the characteristics of the firm/customer interaction equilibrium. In this 
study, I seek to answer the following important questions: while charging customers for 
changing their travel plans might generate higher revenue per changing customer, does it 
ultimately burden the firm with lower revenue? How do customers with time uncertainty 
react to change fees? And finally, how should the firm update its pricing policies with 
change fees to maximize its revenue?  
In the final chapter, I present an overview of the main results from the analysis of the 
customer-based pricing strategies discussed in the thesis and highlight the managerial 
implications of their implementations.  
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Chapter 2  
2 User Reward Programs in Online Social Media 
Online social media (OSMs) have become a popular and growing Internet phenomenon, 
as exemplified by the millions of followers of websites like YouTube, Twitter, and 
Facebook. Given the Internet’s ease of access and the high degree of competition to 
attract users to these sites, a question arises as to whether OSMs should develop revenue-
sharing programs as a way to reward their contributing users. I present an ex ante 
asymmetric duopoly OSM game, where heterogeneous users are either active or passive 
with respect to each OSM. The game includes two steps: First, the OSMs simultaneously 
announce their rewards for active users; and second, based on their preference, users 
choose their level of contribution with respect to each OSM. I show that this game has a 
unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and identify the conditions under which a 
symmetric equilibrium exists, despite the asymmetry between the OSMs. Moreover, at 
equilibrium, no user chooses to contribute content exclusively to the less favourable 
OSM, even when the more favourable firm shares a lower reward than the less favourable 
firm. Furthermore, in some circumstances, a higher asymmetry can diminish the net 
revenue of the more favourable firm and vice versa. 
2.1 Introduction 
During the last decade, online social media (OSMs) have become a popular and growing 
Internet phenomenon. Hundreds of millions of users from all over the world visit and 
contribute to these websites on a daily basis. As of October 10, 2014, LinkedIn, Twitter, 
YouTube, and Facebook had around 300 million, 950 million, 1 billion, and 1.28 billion 
unique users, respectively.4 In this paper, I define an online social medium as any website 
providing a platform that allows online users to join and post user-created content (UCC). 
This definition includes social news websites, such as Digg and Reddit; video- and photo-
                                                 
4
 URLs: press.linkedin.com/News-Releases/333/LinkedIn-reaches-300-million-members-worldwide; 
businessinsid-er.com/number-of-users-who-abandon-twitter-2014-2#!JxoTo; 
youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html; news-room.fb.com/company-info/; accessed 2014-10-10 
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sharing websites like YouTube, Flickr, and Metacafe; social network websites, such as 
MySpace, Facebook, Google+, Tencent QQ, and Twitter; and portal sites such as Yahoo 
Groups. The key benefit for users comes from the pre-dominantly free service that allows 
them to stay connected with their communities and friends, sharing knowledge and user-
created content like photos, videos, files, software, bookmarks, and blogs. These features 
contribute to OSMs’ appeal for advertisers.  
Although some OSMs generate revenue through membership fees, affiliate programs, 
donations, and merchandise sales, the most common source of revenue is through 
advertising. Advertisements are displayed to users, and revenue is generated (to an OSM) 
based on the amount of time the advertisement is displayed and/or the number of times it 
has been clicked. Based on Deane and Agarwal [8], in the United States alone, annual 
revenues from ads on social media sites were estimated at over $26 billion in 2010. Hu 
(2015) argues that advertisers have started to realize that the Internet is a much more 
accountable and measurable medium compared to other forms of traditional media like 
television. Therefore, the larger the online community, the more lucrative the site is for 
advertisers to post their ads, and the greater the opportunity for higher revenue. 
Consequently, community retention and expansion stand out as key issues for OSMs.  
Broadly speaking, there are two types of OSM users: active and passive. Active users 
post content and observe other active users’ contributions, while passive users simply 
review content generated by active users. Within each category, there is, of course, a 
continuum. For example, the active category is likely to contain very active users who 
contribute on a daily or even hourly basis, as well as minimally active users who 
infrequently post a contribution. Likewise for passive users: some may be “active 
passive” in that they visit the site frequently, while others visit the site so infrequently 
that they may not even be considered a user. For the purpose of this pa-per, I restrict the 
discussion to consider only two categories. More details are provided in Section 3.  
Since users visit OSMs because of UCCs created by active users, some OSMs provide 
active users with monetary incentives through revenue-sharing programs. Under these 
relatively new practices, OSMs share a portion of their revenue as rewards to their active 
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users. The main purpose of these programs is to increase the traffic and popularity of 
OSMs, which ultimately drive higher revenue. Table 1 categorizes OSMs with user 
reward programs. For example, YouTube, although not explicitly declared, pays video 
developers of original content approximately $2 to $5 per 1,000 views of their posted 
video. In addition, popular users often may receive additional payment from their own 
advertisement sales, sponsorships and product placements. For instance, Michael 
Buckley, famous for his YouTube video blog “What the Buck?!”, reportedly earns 
$20,000 a month. 5 
I consider two online social media sites that compete simultaneously by rewarding active 
users (e.g., YouTube and Metacafe). The firms are assumed to be asymmetric in that 
online users have a general preference for one of the sites. I label one as “more 
favourable” and the other as “less favourable” and investigate ways for the less 
favourable firm to compete with the more favourable firm. Both firms decide on the 
amount of reward they will offer as their strategy. I demonstrate how to derive the 
optimal reward levels and show that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies. At equilibrium, some users may be indifferent with respect to making a choice 
between two firms, but I show that the possibility of this case is zero and corresponding 
firms’ market size based on users’ choices are unique.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/business/media/11youtube.html; accessed: 2014–5–10. 
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Table 1: Categories of Revenue sharing in OSMs (accessed October 10, 2014) 
Category Examples Structure of Payment 
Written Content Helium Earnings range from $10 to $200 per article plus a $3 bonus.  
 Oondi Writer gets 100% of the advertisement profits.  
Video Sharing, 
Podcasting, 
Audio and Music 
YouTube YouTube pays video developers between $2 and $5 per 1,000 plays. 
About Video producers are paid a flat fee of $250 per video.  
Blip.tv On a 50/50 basis, Blip.tv shares its advertising revenue with 
producers.  
Photography Shutterfly A Shutterfly Affiliate earns $9 per new customer.  
PhotoWorks Users earn money from photos, illustrations, vectors, and footage.  
Professional and 
Reviewing 
Community 
RateItAll It shares 50% of the Google Adsense revenue generated by the 
pages users create.  
Newsvine Users receive 90% of revenue from advertisements. 
Answer Services Ether Users earn money over e-mail.  
Mahalo The most helpful users receive payment from those who submit the 
question. 
Miscellaneous RedBubble An online art community that allows users to sell their works. 
Kongregate A large community of independent game developers with weekly 
prizes. 
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This paper makes the following contributions. First, I find that, for any level of 
asymmetry, there exists a revenue structure such that the game has a symmetric 
equilibrium [i.e., the two OSMs provide the same level of reward to their active users]. 
Consequently, although a symmetric allocation of users signals a symmetric game, a 
symmetric equilibrium does not necessarily imply a symmetric game. Second, when 
users have economy of scale for contribution to both firms, at equilibrium, no one 
chooses to contribute content exclusively to the less favourable firm, even when this firm 
shares a higher reward. This result may seem counterintuitive, but it is anecdotally 
consistent with what is observed, both with regard to OSMs that provide reward pro-
grams (e.g., YouTube versus Metacafe), as well as those that are based merely on users’ 
perceptions (e.g., Facebook versus Google+). Third, although one may expect that, as the 
asymmetry between the OSMs increases, the more favourable firm would decrease its 
reward amount, I show that both websites end up sharing higher rewards. Finally, I 
demonstrate the conditions under which the probability of users being active in the less 
favourable firm increases when the asymmetry increases between the OSMs (and vice 
versa). Interestingly, although the less favourable firm never sees an advantage in a 
higher asymmetry, under certain conditions, a higher level of asymmetry can also 
diminish the more favourable firm’s net revenue. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Different perspectives of OSMs have been studied in literature. For a general review of 
topics related to OSMs, see Bainbridge (2007), Clemons (2009), Messinger et al. (2009), 
and Kim, Jeong, and Lee (2010). These authors agree that OSMs face unique business 
challenges, such as selection of a financially sustainable business model and managing 
the customer relationship, and more research needs to be done to address these 
challenges. The need for further studies about OSMs also has been identified in the 
operations management and management science literature, although the primary focus 
of the studies in these fields has been mainly on online retailing, advertising, and network 
science. (See Ahmed and Kwon (2014), Alderson (2008), Basua, Chakrabortyb, and 
Sharmac (2015), Fridgeirsdottir and Najafi-asadolahi (2014) and Perdikaki, Kesavan, and 
Swaminathan (2012) and the papers referenced therein.) 
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A stream of research that relates – though somewhat orthogonally – to this study is online 
consumer behaviour, which has been empirically studied by social psychology and 
marketing science; see Schau and Gilly (2003), Benabou and Tirole (2006), Johnson et al. 
(2004) and Teo and Yu (2005). This field highlights the crucial role and characteristics of 
content contributors on the success of any user-generated content website (See Zhang et 
al. (2012) and Grewal, Lilien, and Mallapragada (2012)). Moreover, some studies, such 
as Tirunillai and Tellis (2012) and Luo, Zhang, and Duan (2013), investigate the 
relationship between social media and the market performance of the firm. This study 
focuses on the effects of monetary incentives and revenue-sharing programs on the 
dynamics that exist between users and the OSMs on the Internet. This paper contributes 
to the call for further research in this field, such as OSM profitability and revenue 
generation. 
The subject of competition between media sites has been studied in the literature (see 
Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), Godes, Ofek, and Sarvary (2009), Zhang and Sarvary (2014), 
and Zhu and Dukes (2015)), with a focus on different dynamics based on price and other 
factors of service quality, such as product variety and advertising intensities. Shin and 
Sudhir (2010) present a related paper that focuses on rewarding customers within 
symmetric competition. These authors adopt a Hotelling model with two retailers 
geographically located on the two ends of a unit line. Similar to my setup, they assume 
there are two types of consumers in the market with value heterogeneity and unstable 
preference. They present the conditions in which it is optimal for a firm to offer a lower 
price as reward only to its own customers rather than to the competitor’s customers and 
vice versa. In this paper, however, customers select one retail service.  
A recent study, and one that is more closely related, is Zhang and Zubcsek (2010). These 
authors consider a monopoly setting wherein an OSM provides online users both 
monetary and non-monetary incentives for their online contributions. Similar to the setup 
in this paper and in Shin and Sudhir (2010), they also consider two types of customers. 
They find that when the OSM offers monetary incentives, it is more effective to offer 
payments exclusively to top contributors instead of to all users. Moreover, their results 
indicate that one equilibrium strategy involves building a contributor community based 
11 
 
solely on monetary incentives rather than on non-monetary incentives, such as intrinsic 
fun. This study complements their results by providing insights for the duopoly setting. 
Moreover, while Zhang and Zubcsek (2010) and Shin and Sudhir (2010) consider two 
types of contributors – that is, a high and low type contributor – I capture customers’ 
heterogeneity through two independent effort levels.  
2.3 Online Social Media Duopoly Competition 
I assume there are two OSM firms offering the same service and competing 
simultaneously for online users through their revenue-sharing programs. I index the OSM 
firms by i, i = 1, 2 and define users to be either active (A) or passive (P) with respect to 
each firm. Therefore, there are four different states per user. For notational convenience, I 
use the first and second letters to denote the state of a user in firm 1 and firm 2, 
respectively: AP, AA, PA, and PP. For example, AP denotes that the user is active in firm 
1 and passive in firm 2. Although I consider two types of customers, the ensuing model 
setting and analysis can be extended to include additional customer contribution levels; 
however, to keep the model parsimonious, I choose not to include more states. 
Furthermore, in many cases, OSMs, such as YouTube, impose a threshold on the level of 
contribution and deal with a continuous spectrum of online users’ contributions in a 
discrete fashion. In such a case, online users whose contributions are below (above) the 
threshold are considered passive (active). 
I consider a market that consists of a large online user population, a place where the 
decision of one user does not affect how other users behave, and there is no peer pressure 
in this market (consistent with the setup in, for example, Nasiry and Popescu (2012), 
Gallego and Sahin (2010), and references in Shen and Su (2007)). Both OSMs have the 
same pool of online users, since reaching all websites is guaranteed on the Internet. The 
income per user comes from advertising, and the size of that income depends on the 
shopping behaviour of the users since revenue is a function of clicks or purchases per 
advertisement. Urstadt (2008) and Kim, and Jeong and Lee (2010) mention that a fixed 
portion of online users regularly click on ads (e.g., 0.04 percent on Facebook). As a 
result, OSMs generate revenue constantly, per user, from advertising. Facebook charges 
only 14 cents per thousand times that an advertisement is served.  
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I assume firms receive different benefits from active and passive users’ contributions. I 
define wA and wP as the fixed exogenous parameters that represent firms’ revenue per 
active and passive user, respectively. These parameters signify the impact of many 
factors, which monetize the contribution of different classes of users as revenue for the 
firms, such as the different levels of online dedication, influence, or rates of purchase for 
active and passive users. (Venkatesh and Agarwal (2006), Kim, Jeong, and Lee (2010) 
and Grewal, Lilien, and Mallapragada (2012)) According to the information presented in 
Table 1, in most cases, OSMs, such as About and Shutterfly, reward active users based 
on a fixed rate, or they share a fixed percentage of revenue, as, for example, in Oondi, 
Blip.tv, and Newsvine.  
Although advertising revenue may be different for the same type of contribution, in this 
paper, I consider wA and wP as the “average revenues” from active and passive users. For 
a large market of users, it would seem reasonable to define an average contribution level 
for active users and maximise the expected firm revenue over an average reward. I 
assume that, for firms, active users generate higher revenue than do passive users (i.e., wA 
> wP). If wA ≤ wP, then the problem becomes pathological since there is no incentive for 
firms to pay active users a reward. Consequently, all users decide to be passive and no 
content is generated. Note that, although each firm sets its own reward, its net revenue 
depends on its competitor’s reward too.  
The sequence of events is as follows: In the first stage, firms simultaneously announce 
the amount of their rewards ri, i = 1, 2. I denote the vector of rewards by r = [r1, r2]. The 
second stage accounts for the users’ reactions to the reward programs as follows: After 
observing r, each online user selects among AP, AA, PA, and PP. Each website’s 
expected net revenue per user is, for i = 1, 2: 
𝜋𝑖(𝒓) =  𝜑𝑖(𝒓)(𝑤𝐴 − 𝑟𝑖) + (1 − 𝜑𝑖(𝒓)) 𝑤𝑃  
where 𝜑𝑖 is the probability of being active for an online user in firm i, i = 1, 2. Increasing 
this probability is an indication of operational success of the firm’s service and the users’ 
contribution willingness. These probabilities depend on the vector of rewards. Note that I 
could have 𝜑1 + 𝜑2 ≤ 1 or even 𝜑1 + 𝜑2 > 1, since a user may decide to be active or 
13 
 
passive in both firms or in neither firm. To simplify the analysis, I define w = wA − wP, 
the incremental revenue generated by an active user. Firm i aims to find optimal ri to 
maximize its expected net revenue; that is: 
                                               𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑟𝑖
𝜋𝑖(𝒓) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑟𝑖
 𝜑𝑖(𝒓)(𝑤 − 𝑟𝑖) + 𝑤𝑃           (1) 
Next, I use backward induction to solve this game. Given the firms’ reward decisions 
(r1,r2), I consider the users’ best responses that impact each firm’s demand, 𝜑𝑖
∗(𝒓). I 
discuss how online users choose to be active or passive with respect to an OSM. I assume 
that being active at an OSM requires effort or is “costly” for online users, and this cost 
reflects the time or effort spent on participating in a firm’s activities (i.e., generating 
content for an OSM). Also, being passive is effortless and therefore incurs no cost for the 
users. Although an online user pays a cost for an online contribution, he or she could 
have a specific motivation for being active. Studies, including Koufaris (2002) and Hsu, 
Lu, and Hsu (2007), indicate that the ease of use, the level of enjoyment, and the 
usefulness of the online service constitute the users’ main motivations with respect to 
Internet contribution. I capture the impact of these incentives as the general perception of 
the OSM of online users. In the duopoly setting, I assume that one firm enjoys better 
recognition from online users compared to the other firm (i.e., firms are ex ante 
asymmetric in this regard), and this asymmetry could reflect differences in the overall 
preference, technologies, instructions, fees, or designs that are implemented by each firm. 
The social media industry is characterised by a trend towards winner-take-all markets and 
is increasingly dominated by websites such as Facebook or YouTube. However, a large 
number of niche websites now co-exist with these dominant firms, and I thus model 
asymmetric competition to investigate how smaller players can compete with major 
players.  
I label the firm with the better perception as “the more favourable firm” and the other 
firm as “the less favourable firm.” For active users, the better the general perception, the 
lower the cost of contribution; that is, contribution to the more favourable firm is less 
costly than contribution to the less favourable firm. Therefore, in general, online users are 
more willing to contribute to the more favourable firm. I denote the asymmetry 
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(distinction) between the firms by the fixed (finite) discount parameter a, where a ≥ 1. 
Note that in the special case of a = 1, the firms are symmetric. Later, in Chapter 6, I study 
the case where online users have different perspectives with respect to the asymmetry 
between two firms (i.e., a is a random variable). The taste preferences of the customers 
are heterogeneous, and I capture this heterogeneity through two independent effort levels.  
First, the consumers’ effort, or “cost,” of being active in a firm is captured by the random 
variable C, where C is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1; 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤ 𝑐} = 𝐹𝐶(𝑐) = 𝑐, for 
0 ≤ c ≤ 1. From now on, I refer to C as the consumers’ cost. Without loss of generality, I 
label firm 2 as the “less favourable” firm and, therefore, the consumers’ cost of being 
active with respect to firm 1 and firm 2 is C and aC, respectively. Second, the consumers’ 
cost of being active in both firms simultaneously is represented by C(a+K), where K is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and independent of C; 𝑃𝑟{𝐾 ≤ 𝑘} = 𝐹𝐾(𝑘) = 𝑘, for 
0 ≤ k ≤ 1.  A small K represents economy of scale in being active in both firms, reflecting 
a case in which a user has better skills, knowledge, or tools in handling two distinct 
activities at the same time. In Chapter 6, I extend my analysis to the case where 1 ≤ k, in 
which users have diseconomy of scale for joint participation in both firms, a situation that 
is common in many manufacturing and service industries. 
Online users with higher cost are less willing to be active. The rewards, however, have 
the opposite effect on the behaviour of online users and compensate for the costs of these 
contributions. Online users consider both rewards and costs in their decision-making, and 
I define a utility function for online users accordingly. After firms have announced their 
rewards and users have observed those rewards, the users compare their utility of being in 
any of the four defined states and choose the state with the highest utility: 
                                          u(c,k) =  max{r1 – c, r2 – ac, r1 + r2 – c(a+k), 0}        (2) 
where r1 – c, r2 – ac, and r1 + r2 – c(a+k) are the utilities of a user with realized cost 
variables c and k, of being in states AP, PA and AA, respectively, and 0 is the utility of 
being passive in both firms.  
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2.4 Analysis of Firms’ and Consumers’ Interaction  
In this section, I analyze the outcome of interactions between firms and consumers. First, 
I characterize the best response function for the users. According to the rational reaction 
of online users, firms maximize their net revenue. Next, I derive the corresponding Nash 
equilibrium(s) for the simultaneous game between the two firms.  
2.4.1 Users’ Reaction to Firms’ Rewards 
A rational user is active with the following probabilities: 
𝜑1(𝒓) = 𝑃𝑟{𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 1} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 0)}            
𝜑2(𝒓) =  𝑃𝑟{𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 2} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 –  𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 −  𝐶, 0)}            
Then, I have the following results: 
𝜑𝑖
∗(𝒓) = ∫ ∫ 𝑔𝑖(𝒓, 𝑐, 𝑘)
1
0
1
0
𝑓𝐶(𝑐) 𝑓𝐾(𝑘) 𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐 = ∫ ∫ 𝑔𝑖(𝒓, 𝑐, 𝑘)
1
0
1
0
𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑐 
where  
𝑔1(𝒓, 𝑐, 𝑘) = {
 1   𝑖𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝑐,  𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝑐(𝑎 + 𝑘) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 –  𝑎. 𝑐, 0) 
0                                             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                         
 
𝑔2(𝒓, 𝑐, 𝑘) = {
 1   𝑖𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 –  𝑎𝑐,  𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝑐(𝑎 + 𝑘) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝑐, 0) 
0                                             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                         
 
and fC(c) and fK(k) are the pdf of FC(c) and FK(k), respectively. 
The probability functions φi are continuous but not differentiable in ri. Depending on the 
particular rewards r1 and r2, there are, in total, nine different cases for φ1 and φ2. Note that 
the probabilities also depend on a, but a is a parameter of the model and not a decision 
variable for the firms. For the ensuing firms’ duopoly analysis, only three cases are of 
interest, and these are summarized as follows. (For completeness, the remaining six cases 
are summarized in Appendix.) 
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Lemma 1  The probability of being active in firms 1 and 2 is as follows:  
- Case I: if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 <(a−1)r1, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑎
𝑎−1
). 
- Case II: if (a−1) r1 ≤ r2 ≤ ar1, and r1 + r2 ≤ a, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) +
𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 and 
𝜑2
∗(𝒓) = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2). 
- Case III: if (a−1)r1 ≤ r2 ≤ ar1, r1 + r2 > a, and r1 ≤ 1, then  
𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) and  
𝜑2
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2). 
Lemma 1 shows how a market of rational online users responds to firms’ reward 
decisions r. In Case I, φi depends only on ri and not on rj, for i, j = 1, 2, and i ≠ j. In Cases 
II and III, φ1 and φ2 depend on r1 and r2. For all of the above cases, firms pay less than the 
maximum of their active users’ cost (i.e., r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ a). Depending on which case the 
user chooses, different dynamics occur. For instance, in Case I, the probabilities of being 
active for two firms increase linearly with corresponding rewards; firms can increase 
their market shares linearly by increasing their rewards. In contrast, for Cases II and III, 
the probabilities are nonlinear with respect to the rewards. Notice that r1+r2 ≤ a for Cases 
I and II, and r1+r2 > a for Case III. 
I might expect that the probabilities of being in state AP and PA are decreasing in r2 and 
r1, respectively. In other words, by increasing its reward, a firm can diminish the 
likelihood of users being active exclusively with a competitor. However, I see from (2) 
that, if the reward of an OSM compensates the cost of a user, then the competing OSM’s 
reward cannot diminish this state. Instead, adding that reward can convince the user to 
choose to be active in both. Proposition 1 shows that φi are monotonic functions with 
respect to r1, r2 and a. 
Proposition 1  The probability of being active in firm i, φi, is non-decreasing in r1 and r2, 
and non-increasing in a, for i =1,2.  
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Notice that φ1 and φ2 are aggregative probabilities; that is, φ1 is the sum of the probability 
of being in states AA and AP, and φ2 is the sum of the probability of being in states AA 
and PA. Proposition 1 indicates that these aggregative probabilities are a non-decreasing 
function of r1 and r2, and a non-increasing function of a. However, their components – 
the probability of being active in states AA, AP, and PA – do not necessarily follow the 
results in Proposition 1. For example, it can be shown that the probability of being in 
state AP is decreasing in r2, and the probability of being in state PA is decreasing in r1. 
Counterintuitively, the probability of being active in firm 1, φ1, can be increasing in r2 as 
one of its two components (i.e., the probability of being in state AA) is increasing in r2 at 
a greater rate in absolute value than the decreasing rate of its other component (i.e., the 
probability of being in state AP). For a similar reason, φ1 is decreasing in a.  
Now, knowing the users’ best responses about which firm to contribute to, and hence 
knowing each firm’s demand 𝜑𝑖
∗(𝒓), I solve for the two firms’ reward decisions at 
equilibrium (r1*, r2*). Next, I study the firms’ competition problem.  
2.4.2 Firms’ Equilibrium Reward Decisions Under the General Case 
of a 
Firms could anticipate the reactions of online users by calculating 𝜑𝑖
∗(𝒓) and then 
maximizing their net revenue accordingly. To analyze the simultaneous game between 
two firms, I start by examining the firms’ net revenue functions given in equation (1). As 
mentioned in 4.1, firm 1 chooses r1 ≤ 1 and firm 2 chooses r2 ≤ a; that is, the firms never 
reward beyond their users’ maximum cost of being active. This is because, by paying r1 > 
1, φ1 = 1 and firm 1’s payoff is w − r1, which is dominated by paying r1 = 1. By the same 
logic, firm 2 never pays r2 > a. Note that website i also never chooses ri higher than w 
because any reward higher than this level generates a negative revenue in equation (1). 
Next, I analyze the equilibrium of the simultaneous game between two firms, denoted by 
(r1*, r2*). Theorem 1 demonstrates that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium. This 
equilibrium exists in only one of the three cases discussed in Lemma 1. 
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Theorem 1 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for firms’ reward 
structures such that:  
- If a ≤ 2, then r1* ≤ 1 and (a −1)r1* ≤ r2* ≤ ar1*, i.e., the equilibrium exists in Cases II 
and III only. 
- If a >2, then r1* ≤ 1 and r2* <(a −1)r1*, or (a−1)r1* ≤ r2* ≤ ar1* and r1* + r2* > a, 
i.e., the equilibrium exists in Cases I and III only. 
Theorem 1 states that firms’ equilibrium is in one of Cases I, II, or III in Figure 1. The 
structure of the equilibrium depends on a and results in two possibilities: (1) when a ≤ 2, 
the equilibrium is in a convex set that includes only Case II and Case III (Panel A, Figure 
1); (2) when a > 2, the equilibrium is in a non-convex set, which is composed of Case I 
and Case III (Panel A, Figure 1). 
Theorem 1 also states that the firms’ game has a unique, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
of reward decisions. This implies that the users’ (equilibrium) probability of being active 
with regard to each firm, 𝜑1 and 𝜑2, is also unique. In other words, Theorem 1 extends 
the equilibrium to include the firms’ interaction with the users. At equilibrium, however, 
some users with specific cost levels (c, k) may be indifferent about their status within two 
firms (see equation 2). Nevertheless, since users are spread over continuous C and K 
spaces, the possibility of this case is zero. Hence, these “boundary” users do not affect the 
uniqueness of firms’ market sizes and reward decisions at equilibrium.  
Next, I consider how to specifically derive the equilibrium solution (r1*, r2*). First, for a 
given a, I define a unique threshold, ŵa, which is used to determine which feasible case 
contains the equilibrium. Specifically, if w > ŵa, the equilibrium is in Case III. If w ≤ ŵa, 
the equilibrium depends on a. That is, if a ≤ 2, the equilibrium is in Case II; otherwise, 
the equilibrium is in Case I. The threshold ŵa can be calculated as follows. 
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Figure 1: Cases of Lemma 1 (Panel A), and Threshold for wa based on a (Panel B) 
Lemma 2  For a given a, there is a unique threshold ŵa, such that if w ≤ ŵa, then r1* + 
r2* ≤ a, and if w > ŵa, then r1* + r2* > a. ŵa is derived as follows: 
 For a ≤ 2, ŵa is solved from the following system of equations: 
                                                    
{
 
 
 
 ?̂?𝑎 = 2𝑟2 + 
𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2)−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎) 
?̂?𝑎 =  2𝑟1 + 
𝑟1𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑎𝑟1−𝑟2−𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) 
𝑟1 + 𝑟2 = 𝑎
                     (3) 
 For a > 2, ?̂?𝑎 = 2(𝑎 − 1)                              (4) 
 
The solid line in Panel B, Figure 1, illustrates the general shape of ŵa as a function of a. 
Note that ŵa ≥ 1.5 and is increasing in a. This finding implies that, as the asymmetry 
increases between two firms, for a fixed w, the equilibrium moves from Case III toward 
Cases I or II. Moreover, by increasing the w, the sum of rewards increases at equilibrium. 
I 
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a 
1 0 
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Note that, when a ≤ 2, no closed-form solution exists for ŵa from the system of equations 
(3), and it has to be solved numerically.6 
The special cases when w = ŵa are as follows: If a ≤ 2, then the unique equilibrium 
solution should satisfy r1* + r2* = a. In this case, the equilibrium is on the boundary of 
Cases II and III. When a > 2, then r1* = 1 and r2* = a − 1, the equilibrium is a unique 
boundary point between Cases I and III. Next, I present the conditions to derive the 
equilibrium for each case by solving the corresponding systems of equations. Lemmas 3 
to 5 give the form of equilibrium solution in Cases I to III, respectively. 
Lemma 3  If a > 2 and w ≤ ŵa (Case I), then 𝑟1
∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑤
2
, 1) and  𝑟2
∗ =
𝑤
2
.  
When a > 2 and w ≤ ŵa, the equilibrium is in Case I, and the firms’ net revenues are as 
follows: 
𝜋1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1) 𝑟1 
𝜋2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2) 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑎
𝑎 − 1
) 
In this case, when w ≤ 2,  𝑟1
∗ =  𝑟2
∗ =
𝑤
2
; both rewards increase linearly with respect to w 
and the equilibrium is symmetric, despite the asymmetry between two firms. In Section 5, 
I discuss why the less favourable firm pays the same as the more favourable firm, even 
when it has a smaller market share. When 2 ≤ w ≤ ŵa, the symmetric equilibrium no 
longer holds, whereas the more favourable firm shares the unit of cost only, the reward 
for the less favourable firm increases linearly with respect to w, and this firm pays an 
even higher reward than its competitor.  
Now, assume a ≤ 2 and, w ≤ ŵa. The equilibrium can be derived based on Lemma 4.  
Lemma 4  If a ≤ 2 and w ≤ ŵa (Case II), then r1* and r2* are the feasible solutions to the 
following system of equations:    
                                                 
6
 When a ≤ 2, a close approximation of ŵa is ?̃?𝑎 = 1.5 𝑎
√2−1.  
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                   {
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1) (𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟1𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) = 0
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑟2
) − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) = 0
                   (5) 
where the ŵa is the unique solution of the system of equations (3) in Lemma 2.  
 
The system of equations (5) cannot be solved in closed form in general. In this case, the 
equilibrium is in Case II, and the net revenue functions of firms are as follows: 
𝜋1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2) 
𝜋2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2)) 
As I discussed, in Case II, the sum of rewards at equilibrium is less than a. In Section 6, I 
numerically show that the sum of rewards at equilibrium increases linearly with respect 
to w when w is less than ŵa. In other words, for a low w, the reimbursement of users in 
state AA increases linearly with respect to w when w is low. However, this is not the case 
when w is high. In Case III, the sum of rewards at equilibrium increases concavely with 
respect to w, as firms cannot continue increasing their rewards linearly. (See Section 6 for 
more details.)  
Notice that, together, firms never pay beyond a + 1, no matter how large the w is, since 
the firms never reward beyond their users’ maximum cost. Also, by decreasing a, the 
intensity of the competition increases, and r1* and r2* transfer from Case I to Case II. 
Next, I have the following result, when w > ŵa. 
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Lemma 5  If w > ŵa (Case III), then r1* and r2* are found through a two-step process: 
(1) Determine ?̂?1 and ?̂?2 as the solution to the following system of equations: 
        {
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1)(𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1) + 𝑟1(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)) = 0
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎
𝑟2
) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) = 0
                 (6) 
(2) Let 𝑟1
∗ = {
?̂?1          𝑖𝑓  ?̂?2 ≤ 𝑎?̂?1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎 − ?̂?2 ≤ ?̂?1 ≤ 1
1                                                   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                     (7-1) 
and r2* is found by solving for r2 in: 
                               (𝑤 − 2𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎
𝑟2
) − 𝑟1
∗ − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1
∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1
∗) = 0.                     (7-2) 
Lemma 5 demonstrates that, when w > ŵa, the equilibrium can be calculated through a 
two-step process. First, I derive the solution of the system of equations (6); I label the 
solution of this system by ?̂?1 and ?̂?2. If this solution is feasible  – as it is in Case III – the 
solution is the equilibrium of the game. However, the solution of system (6) can be 
outside Case III. I show that this can happen only if the equilibrium of the game is on line 
AC in Figure 1; that is, when r1* = 1. In this case, r1* is calculated based on Equation (7-
1), and r2* is derived through solving Equation (7-2) in the second step. In Case III, the 
net revenue functions of firms are as follows: 
𝜋1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1) (𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)) 
𝜋2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2) (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2)) 
Analogous to Case II (Lemma 4), I am unable to find the closed-form solution for r1* and 
r2*, based on w and a, in Case III (Lemma 5) as well. In general, the closed-form solution 
for equilibrium can be derived in Case I (Lemma 3) only. However, I illustrate that, in the 
symmetric game, it is possible to find a closed-form solution for the equilibrium under 
Case II (Proposition 2). Moreover, in Section 7, I provide numerical results for the 
asymmetric game and show the condition under which the equilibrium is symmetric 
despite the asymmetry between the two firms. When a > 2 and w > ŵa, Lemma 5 can be 
simplified as follows:  
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Corollary 1  If a > 2 and w > ŵa, then r1* = 1, and r2* is found by solving for: 
                                         (𝑤 − 2𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎
𝑟2
) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 − 1 = 0.                                           (8) 
Corollary 1 indicates that, when a > 2 and w > ŵa, firm 1 always shares the amount equal 
to the unit cost. In this case, the equilibrium is on line AC at Panel (A) in Figure 1. I have 
already proven the existence of equilibrium in Theorem 1. All equilibrium cases are 
summarized in Table 2. Next, I study the outcome of equilibrium when either the 
asymmetry (a) or incremental revenue (w) increases to the highest point.  
Corollary 2A  The asymptotic limit of the equilibrium reward solution with respect to a 
is given by 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑎→∞
 𝑟1
∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑤
2
, 1) and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑎→∞
 𝑟2
∗ =
𝑤
2
.   
Corollary 2B  The asymptotic limit of the equilibrium reward solution with respect to w 
is given by, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑤→∞
 𝑟1
∗ = 1 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑤→∞
 𝑟2
∗ = 𝑎. 
Corollaries 2A and 2B simplify the previous results for the extreme cases of a and w. 
Notice that when a goes to infinity, as I might expect, no user contributes to the less 
favourable firm, and the duopolistic setting converts to a monopolistic setting. In this 
case, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑎→∞
 𝜋1
∗ = (𝑤 − 1) 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑤
2
, 1) and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑎→∞
 𝜋2
∗ = 0. These results also suggest that 
when a increases significantly, the less favourable firm may completely shut down its 
rewards program due to a lack of demonstrable profitability. This finding is consistent 
with what has been observed between YouTube and Metacafe (or even Facebook and 
MySpace). Also, notice that Corollary 2A and 2B are in conformity with Corollary 1. 
When w goes to infinity, φ1* and φ2* limit to 1, and both firms share the highest cost 
incurred by their users. Hence, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑤→∞
 𝜋𝑖
∗ = ∞, for i =1,2. 
Regarding the equilibrium, some questions may arise. For example, I have already 
mentioned that r1 and r2 are less than or equal to w. I might wonder whether the firms 
will be generous in their payments; that is, will they share a higher portion of w with their 
active users or keep (save) the major amount of it for themselves? Moreover, is it 
possible that, by sharing a higher payment, the less favourable firm gains a higher market 
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share or revenue than the more favourable firm? I summarize these finding in Corollary 
3.  
Table 2: Different cases of equilibrium 
 w ≤ ŵa w > ŵa 
a ≤ 2 
Case II 
r1* and r2* are solved by (5) 
Case III 
r1* and r2* are solved by (7.1) and (7.2) 
a > 2 
Case I 
r1* = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑤
2
, 1) and r2* =  
𝑤
2
 
Case II 
r1* = 1 and r2* are solved by (8) 
  
Corollary 3  At equilibrium:  
 The proportion of active users in the more favourable firm is higher than or equal to 
the proportion of active users in the less favourable firm, i.e., φ1* ≥ φ2*. 
 The reward payments are less than or equal to half the incremental revenue 
generated by active users, i.e., ri* ≤ w/2, for i = 1, 2. 
 The set of active users in the less favourable firm is a subset of the set of active users 
in the more favourable firm. 
First, Corollary 3 asserts that, at equilibrium, the probability of being active is higher for 
the more favourable firm than for the less favourable firm. This finding holds, even when 
the more favourable firm shares a lower reward than the less favourable firm. 
Second, at equilibrium, firms keep at least half of w for themselves and never pay back 
more than half of this incremental revenue with their active users. In most cases, firms 
keep for themselves more than w/2. The only case where firms share w/2 is when a ≥ 2 
and w ≤ ŵa.  
Third, Corollary 3 states that the set of active users in the more favourable firm includes 
the set of active users in the less favourable firm; that is, no users will be passive with 
respect to firm 1 and active with respect to firm 2. This finding reflects the example of 
online users, such as Kip Kedersha, who anecdotally decided not to work exclusively for 
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their original community (Metacafe). In doing so, they expanded their activities to an 
appealing competitor website (YouTube) and found that the competitor’s platform was 
more popular and more convenient to work with. 
2.5 Analysis of Asymmetry Between Firms 
Due to the complexity of the model, obtaining closed-form equilibrium solutions is 
challenging. Therefore, to gain further insight regarding the impact of the asymmetry, I 
analyze certain instances and conduct numerical analyses. More specifically, I first 
analytically compare two special cases of a. Second, using a thorough numerical analysis, 
I study the firms’ equilibrium reward decisions. Finally, I relax my assumption on the 
fixed a, and I investigate the case where customers are heterogeneous with respect to the 
asymmetry between two firms. 
2.5.1 Impact of Asymmetry in Cost: Comparison of Special Cases 
of a 
In the following section, I study two special cases when a = 1 and a = 2 in order to 
achieve some insights on how the asymmetry in firms’ costs affects their reward 
decisions and revenues. When a = 1, the game is symmetric. The case with a = 2 
represents another special situation since, as I see in section 4, this point is a threshold for 
two different cases of a < 2 and a > 2, in which the firms’ reward decisions at equilibrium 
are significantly different. Recall that, when a < 2 and w ≤ ŵa, the equilibrium is in Case 
II, but when a > 2 and w ≤ ŵa, the equilibrium is in Case I. Moreover, in the case of a < 
2, the game is more “intensive” than in the case of a > 2; as a result of asymmetry, when 
a > 2, there is lower chance for the more favourable firm to have a better position in the 
competition.  
Symmetric Duopoly Case (a = 1). A question arises regarding how Lemmas 4 and 5 can 
be simplified when firms are symmetric. Moreover, I would like to examine whether the 
equilibrium is symmetric (i.e., if r1* = r2*) and study the arrangement of users’ states at 
equilibrium. For example, which portion of users selects states AA, AP, PA or PP? For 
the symmetric case, ŵa = 1.5. I summarize the result in Proposition 2.  
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Proposition 2  The symmetric game (a = 1) has a unique and symmetric Nash 
equilibrium, which can be calculated as follows: 
(a) If w ≤ 1.5, then r1* = r2* = w/3.  
 (b) If w > 1.5, then r1* = r2* = r*, where r* is the feasible unique solution to the 
following equation: 
                                         (𝑤 − 3𝑟)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟) + 2𝑟 − 1 = 0.                                         (8) 
Proposition 2 presents a simplified form of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 for the symmetric 
game, which has a symmetric equilibrium and fixed threshold ŵa = 1.5. When w ≤ 1.5, 
both firms share one-third of w with their active users. (The equilibrium is on line OB in 
Panel A, Figure 1.) This result represents a case in which the revenue contribution of an 
active user is less than 1.5 times of the cost of a user with the highest effort (unit of cost). 
When w > 1.5, the equilibrium is derived based on equation (8), i.e., the equilibrium is on 
line BC in Panel A, Figure 1.  
Note that, for a symmetric game, users decide whether to contribute or not to contribute 
to both firms; that is, users never choose states AP and PA. For example, if w = 1.5, at 
equilibrium, nearly 70 (30) percent of users decide to be active (passive) in both firms, 
and the total rewards they receive from firms equal the unit of cost (i.e., r1* = r2* = 0.5). 
Each firms share one-third of w and keeps two-thirds. Although the equal probabilities of 
being in states AP and PA seem natural because of the symmetric setting, selection of 
neither of these states may seem counterintuitive.  
Asymmetric Duopoly Case (a = 2). When a = 2, one would presume an asymmetric 
equilibrium since the users’ cost of contribution to the less favourable firm is twice the 
cost of contribution to the more favourable firm. In this case, ŵa = 2 and the equilibrium 
solution is given in Proposition 3:  
Proposition 3  When a = 2, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which can be 
calculated as follows: 
(a) If 𝑤 ≤ 2, then r1* = r2* = w/2.  
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 (b) If 𝑤 > 2, then r1* = 1 and r2* is the feasible unique solution to this equation: 
                                                        (𝑤 − 2𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
2
𝑟2
) − 𝑟2 + 1 = 0.                                      (9) 
An interesting result is that, when w ≤ ŵa = 2, the equilibrium is symmetric for the 
asymmetric game. Both firms share half of w with their active users. When w > 2, the less 
favourable firm gives a higher reward than the more favourable firm; however, the less 
favourable firm always has a lower market share and revenue, even when it pays more 
than its competitor. For example, when a = 2 and w = 3, at equilibrium, nearly 83 percent 
of users decide to be active in both firms, and the remaining users exclusively contribute 
to the more favourable firm. Note that, when a = 2, the equilibrium is on line OA of 
Panel A in Figure 1 if w ≤ 2, and it is on line AB if w > 2.  
Next, I compare the outcomes of the symmetric (a = 1) and asymmetric (a = 2) games, 
and I observe that, for both firms, payments in the asymmetric game are higher than those 
in the symmetric game. Also, the proportion of active users in the asymmetric game is 
greater (less) than the proportion of active users in the symmetric game for the more 
(less) favourable firm. Define πi a* as the revenue of firm i at equilibrium for a specific a. 
Corollary 4 compares the above cases. 
Corollary 4 The net revenue in the symmetric game is higher than the net revenue in the 
asymmetric game for both firms, i.e., πi1*  > πi2*, for i = 1, 2. 
Corollary 4 demonstrates that increasing asymmetry results in shrinkage of net revenues 
for both firms. Revenue shrinkage for the less favourable firm is not surprising due to the 
higher reward paid out and the loss in customers. However, the diminishing revenue for 
the more favourable firm is counterintuitive. This result can be explained by the fact that, 
as a increases, while φ1 increases, the more favourable firm has to share a higher reward 
in order to better compete with its rival, which also increases its rewards. The negative 
impact of the higher reward is greater than the positive impact of the higher market share 
on the firm’s revenue. Therefore, the more favourable firm ultimately loses revenue.  
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Since the above results come from the comparison of just two special cases for a = 1 and 
2, the question arises as to whether these results still hold for other general cases of a. In 
the next section, I aim to answer this question through a numerical study. I will 
demonstrate whether increasing asymmetry always increases (reduces) the proportion of 
active users for the more (less) favourable firm and whether it shrinks the revenue for the 
more favourable firm. I further explore this effect in subsection 5.2.  
2.5.2 Numerical Analysis for the General Cases of a  
In Lemmas 3, 4, and 5, I presented the Nash equilibrium. In this section, I expand my 
findings about the revenue-sharing equilibrium through solving the game numerically for 
specific values of w and a. The following analysis reports on a subset of 64 parameter 
combinations, spanned by 
𝑎 𝜖 {1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, 3, 5, 20},  𝑤 𝜖 {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 20, 100}. 
I find this selection of parameter combinations to be sufficient for analysing the firms’ 
equilibrium reward decisions. I start this  discussion with the symmetric case (a = 1) and 
then review the results of the asymmetric case (a > 1). In the symmetric case, when a = 1, 
as prescribed by Proposition 2, r1* = r2*. See the dashed line at a = 1 in Figure 2 for the 
first symmetric region. Furthermore, if w ≤ 1.5, then r1* = r2* = w/3. When w > 1.5, then 
r1* and r2* are monotonically increasing in w and converge to 1. I also see that the 
probability of being active φi and net revenues πi are monotonically increasing in w and 
converge to 1 and w − 1, respectively. In the asymmetric case, when a > 1, I observe 
some interesting and counterintuitive results:  
Existence of symmetric equilibrium for the asymmetric game. First, when w is “low” 
and 1 < a < 2, r1* and r2* are very close, since with low w, there is little room to share 
rewards, and both firms pay approximately the same amount for the asymmetric game. 
Figure 2 presents the first asymmetric region, where the more favourable firm pays 
slightly more. In this region, the difference between payments of rewards starts 
increasing when a increases; however, after a certain level of a, the gap starts to diminish, 
29 
 
so that, at a = 2 for w ≤ 2, both firms pay exactly the same amount. See Figure 2 for the 
second symmetric region.  
It may seem counterintuitive that the symmetric equilibrium is at a ≥ 2 when w is not 
very “high.”  The reason for this result is that, in this case, the market competitiveness of 
the second firm is weakened to the utmost, and thus, active users prefer to join the more 
favourable firm. However, to increase their surplus, they also decide whether they may 
work for the less favourable firm in addition to the more favourable firm or not. 
To attract active users, at this point, the less favourable firm should pay them at least the 
same as the more favourable firm pays in an effort to convince them to join. Note that, 
when a is smaller, active users can be convinced to join by the less favourable firm with a 
slightly lower payment compared to the payment of the more favourable firm. I also find 
that, for small w, w/3 ≤ ri* ≤ w/2 where w/3 and w/2 are the solutions of Propositions 2 
and 3, respectively. 
Second, when w is high, the more favourable firm shares a higher reward when a is not 
too high. Nevertheless, when w increases, after a certain level, both firms pay the same 
amount. This finding indicates an extension of the situation discussed above, in which an 
asymmetric game leads to a symmetric equilibrium where both firms pay ri* = 1 (Figure 
2); the dashed line represents this case (1 < a < 2). When w increases, the less favourable 
firm pays a higher reward than the more favourable firm.  
Figure 2 illustrates the second asymmetric region. In this case, firm 1 receives more 
benefits than firm 2 because firm 1 pays less than its competitor at equilibrium, while it 
attracts more users (Corollary 3). Conversely, when w is low, firm 1 still receives higher 
net revenue through paying a higher reward, although the difference between the revenue 
of the two firms increases since the second firm shares higher rewards without attracting 
more active users. Figure 3 displays the equilibrium reward level as well as the firm 
surplus, w − ri, and shows how firms share the marginal revenues between themselves 
and their active users. As the asymmetry between two firms, a, increases, both firms 
share higher revenues and keep less revenue for themselves. Notice that they never share 
beyond w/2 (i.e., half of the marginal revenues) with users.   
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Figure 2: Comparison of equilibrium reward payments 
Non-monotonic relationship between φi* and a. First, when a increases, firms’ rewards 
increase monotonically. The dynamics of the game explain why this happens. As a 
increases, the less favourable firm pays a higher reward, which provides a trade-off for its 
higher cost to keep its users. However, this scenario pushes the more favourable firm to 
increase its payment at the same time in order to avoid becoming non-competitive by 
failing to share a stimulating reward, as its competitor has done. 
Second, for both firms, the probability of being active monotonically increases in w 
(Figure 4). As I demonstrate in Corollary 3, compared to the less favourable firm, the 
more favourable firm has a higher probability of gaining active users. While φ2 does not 
decrease monotonically in a when w > ŵa, φ1 does not increase monotonically in a when 
w ≤ ŵa; the decreasing φ1 and increasing φ2 with respect to a occur when a is small. This 
exceptional effect is an extension of this  finding in Corollary 4 in Section 5.1. 
Furthermore, an increase in φ1 with respect to a at equilibrium may seem to conflict with 
Proposition 1, which suggests decreasing φ1 with respect to a. Notice that Proposition 1 
analyzes the game in a static setting with fixed r1 and r2, while, at equilibrium, both firms 
increase their rewards, and the game ends up with an increasing φ1 with respect to a.  
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Figure 3: The equilibrium reward level, ri*, (white region) as well as firms' surplus, 
w – ri*, (grey region) for case of w = 5 
Decreasing the net revenue of the more favourable firm in a < 2. Increasing w leads to 
an increase in the net revenue for both firms, while increasing a leads to a decrease in the 
net revenue for less favourable firms and in the more favourable firm when a < 2 (Figure 
4). Decreasing the net revenue of the less favourable firm by increasing a is intuitive. 
Surprisingly, the more favourable firm also loses net revenue, but it is less affected.  
As I see from Corollary 4, it may seem counterintuitive to decrease the net revenue for 
the more favourable firm when a < 2. Recall that, as a increases, while φ1 increases, the 
more favourable firm must share a higher reward and keeps a lower saving at 
equilibrium. Since the negative impact of the higher r1 is greater than the positive impact 
of φ1 on revenue of the more favourable firm (equation 1), this firm ultimately loses 
revenue. When a > 2, the net revenue of the more favourable firm is independent of a; 
that is, it is equal to w2/4 when w ≤ 2 and to w − 1 when w > 2. Next, I investigate the 
case where customers are heterogeneous with respect to a (i.e., where a is a random 
variable). 
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Figure 4: Proportion of active users, φi* (left) and net revenues of firms πi* (right) at 
equilibrium 
2.5.3 Heterogeneous Users with Respect to a 
In the previous sections, I have assumed that an asymmetry exists in users’ preferences 
between the two firms. In other words, for all users, one firm is a more favourable firm, 
and the asymmetry factor between two firms, a, is the same for all users. Next, I consider 
the case where customers are heterogeneous about references of two firms. The 
heterogeneous case contains two scenarios: First, customers still believe that firm 1 is the 
more favourable firm, but they may have different level of asymmetry factor, a. I refer to 
this scenario as a compatible market. Second, some customers may regard firm 2 as more 
favourable. I refer to this scenario as a dissident market. 
To analyze the case where users have different preferences with respect to firms, I solve 
the game numerically when the asymmetric factor, a, follows a three-point distribution 
with mean aM. Specifically, a takes three values – aL, aM, and aH – with equal probability, 
where aH ≥ aM = a ≥ aL ≥ 0. As an extension of the two-point distribution, a three-point 
distribution is widely used in literature since it can be used effectively to approximate 
many well-known and practical distributions, such as normal, lognormal, and beta 
distribution; see Desai, Koenigsberg, and Purohit (2007), and Yang and Schrage (2009). 
Notice that, for a dissident market, aL < 1, and for a compatible market, aL ≥ 1. I say that 
a becomes more divergent when aL and aH are farther from aM. Notice that 𝜑𝑖(𝒓, 𝐴) =
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1
3
(𝜑𝑖(𝒓, 𝑎𝐿) + 𝜑𝑖(𝒓, 𝑎𝑀) + 𝜑𝑖(𝒓, 𝑎𝐻)), where 𝜑𝑖(𝒓, 𝐴) is the probability of being active in 
firm i, for i =1,2, when a is a random variable with cumulative distribution function A(a). 
Also, 𝜑𝑖(𝒓, 𝐴) ≤ 𝜑𝑖(𝒓), since 𝜑𝑖(𝒓) is concave in r for a compatible market. (See the proof 
for Proposition 1.) This result implies that, for a compatible market, as a diverges, fewer 
users choose to be active in each firm for the same reward level. This result does not 
necessarily hold for a dissident market. 
I numerically solve the game for the case where the joint contribution factor is fixed,  K = 
0.7. (I analyze the fixed K case in Section 6 and derive the probabilities of being active in 
Lemma 6A.) I compare the equilibrium solutions between the case where a is constant 
and the cases where a follows different three-point distributions. The results are 
summarized in Table 3. The three sections of Table 3 correspond to cases in which half–
width of the distribution are 0, 0.5, 0.75 (for aM = 1) and 0, 1, 1.5 (for aM = 2) and 0, 4 
and 4.5 (for aM = 5). 
Table 3: Equilibrium reward payments for different three-point distribution of a 
* The equilibrium is not unique. 
 
Table 3 demonstrates the firms’ rewards at equilibrium under different marginal revenue 
(w) and different distributions of a (with different mean and variance). Comparing the 
deterministic a case with the stochastic a case, I observed that at least one equilibrium 
exists for the deterministic case, but the stochastic case may not have an equilibrium. In 
spite of this difference between the two cases, for some scenarios of w and a, the 
equilibrium is not unique for both cases. When the equilibrium is not unique, in these 
(r1*, 
r2*)  
k = 0.7 
[aL,  aM,  aH] 
[1, 1, 1] [0.5, 1, 1.5] [0.25, 1, 1.75] [2, 2, 2] [1, 2, 3] [0.5, 2, 3.5] [5, 5, 5] [1, 5, 9] [0.5, 5, 9.5] 
w 
1 (0.33, 0.33) (0.44, 0.44) (0.44, 0.44) (0.5, 0.5) (0.45, 0.41) (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5) No Eq. (0.5, 0.5) 
3 (0.85, 0.85)* (1.1, 1.1)* (1.22, 1.22)* (1, 1.5) (1, 1.31) (1.5, 1.5) (1, 1.5) (1, 1.18) (1, 1.5) 
5 (0.85, 0.85)* (1.1, 1.1)* (1.22, 1.22)* (1, 1.7)* (1, 1.33) (2, 2.55)* (1, 2.5) (1, 1.32) (2, 1.5) 
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scenarios, the sum of rewards at equilibrium is constant for both cases. For example, for 
deterministic cases, when w = 3, k = 0.7 and aL = aM = aH = 1, at equilibrium r1* + r2* = 
1.7, where 0.7 ≤ r1* ≤ 1. In this case, φ1 and φ2 are equal and depend on the sum of r1 and 
r2. (I derive the probabilities of being active in both firms in section 6; please refer to 
Case II in Lemma 6A for this scenario.) Therefore, any combination of r1 and r2 with 
fixed summation generates the same proportion of active and passive users, and each 
firm’s best reaction to a competitor’s action is to pay the remaining share of the fixed 
total rewards. 
I also investigate the difference between the deterministic and stochastic a cases in terms 
of the amount of rewards. In the deterministic case, I observe the following result: 
Corollary 5 For the deterministic a case, if a ≥ 2, r1* ≤ r2*. 
Corollary 5 asserts that, when a ≥ 2 for the deterministic a case, the more favourable firm 
always pays a lower reward level than the less favourable firm. I find, however, that the 
less favourable firm may have a lower reward when a is stochastic, more specifically, 
when w and aM are very high and aL < 1. In this special scenario of a stochastic a case, 
the market is in an extremely dissident state, and the more favourable firm should pay a 
higher reward to accommodate all users with conflicting tastes. Theretofore, the less 
favourable firm may have a higher reward when a is stochastic, while, when a is 
deterministic, the more favourable firm’s reward is always lower. 
Based on the results presented in Table 3, for a given value of w, as a diverges, both 
firms could pay higher or lower rewards, depending on whether the market is compatible 
or dissident and whether competition is symmetric or asymmetric. Specifically, for an 
asymmetric competition (aM > 1), when a diverges, both firms pay lower rewards in a 
compatible market, but as a diverges further, they both pay higher rewards in a dissident 
market. For a symmetric completion (aM = 1), when a diverges, both firms pay lower 
rewards. 
As previously discussed, for the same reward levels, the probability of being active for 
the stochastic a case is lower than the probability of being active for the deterministic a 
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case. In equilibrium, however, firms may receive a higher or lower revenue in the 
stochastic case since they pay lower or higher rewards in this case. Comparing firms’ 
revenues under deterministic and stochastic cases, I observe that, in most situations, 
firms’ revenues for both more favourable and less favourable firms are lower under the 
stochastic case. The only exception occurs when the market is in an extremely dissident 
state and the incremental revenue, w, is high. In this scenario, the less favourable firm 
receives a higher revenue under the stochastic case since it benefits from a higher 
payment from the more favourable firm. 
2.6 Analysis of Users’ Cost for Simultaneous Contribution 
In the previous sections, I assumed that K (i.e., the parameter that associates with the cost 
of being active in both firms simultaneously) is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. 
This represents a case, for example, in social media and digital markets, where users have 
economy of scale in being active in both firms since the cost of simultaneous 
participation in both firms is lower than the sum of separate participation cost in each 
firm. In this section, I also consider the case where K > 1, where the users have 
diseconomy of scale for joint contribution to both firms. This case is very popular in 
manufacturing and service industries since it is very costly for a user (employee) of a 
firm to work for another firm simultaneously. To focus on the comparison of the two 
cases where K ≤ 1 and K > 1, I assume that K is a constant and I derive the equilibrium 
rewards. 
Similar to Lemma 1, the following lemmas describe only those cases of interest. (The 
remaining cases are summarized in the Appendix.) 
Lemma 6A  For K ≤ 1, the probability of being active in firms 1 and 2 is as follows:  
- Case I: if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ (a+K−1)r1, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
 . 
- Case II: if (a+K−1) r1 < r2 ≤ (
𝑎
𝐾
)r1, and r1 + r2 ≤ a+K, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) =  𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
 . 
Lemma 6A presents the way a market of online users responds to firms’ reward decisions 
r when all users incur the same cost of joint involvement in both firms. In Case I, φi 
depends only on ri and not on rj, for i, j = 1, 2, and i ≠ j. In Case II, φ1 and φ2 depend on 
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both r1 and r2. Similar to the stochastic K case, firms pay less than the maximum of their 
active users’ cost (i.e., r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ a). It can be shown that, for a fixed K ≤ 1, the same 
properties regarding φi hold as in the stochastic K case; that is, the probability of being 
active in firm i, φi, is non-decreasing in ri and non-decreasing in rj. In other words, a firm 
enjoys a higher demand when its ‘competitor’ offers higher rewards to lure away users. 
This result stems from the economies of scale that are important in industries such as 
online social media. Since digital content can be duplicated without a high cost, 
consumers can generate content for two competitors – for example YouTube and 
Dailymotion – and receive a reward for their contribution from both firms (multi-home). 
Therefore, when YouTube increases its reward, online users become more willing to 
generate content on Dailymotion as well. As a result, more videos will be created on 
YouTube, but Dailymotion also benefits since those videos can be uploaded onto its 
website as well. In this way, economies of scale fundamentally change the competitive 
dynamics between the social media firms. Finally, the probability of being active in firm 
i, φi, is non-increasing in a and non-increasing in K.  
Next, I formally present the equilibrium rewards for the case of a fixed K > 1. 
Lemma 6B   For K >1, the probability of being active in firms 1 and 2 is as follows:  
- Case III: if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ (
𝑎+𝑘−1
𝐾
)r1, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
 . 
- Case IV: if (
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝐾
)r1 < r2 ≤ r1 +a − 1, and 1 < r1 ≤ K, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 1 +
𝑟1
𝐾
−
𝑟2−𝑟1
𝑎−1
 
and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟2−𝑟1
𝑎−1
 . 
Lemma 6B also studies Cases III and IV, in which K > 1. In Case IV, φi depends only on 
ri and not on rj, for i, j = 1, 2, and i ≠ j. In Case IV, φ1 and φ2 depend on both r1 and r2. 
The K > 1 case is different than K ≤ 1 case in two ways. First, in K > 1 case, firms may 
decide to pay more than the maximum of their active users’ cost (i.e., r1 > 1 and r2 > a). 
When there is no economy of scale, K > 1, users should pay a high cost for generating 
content for both firms. As a result, firms should pay higher rewards and compete harder 
to encourage active users to join them. Second, the probability of users being active for 
two firms (as before) increases linearly with their own rewards; however, it is non-
increasing with the competitor reward for the K > 1 case.  
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When K > 1, the consumers face diseconomies of scale when they participate in multiple 
firms; as firm i’s competitor offers a higher reward, fewer users join firm i. This is the 
case for many traditional manufacturing and service industries, in which users cannot 
participate freely in both firms. When K is sufficiently large, the users may prefer a single 
home in one community rather than joining multiple communities. When consumers can 
select only one firm (single-home), both firms have to compete harder to gain their 
usership. I highlight the fact that the equilibrium solution can be simplified by fixing K 
under some cases.  
I conclude this section with a note on parameter K, the cost of being active 
simultaneously in both firms. It has been stated that, for online social media, users have 
economy of scale for joint participation. For example, in most cases, users encounter 
economies of scale for posting videos to different sites, since the major cost of video-
sharing comes from the cost of video creation. Therefore, once a video is created, it is 
relatively inexpensive to upload it on different websites. However, for certain types of 
websites with user-generated content, online users may also face a diseconomy of scale 
for joint participation. This can occur, for example, when active users keep track of all 
activities and post in online networks and generate many feedbacks to online comments, 
which can be a very time-consuming and costly task. Other factors that contribute to a 
high online users’ cost are the large size of the network, peer pressure, and copyright and 
contract regulations.  
The high cost of contribution in user-generated content has been addressed in the 
literature. For example, Godes, Ofek, and Sarvary (2009) ﬁnd evidence that the declining 
online trend for already highly rated books is linked to the high cost of rating. Kumar, 
Sun, and Srinivasan (2010) ﬁnd that contribution status or positional utility play an 
important role in level of contribution. These authors found that older consumers are 
more sensitive to the cost of contribution, but interestingly, consumers with higher 
centrality are less sensitive to contribution cost. Thus, online users of social networks 
may face either economy of scale (i.e., K ≤ 1) or diseconomy of scale (i.e., K >1), 
depending on whether joint participation indeed reduces users’ cost by considering all the 
factors mentioned above.  
38 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This study investigates revenue-sharing strategies of online social media and shows how 
these strategies shape the contribution levels of online users. While the two opposite 
strategies of saving and sharing revenue have their pros and cons for the firms, the 
proposed model aims to provide insights for firms to consider the trade-off between these 
strategies within a state of asymmetric competition. The game consists of two steps: first, 
the OSMs announce their rewards for active users; and second, users choose their level of 
contribution with respect to each OSM, based on their preferences. I derived the revenue 
function for the firms by assuming they seek to maximize net revenue. The existence and 
uniqueness of equilibrium was shown for this duopoly game.  
My results indicate that users always select the more favourable firm whenever they 
decide to work exclusively for one firm. Anecdotally, these results are consistent with 
observed online evidence. For example, within the emergence of YouTube, all online 
celebrities opened a channel with this medium. Some of these results are even observable 
for OSMs who do not compete based on revenue-sharing programs. An example includes 
the ongoing challenge of Google+ to compete with Facebook.7 Many social media 
connoisseurs were highly optimistic about Google+ when it first emerged (and even used 
it exclusively at that point), but over time, they reopened their Facebook accounts.8 When 
a firm decides to enter an online competition, it should investigate how online users 
position it relative to a competitor. My results indicate that, even for a huge asymmetry 
between two firms, a market share still exists for the less favourable firm (or niche 
player), which explains why a large number of small websites now co-exist with 
dominant websites such as Facebook and YouTube.  
                                                 
7
 URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204653604577249341403742390.html; accessed: 
2014–5–10. 
8
 URL: http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/04/16/six-months-later-google-plus-still-doesnt-add-
up/; accessed: 2014–7–10. 
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A less favourable firm can better position itself in an online competition if it continuously 
improves the users’ perspective of its online community. For example, while the 
popularity of iTunes makes it a favourable service for artists, downloads from iTunes are 
easily accessible on an iPod or other device as well, which makes music more readily 
accessible for fans. These results suggest that small social media firms can compete with 
a dominant firm in the market by providing users with a service that has a higher utility. 
The revenue generated by users’ contributions also plays a significant role with respect to 
the outcome of the competition. If users’ contributions easily generate revenue, then both 
firms share high rewards and earn high net revenues as well. However, the more 
favourable firm can better exploit its advantage in this case by sharing a lower reward. 
On the other hand, when the monetary impact of contributions is too small, both firms 
follow a parsimonious strategy in sharing rewards. These results imply a bilateral 
relationship between the monetary values of users’ contributions and the rewards they 
receive; if users demand high rewards, they should deliver rewarding contributions. For 
example, some media-streaming websites pay substantial payments since the type or level 
of contributions delivered by their users help to promote the website and thus is in the 
interest of the website as well as the advertising business.  
For many types of online social media, the monetary impact of the contributions is too 
small. As previously discussed, the less favourable firm can compete with a dominant 
firm in the market by improving users’ perspective of it within the market. When the 
monetary rewards are insignificant, this strategy is even more beneficial for the less 
favourable firm. My results suggest that, in this case, the less favourable firm can 
generate higher revenues, and as a result, the firm can share higher rewards with active 
users. This trend has been observed recently in the ongoing competition between a 
dominant firm, such as YouTube, and a smaller online music service, such as Spotify. As 
Spotify’s user base continues to grow, the firm pays increasingly higher reward levels to 
the artists who use its platform.  
Some results regarding properties of equilibrium reward are worth our attention. For 
example, in order for firms to be successful, it is critical for them to find the right balance 
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between saving and sharing their revenues with active users. I observe that, at 
equilibrium, firms keep at least half of the marginal revenues for themselves and never 
share more than half of this incremental revenue with their active users. Moreover, when 
the asymmetry between two firms increases considerably, it may be optimal for the less 
favourable firm to completely shut down its rewards program. A higher level of 
asymmetry not only adversely affects the less favourable firm, but it can also generate 
monetary challenges for the more favourable firm, especially when the difference 
between two firms is insignificant originally. 
Online user behaviour and online competition are complex issues. In order to make this 
discussion tractable, I made a few simplifying assumptions in this study. For example, I 
assumed that users are uniformly distributed with respect to their cost structure. A more 
general setting would be interesting, but also more challenging, as the probabilities and 
equilibrium are already non-trivial. Another extension would be to consider more than 
two OSMs. My main motivation for analyzing a duopoly came from observing the 
competition between YouTube and Metacafe (or between Spotify and We7), and making 
note of the particular behaviours of the online users. Further studies can also extend the 
analysis of users’ behaviour by considering both the level and quality of the contributions 
as a continuum and by endogenously modelling the OSMs’ revenue as a function of the 
level and quality of user-created content. Finally, it might be argued that the size of the 
OSM should be explicitly modelled. In this setting, the initial size (that is, before 
announcing r) can be considered as part of the parameter a, but the subsequent size (that 
is, after announcing r) is reflected by φi. For instance, note that, in this setting, the 
revenue (πi) is increasing in size (φi). I leave all further enrichments as opportunities for 
future research. 
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2.8 Appendix to Chapter 1 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.  
Case I. I show that if r2 ≤ (a-1)r1, and r1 ≤ 1, then φ1 = r1 and φ2 =  𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑎
𝑎−1
). In this 
case no one choose to be active in the second firm and passive in the first firm as follows: 
When c ≤ r2 / a (i.e. r2-ac ≥ 0), state PA is preferable than being passive at both firms. 
Also state PA is preferable than being active at both firms when c ≥ r1/k (r2-ac ≥ r1 + r2 - 
ac - c). As r2/a ≤ r2/(a-1) ≤ r1 ≤ r1/k, there is no c exists which satisfies above conditions. 
Note that state PA is never chosen whenever r2/a ≤ r1. For the same logic state AP is 
never chosen whenever r2/a ≥ r1. Then I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  +
𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0}. 
Note for any A, B, C and D, if max(B,D) >  C, then Pr{max(A,B) > max(C,D)} = 
Pr{max(A,B) > D}. Therefore, I have: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{(r1 –  C ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (r1  + r2 –  C(𝑎 + K)  ≥
0)} =  𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  r1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
r1 +r2
𝑎+K
)}. As r1(a + k) ≥ r1a ≥ r1(a-1) + r1 ≥ r1 + r2, 
therefore r1 ≥ (r1 + r2)/(a + k). Then I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤
 
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤  𝑟1} = 𝑟1. 
Now take website 2’s perspective. 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1  +
𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 –  𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
 
r2
𝑎+K−1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
r1 +r2
𝑎+K
)}. Since ar1 ≥ r1 + r2, therefore 
r2
𝑎+K−1
≤ 
r1 +r2
𝑎+K
.  
Now I have the following: 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤
𝑟2
𝑎
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
)} + 𝑃𝑟 {(
𝑟2
𝑎−1
≥  𝐶 ≥
𝑟2
𝑎
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
)} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≥
𝑟2
𝑎−1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
)} 
42 
 
= 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎
} + 𝑃𝑟 {(
𝑟2
𝑎 − 1
≥  𝐶 ≥  
𝑟2
𝑎
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐾 ≤  
𝑟2
𝐶
+ 1 − 𝑎)} + 0
=   
𝑟2
𝑎
+ ∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑘
𝑟2
𝐶 +1−𝑎
0
𝑟2
𝑎−1
𝑟2
𝑎
𝑑𝑐 
=
𝑟2
𝑎
+ ∫ (
𝑟2
𝐶
+ 1 − 𝑎)
𝑟2
𝑎−1
𝑟2
𝑎
𝑑𝑐 =
𝑟2
𝑎
+ [𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶) + (1 − 𝑎)𝐶]𝑟2
𝑎
𝑟2
𝑎−1 = 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎
𝑎 − 1
) .     
Case II. In previous cases, it was shown that state PA is never chosen whenever r2/a ≤ r1. 
Now I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −
 𝑎. 𝐶, 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0} 
= 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 –  𝐶 ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)  ≥ 0)}
=  𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)} 
= 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
))𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
))𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎
≥  𝐶 ≥  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
))𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≥  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎
)}
= 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤  𝑟1} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎
≥  𝐶 ≥  𝑟1)} + 0 
= 𝑟1 + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝐶
− 𝑎) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎
≥  𝐶 ≥  𝑟1)} 
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= 𝑟1 +∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑘
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑐 −𝑎
0
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎
𝑟1
𝑑𝑐 = 𝑟1 +∫ (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑐
− 𝑎)
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎
𝑟1
𝑑𝑐 
= 𝑟1 + [(𝑟1  + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐) − 𝑎𝑐]𝑟1
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎 = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2. 
Now take website 2’s perspective. 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 –  𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)} 
= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎
)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ( 
𝑟2
𝑎
 ≤  𝐶 ≤  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤  𝐶 
≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎
)}
+  𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎
 ≤  𝐶 )} 
Note that as (𝐶 ≤  𝑟1), then 𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
 is an irrelevant condition. Since (𝑟1  ≤  𝐶 ≤
 
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
), then 
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
≤
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
. Therefore I have: 
𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎
} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ( 
𝑟2
𝑎
 ≤  𝐶 ≤  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 { (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤  𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎
)} +  0 
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=
𝑟2
𝑎
+  𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤  
𝑟2
𝐶
+ 1 − 𝑎)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ( 
𝑟2
𝑎
 ≤  𝐶 ≤  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝐶
− 𝑎)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤  𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎
)}
=
𝑟2
𝑎
+ ∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑘
𝑟2
𝑐 +1−𝑎
0
𝑟1
𝑟2
𝑎
𝑑𝑐 + ∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑘
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑐 −𝑎
0
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎
𝑟1
𝑑𝑐 
= (𝑟1 + 𝑟2) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2).     
Case III. 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0} 
= 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 –  𝐶 ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)  ≥ 0)}
=  𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)} 
= 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
))𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {((𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
))𝑎𝑛𝑑( 𝐶 ≥  𝑟1)} 
= 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤  𝑟1} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝐶 ≥  𝑟1)}
= 𝑟1 + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝐶
− 𝑎) 𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝐶 ≥  𝑟1)} 
= 𝑟1 +∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑘
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑐 −𝑎
0
1
𝑟1
𝑑𝑐 = 𝑟1 +∫ (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑐
− 𝑎)
1
𝑟1
𝑑𝑐 = 𝑟1 + [(𝑟1  + 𝑟2) log(𝑐) − 𝑎𝑐]𝑟1
1  
= 𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1). Now take website 2’s perspective. 
𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} 
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= 𝑃𝑟{𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} = 
= 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 –  𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)} 
= 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎
)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ( 
𝑟2
𝑎
 ≤  𝐶 ≤  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤  𝐶)} 
Based on the proof in the previous case I have the following: 
𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎
} + 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾 − 1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ( 
𝑟2
𝑎
 ≤  𝐶 ≤  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 { (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎 + 𝐾
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤  𝐶)} 
=
𝑟2
𝑎
+  𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤  
𝑟2
𝐶
+ 1 − 𝑎)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ( 
𝑟2
𝑎
 ≤  𝐶 ≤  𝑟1)}
+ 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐾 ≤  
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝐶
− 𝑎)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1 ≤  𝐶)} 
=
𝑟2
𝑎
+ ∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑘
𝑟2
𝑐 +1−𝑎
0
𝑟1
𝑟2
𝑎
𝑑𝑐 + ∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑘
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑐 −𝑎
0
1
𝑟1
𝑑𝑐 
= 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎. 𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2). The probabilities of being 
active for the remaining six cases are as follows (the details of prove for these cases are 
available in a longer version of Appendix): 
- if r1 > 1 and r2 > a, then φ1 = 1 and φ2 = 1. 
- if r1 > 1 and a-1 <r2 ≤ a, then φ1 = 1 and φ2 = 𝑟2 + 1 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2/𝑎). 
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- if r1 > 1 and r2 ≤ a-1, then φ1 = 1 and φ2 = 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑎
𝑎−1
). 
- if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 > a, then φ1 = 𝑟1 − 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) and φ2 = 1. 
- if ar1 < r2, and r1 + r2 ≤ a, then φ1 = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 + 𝑟2) − 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2) 
and  
φ2 = (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔((𝑟1 + 𝑟2)/𝑟2) + 𝑟2/𝑎 − 𝑟1. 
- if ar1 < r2, r1 + r2 > a, and r2 ≤ a, then  
φ1 = 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎) and φ2 = 𝑟2 +
𝑟2
𝑎
− 𝑎 −
(𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2/𝑎).   
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The first derivative of φi in Lemma 1 for all three cases 
with respect to r1 and r2 is non-negative and with respect to a is non-positive. See Table 
A1 for the derivative of φi for all cases. For Case I, as a ≥ 1, 
𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟2
 and 
𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑎
 are negative and 
other derivatives are 0. For Case II, I have the following: 
𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑟1
=  𝑎 +  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) −
𝑟2
𝑟1
>
0 because r2 ≤ ar1 and r1 + r2 ≥ ar1 (I proved this inequality in Lemma 1). Also 
𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑟2
=
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) > 0, 
𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟2
= 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) +  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) −  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2) > 0, 
𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟1
= 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) >
0, 
𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑎
= 𝑟1 −
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑎
= −
𝑟1
𝑎
< 0 for the same reason. In Case III, the same 
results hold as r2 < a, r1 < 1, and r2 ≤ ar1. The results hold for all remaining six cases as 
well. 
Table 4: The first derivatives of φi. 
Case 
𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑟1
 
𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑟2
 
𝜕𝜑1
𝜕𝑎
 
𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟1
 
𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑟2
 
𝜕𝜑2
𝜕𝑎
 
I 1 0 0 0 𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝑎
𝑎 − 1
) −
𝑟2
𝑎2 − 𝑎
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II 𝑎 +  𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) −
𝑟2
𝑟1
 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) 𝑟1 −
𝑟1  +  𝑟2
𝑎
 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1  + 𝑟2
𝑟2
) −
𝑟1
𝑎
 
III 𝑎 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) −
𝑟2
𝑟1
 −𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) 𝑟1 − 1 −𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎
𝑟2
) 
𝑟2
𝑎
− 1 
 
Moreover φi for all nine cases with respect to r1 and r2 are continuous on the boundaries 
of these cases, i.e., φ1 and φ2 for any neighbour cases, such as I and II or II and III, are the 
same on their boundary. Therefore, over all cases, φi are non-decreasing in r1 and r2.   
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. I have already shown that NE has to be such that r1* ≤ 1, r2* 
≤ a. The proof of theorem has the following steps:  
1) No equilibrium exists in Case I when 1 ≤ a ≤ 2  
2) No equilibrium exists in Case II when a > 2 
3) No equilibrium exists when ar1 < r2, and r1 + r2 ≤ a 
4) No equilibrium exists when ar1 < r2, r1 + r2 > a, and r2 ≤ a 
5) At least one equilibrium exists in the feasible cases, i.e., Case II and III when 1 ≤ a ≤ 
2, and Case I and III when a > 2. The details of proof are as follows:  
1) Next, I show that no equilibrium exists in Case I when 1 ≤ a ≤ 2. Assume there is an 
equilibrium (r1*,r2*) with (a-1)r1
*
 > r2
*. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 1 and 2 payoff 
functions are π1 = (w-r1*)r1* and π2 = (w-r2*)r2log(a/(a-1)), respectively. Note that both 
payoff functions πi are concave in ri because 
𝜕2𝜋1
𝜕𝑟12
= −2  and 
𝜕2𝜋2
𝜕𝑟22
= −2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎
𝑎−1
), and 
both are maximized at 𝑟𝑖 = 
𝑤
2
 (set 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑟𝑖
= 𝑤−2𝑟𝑖 = 0). However when 𝑟𝑖
∗ = 
𝑤
2
, the 
condition of (a-1)r1
*
 > r2
* is violated because 1 ≤ a ≤ 2. Therefore (r1*,r2*) cannot be an 
equilibrium. As a result, Nash equilibrium cannot be in Case I.  
2) First, if the equilibrium is on the boundary of Case I and II, then a = 2 (check the 
F.O.C for the objective function of firm 1 and 2). When a increases beyond 2, the slope 
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for the objective function of firm 2 is negative on the boundary with respect to r2, which 
implies that the equilibrium can not be on the top of the boundary in Figure 1. 
3) Next, I illustrate no equilibrium exists when ar1 < r2, and r1 + r2 ≤ a. In doing so, I 
show that the assumed equilibrium in this case can never be a best response strategy for 
firm 1. 
Assume there is an equilibrium (r1*,r2*) when ar1
*
 < r2
*. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 2 
payoff is (𝑤 − 𝑟2)((𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔((𝑟1 + 𝑟2)/𝑟2) + 𝑟2/𝑎 − 𝑟1). Note that 
𝜕3𝜋2
𝜕𝑟23
=
−
(3𝑟1
2𝑟2+2𝑟1
3)𝑤+𝑟1
3𝑟2
𝑟2
3(𝑟1+𝑟2)2
 < 0, and 
𝜕2𝜋2
𝜕𝑟22
= 
−2(𝑎+1) log(
𝑎+1
𝑎
)
𝑎
< 0 at r2 = ar1. Therefore the 
payoff function of firm 2 is concave in in this case. As r2* = BR (r1*) is in this case, the 
F.O.C is 
𝜕𝜋2
𝜕𝑟2
> 0 at r2 = ar1. Positive F.O.C at r2 = ar1 requires that w > r1(2a+1) 
(substitute r1 =r2/a in 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑟𝑖
).  
Now take website 1’s perspective. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 1 payoff is φ1 = (𝑤 −
𝑟1)((𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1 + 𝑟2) − 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2)).  
Note that 
𝜕3𝜋1
𝜕𝑟13
=
(𝑟2
2+2𝑟1𝑟2)𝑤+2𝑟2
2𝑟1+𝑟1
2𝑟2
𝑟1
2(𝑟1+𝑟2)2
> 0 and 
𝜕2𝜋1
𝜕𝑟12
= − 
𝑎2𝑤+𝑟2(2(𝑎+1) log(
𝑎+1
𝑎
)−𝑎)
(𝑎+1)𝑟2
< 0 
at r1 = r2/a. Therefore, the payoff function of firm 1 is concave. Now 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1
= (𝑤 −
𝑟1(𝑎 + 2)) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎+1
𝑎
) < (𝑟1(𝑎 − 1)) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎+1
𝑎
) > 0 at r1 = r2/a as w > r1(2a+1). This is a 
contradiction because r1* = BR (r2*) in this case, and 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1
 should be negative for any r1 > 
r1* such as r1 = r2/a. Therefore no equilibrium exists when ar1 < r2, and r1 + r2 ≤ a. 
4) Next Note that 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1
= −𝑤𝑙𝑛(𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑎) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑟2) + 2𝑟1𝑙𝑛(𝑟1) > 0 at r1 = a – r2, 
and for r2 > ar1 as r1 = a – r2 < ar1. Now I show that no equilibrium exist when ar1 < r2, 
r1 + r2 > a, and r2 ≤ a. In doing so, I show that the assumed equilibrium in this case can 
never be a best response strategy for firm 1. 
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Assume there is an equilibrium (r1*,r2*) when ar1
*
 <  r2
*. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 1 
payoff is (𝑤 − 𝑟2) (𝑟2 +
𝑟2
𝑎
− 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2/𝑎)).  
Note that 
𝜕2𝜋2
𝜕𝑟22
= −
(𝑎𝑟2−𝑎𝑟1)𝑤−2𝑎𝑟2
2 log(𝑟2)+(2𝑎 log(𝑎)−𝑎+2)𝑟2
2−𝑎𝑟1𝑟2
𝑎𝑟22
< 0. Therefore, the 
payoff function of firm 2 is concave in this case. As r2* = BR (r1*) is in this case, 
𝜕𝜋2
𝜕𝑟2
>
0 at r2 = ar1. Positive F.O.C at r2 = ar1 requires that 𝑤 >  2𝑎 − 𝑟1 +
−𝑟1(𝑎𝑟1−𝑎+𝑟1)
𝑎(𝑎−𝑟1) log(
𝑎
𝑎−𝑟1
)+𝑎−𝑟1−𝑎𝑟1
 when r1 ≤ a/(a+1) and 𝑤 >  (2𝑎 + 1)𝑟1 +
𝑎𝑟1+𝑟1−𝑎
log(𝑟1)
 when r1 > 
a/(a+1).  
Now take website 1’s perspective. Based on Lemma 1, the firm 1 payoff is φ1 = (𝑤 −
𝑟1)(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)).  
As 
𝜕2𝜋1
𝜕𝑟12
= −
𝑤−2𝑟1 log(𝑟1)−𝑟1
𝑟1
< 0 in this case, the payoff function of firm 1 is concave. 
Now 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1
= −𝑤𝑙𝑛(𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑎) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑟2) + 2𝑟1𝑙𝑛(𝑟1)  + 𝑎 − 𝑟1 − 𝑎𝑟1 at r1 = r2/a is 
positive because I have already shown that = −𝑤𝑙𝑛(𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑎) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑟2) +
2𝑟1𝑙𝑛(𝑟1) > 0 and the conditions on w which are mentioned above. This is a 
contradiction because r1* = BR (r2*), and 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑟1
 should be negative at any r1 > r1* such as 
r1 = r2/a. Therefore there is no equilibrium when ar1 < r2, r1 + r2 > a, and r2 ≤ a. 
5) I have already shown that no equilibrium exists outside Case I, II and III. Next, I show 
its existence in these cases. I also assume if there is more than one reward level, which 
generate the same amount of revenue for a firm in equation (1), the firm always prefers 
the lowest one. Through doing this, firm can keep a higher saving for itself.  
My proof for existence of equilibrium is based on applying results from Szidarovszky 
(2008). I paraphrase Theorem 3 (p. 100) of Szidarovszky (2008) regarding the existence 
of equilibrium: 
 
Theorem 3: Suppose that, in game Γ, for all players: 
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- The strategy profile is a nonempty, convex, compact subset of a finite 
dimensional Euclidean space; 
- The payoff function is continuous on the strategy profile; 
- The best response function is single valued. 
Then the game Γ has at least one (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. 
 
Theorem 3 in Szidarovszky (2008) indicates three sufficient conditions for the existence 
of the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. I show that the game I study here satisfies the 
above conditions. 
First, based on Proposition 2, strategy profiles are a nonempty, convex, and compact set 
for both firms. Second, as firms’ payoff functions are the product of continuous 
functions, firms’ payoff functions are continuous. Finally, the firms’ best response 
functions are singled-valued (see the assumption after equation 1). Consequently, the 
game satisfies the above conditions. Therefore, it has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.  
The proof of uniqueness will be shown later.   
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. The proof of Lemma has the following steps:  
1) For all a, there exists a unique ŵa  
2) If w = ŵa, then r1* + r2* = a, and if r1* + r2* = a then w = ŵa 
3) If w < ŵ, then r1* + r2* < a, and if w > ŵa, then r1* + r2* > a 
The details of proof are as follows: 
1) System of equations (2) denotes the points on Line AB in Figure 1 where r1 + r2 = a 
and a/(a+1) ≤ r1 ≤ 1. For showing the existence of ŵa, I compare the value of the first and 
second equations of this system at two extreme values on Line AB in Figure 1, i.e., for r1 
= a/(a+1) and r1 = 1.  When r1 = a/(a+1), I have the following: 
2𝑟2 + 
𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)
=
𝑎(2𝑎 + 1)
𝑎 + 1
≥
𝑎(2 + 𝑎)
𝑎 + 1
= 2𝑟1 + 
𝑟1𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 − 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
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and when r1 = 1: 
2𝑟2 + 
𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)
= 2(𝑎 − 1) ≤ 2 = 2𝑟1 + 
𝑟1𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 − 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
 
Note that both equations are continuous functions of r1 and r2 over the above interval. 
Therefore, the above inequalities guarantee the existence of ŵa based on the Fixed-point 
Theorem. 
Moreover, ŵa is unique as the first equation in System (2) is a strictly decreasing function 
of r1 and the second equation of in System (2) is a strictly increasing function of r1. I can 
check these finding by substitute r2 = a – r1 and take the first derivative with respect to r1 
as follows: 
𝜕 (2(𝑎 − 𝑟1) + 
𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎 − 𝑟1) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎)
)
𝜕𝑟1
= 
log(𝑟1) + 1
log(𝑎 − 𝑟1) − log(𝑎)
−
2𝑟2[log(𝑎) − log(𝑎 − 𝑟1)]
2 − 𝑟1 log(𝑟1)
𝑟2[log(𝑎) − log(𝑎 − 𝑟1)]2
< 0 
𝜕 (2𝑟1 + 
𝑟1(𝑎 − 𝑟1)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑎𝑟1 − (𝑎 − 𝑟1) − 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
)
𝜕𝑟1
= 
 −
(log(𝑟1) − 1)(𝑎 − 𝑟1)
2 + (3𝑎𝑟1 − 4𝑟1 log(𝑟1))𝑟1 − 2𝑟1
2𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑟1) + 4𝑎𝑟1
2 log(𝑟1) − 2𝑎
2𝑟1
2
[𝑎 − 𝑟1 + 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) − 𝑎𝑟1]2
 
+
𝑟1
2𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑟1) − 𝑎𝑟1
2𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑟1)
[𝑎 − 𝑟1 + 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) − 𝑎𝑟1]2 
> 0 
Therefore, system (2) has only one unique solution for a ≤ 2. For a ≤ 2, it is 
straightforward that there exists a unique ŵa. Note that in Theorem 1, part 1, I have 
shown that 2 is maximized at 𝑟2 = 
𝑤
2
. On the boundary of case I and III, 𝑟2 = 𝑎 − 1, 
which derive the equation 3. 
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2) Based on Lemmas 2 in Case II, 1 is concave and continuously differentiable and 2 is 
continuously differentiable and 
𝜕3𝜋1
𝜕𝑟13
 < 0. Therefore, the best response functions should 
satisfy the first order conditions for both firms’ payoff functions. If an equilibrium exists 
such that r1* + r2* = a, it should be the solution of the system of equations (2) as this 
system is F.O.C of payoff functions for firms. 
Now assume w = ŵa. Solving the system of equations (2), I find r’1 and r’2, such that 
r’1+r’2 =a. Moreover, r’1 and r’2 are the best strategy response of each other as both 
satisfy the F.O.C of firm’ payoff functions. Therefore, (r’1, r’2) is an equilibrium.  
3) Assume there is an equilibrium in Case III when w < ŵa. As w < ŵa, the F.O.C for 
firm 2 payoff function at r2 = a – r1 is negative. Note that the payoff function of firm 2 is 
concave. This implies that the best strategy profile of this firm for any r1 always 
satisfying the following condition: r2*(r1) = a – r1. Therefore at equilibrium I have the 
following: r2* < a – r1*. Based on the same logic, when w > ŵa, I can show that r2* > a – 
r1*.     
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. The results in Lemma 3 is immediate from Theorem 1, part 1. 
Note that r1* cannot be higher than 1.      
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. Based on Lemma 2, if w < ŵ, r1*+ r2* ≤ a. Based on Lemma 1, 
firms’ payoff functions are: 
1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1)(𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑛(𝑟1))  
2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2)(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑛(𝑟1) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑟2)). 
Checking the F.O.C for both firms, I have the following for ri = ri*, i = 1, 2: 
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1) (𝑟1 log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟1𝑟2 log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) = 0  
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2) log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑟2
) − 𝑟1 log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) = 0 for r2 = r2*.  
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PROOF OF LEMMA 5. Based on Lemma 2, if w > ŵa, r1*+ r2* > a. Based on Lemma 1, 
firms’ payoff functions are: 
1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2) and  
2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2)). 
 
Checking the F.O.C for both firms, I have the following for ri = ri*, i = 1, 2:: 
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1)(𝑟1 log(𝑟1) + 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1) + 𝑟1(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2 log(𝑟1)) = 0  
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2) (log (
𝑎
𝑟2
)) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1 log(𝑟1) = 0, for r2 = r2*.  
Note that in this case, an equilibrium may exists at r1* = 1, without satisfying the F.O.C 
for firm 1 because r1 = 1 is a boundary for strategy set of the first firm and firm 1 payoff 
function is not concave necessary.     
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. Based on System of equations (6) r1* and r2* are non-
decreasing function of w. For a > 2, when w = ŵ, r1* = 1 and r2* = a – 1. Therefore, 
when w > ŵ, r1* = 1. Then r2* can be derived from equation (7-2).     
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2. Part a. In this case the equilibrium is in Case I. Based on 
Lemma I and III, the results are immediate. Part b. In this case the equilibrium is in Case 
III. Note that the r1* = 1, r2* = a is a limiting solution for System (6). As both firms pay 
at the maximum cost of their active users, the probabilities of being active for both firms 
are equal 1. The remaining results are immediate.  
PROOF OF UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM. Lemma 3 implies the uniqueness of 
Nash equilibrium in Case I. for Case II and III, I paraphrase the following Theorem in 
Chenault [6] as proof of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium: 
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Theorem: If the following assumptions are satisfied, the game has a unique 
Nash equilibrium: 
- Assumption 1 (continuity):  The response functions are continuous; 
- Assumption 2 (boundedness): the choice set of an agent is bounded; 
- Assumption 3 (boundary conditions): if all other agents choose extreme 
values it is not optimal for an agent to do likewise; 
Assumption 4 (determinant condition): The determinate of the matrix of the derivative of 
response functions minus strategy sets with respect to strategies is not zero. 
This game is a continuous game, i.e., the payoff functions are continuously differentiable 
over a bounded set in R2. Notice that the response functions are continuous as 
(∂r1*(r2))/(∂r2) and (∂r2*(r1))/(∂r1) are continuously differentiable over Cases II and III, 
respectively (system of equations in Theorem 1 and 2 specify these response functions).  
Moreover, as I have shown in Proposition 2, the strategy set of players is bounded 
(assumption 2). Defining any r1 > 1 and any r2 > a as extreme cases in assumption 3, I 
have established in Proposition 2 that choosing these extremes is not an optimal decision 
for agents (assumption 3). 
To check whether assumption 4 holds, define v(r1,r2) = ψ(r1,r2) - (r1,r2) over strategy set, 
where ψ(r1,r2) is the vector of best response functions for given r1 and r2. The equilibrium 
is in Case II or III. Now assume the equilibrium is in Case II, i.e., w ≤ ŵa. Then, I have 
the following: 
|𝑑𝜐(𝑟1, 𝑟2)| =  
[
 
 
 −1
𝜕𝜓1
𝜕𝑟2
𝜕𝜓2
𝜕𝑟1
−1
]
 
 
 
≠ 0 
because 
𝜕𝜓1
𝜕𝑟2
= 
𝑟2𝑤 + 𝑟1(𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) − 𝑟1𝑟2
𝑤((𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + (𝑎 − 1)𝑟2 + 𝑟1) − (𝑟2 + 4𝑟1)(𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑟2(3𝑟2 − 4(𝑎 − 1)𝑟1) − 4𝑎𝑟1
2
 
< 0 
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and 
𝜕𝜓2
𝜕𝑟1
=
𝑟2 (𝑤 − (𝑟2 + 𝑟1)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) − 𝑟2)
𝑟1𝑤 + 2𝑟2(𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑟2
) − 𝑟1𝑟2
 < 1. 
as w < r2 + 2r1. Consequently, the game satisfies all above assumptions and has a unique 
Nash equilibrium.   Now assume the equilibrium is in Case III, i.e., w > ŵa. Then, I have 
the following:  
|𝑑𝜐(𝑟1, 𝑟2)| =  
[
 
 
 −1
𝜕𝜓1
𝜕𝑟2
𝜕𝜓2
𝜕𝑟1
−1
]
 
 
 
≠ 0 
because 
𝜕𝜓1
𝜕𝑟2
= 
𝑟1(𝑟1 −𝑤)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑤(𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1 + 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)) − 𝑟1(2𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 𝑟1(2(𝑎 − 1)𝑟1 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2)
 < 0 
and 
𝜕𝜓2
𝜕𝑟1
=
(𝑤 − 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑎
𝑟2
) (𝑤 − 2𝑟2) + 𝑟1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 𝑎 − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2
 < 1. 
Consequently, the game satisfies all above assumptions and has a unique Nash 
equilibrium.     
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3.  
Part a. Based on Lemma 1, for a > 2, the result is straightforward. For a ≤ 2, I have the 
following: 
𝜑1 − 𝜑2 = 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2 − 𝑟2𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟2
) =
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟2
 −  1 −  𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟2
)
1
𝑟2
 . 
Note that 
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟2
− 1 ≥ 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑎𝑟1
𝑟2
) (this is because 𝑥 − 1 ≥ 𝑙𝑛(𝑥) as the function 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 −
1 − 𝑙𝑛(𝑥) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 1 since f(1) = 0 and 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑥
=
𝑥−1
𝑥
≥ 0). Therefore 𝜑1 − 𝜑2 ≥ 0.    
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Part b. Based on Lemma 1, for a ≤ 2, the result is straightforward. There are three cases 
for this proof: Assume r1*+ r2* ≤ a. Based on Lemma 1, firms’ payoff functions are  
1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1)(𝑟1 + 𝑎(𝑟1 − 1) − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑛(𝑟1)) and 
2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2)(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − (𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑛(𝑟1) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑎. 𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑛(𝑟2)). 
Now check F.O.C for both firms: 
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1) (𝑟1 log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟1𝑟2 log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) = 0 for r1 = r1* and 
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2) log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑟2
) − 𝑟1 log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) = 0 for r2 = r2*. 
As 𝑟1 log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) − 𝑟2 + 𝑎𝑟1, log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑟2
) and log (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) are positive, (𝑤 − 2𝑟1) and 
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2) should be positive for r1 = r1* and r2 = r2*. Therefore r1* and r2* are less than 
or equal w/2. Now assume r1*+ r2* > a and r1* < 1. Based on Lemma 1, firms’ payoff 
functions are  
1 = (𝑤 − 𝑟1) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2)𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑎𝑟1 − 𝑟2) and 
2 = (𝑤 − 𝑟2) ((𝑟1 + 𝑟2) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑟1+𝑟2
𝑎𝑟1
) + 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑟1) − 𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟2)). 
Checking F.O.C for both firms: 
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1)(𝑟1 log(𝑟1) + 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1) + 𝑟1(𝑟1 + 𝑟2 − 𝑎 − 𝑟2 log(𝑟1)) = 0 for r1 = r1* 
(𝑤 − 2𝑟2) (log (
𝑎
𝑟2
)) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1 log(𝑟1) = 0 for r2 = r2*. 
As (𝑟1 log(𝑟1) + 𝑟2 − 𝑎𝑟1) and −𝑟1 − 𝑟2 + 𝑎 + 𝑟1 log(𝑟1) are negative and (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 −
𝑎 − 𝑟2 log(𝑟1)) are positive, (𝑤 − 2𝑟1) and (𝑤 − 2𝑟2) should be positive for r1 = r1* and 
r2 = r2*. Therefore r1* and r2* are less than or equal w/2. Now assume r1*+ r2* > a and 
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r1* = 1. Based on Lemma 2, w > ŵa and ŵa is the solution of following system of 
equations: 
{
?̂?𝑎 = 2𝑟2
?̂?𝑎 =  2𝑟1
𝑟1 + 𝑟2 = 𝑎
 
Therefore w > ŵa = 2. Therefore r1* is less than or equal w/2. The proof in previous case 
can be applied for r2* in this case.   
Part c. In Theorem 1, I have shown that the game has Nash equilibrium in Cases I or II or 
III. Based on Lemma 1, I also have shown that no user choses state PA in these cases. 
These results conclude that, at equilibrium, no one will be active merely in the less 
favourable firm.  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. When I substitute a = 1 and r1 = r2 = r in System of 
equations (2), it is simplified as: 
{
 
 
 
 ?̂?𝑎 = 2𝑟 + 
𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
= 3𝑟
 
?̂?𝑎 =  2𝑟 + 
𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
−𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
= 3𝑟
 
2𝑟 = 1
 
Solving this results in ?̂?𝑎= 1.5. Now, consider a = 1 and r1 = r2 in System of equations 5 
as follows: 
{
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1)(𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) − 𝑟1 + 𝑟1) − 𝑟1
2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) = 0
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) = 0
 
This system can be simplified further as: 
{
𝑤 − 3𝑟1 = 0
𝑤 − 3𝑟1 = 0
 
Which implies that r1* = r2* = w/3. Now, consider a = 1 and r1 = r2 in System of 
equations 6 as follows: 
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{
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1)(𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 𝑟1 − 𝑟1) + 𝑟1(𝑟1 + 𝑟1 − 1 − 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1)) = 0
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1) (𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
1
𝑟2
)) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟1 + 1 + 𝑟1 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) = 0
 
This system can be simplified further as: 
{
(𝑤 − 3𝑟1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 2𝑟1 − 1 = 0
(𝑤 − 3𝑟1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟1) + 2𝑟1 − 1 = 0
 
which results in equation 8.  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. When I substitute a = 2 and r1 = r2 = r in System of 
equations (2), it is simplified as: 
{
 
 
 
 ?̂?𝑎 = 2𝑟 + 
𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(2)
= 2𝑟
 
?̂?𝑎 =  2𝑟 + 
𝑟2𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
𝑟 − 𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟)
= 2𝑟
 
2𝑟 = 2
 
Solving this results in ?̂?𝑎= 2. Now, consider a = 2 and r1 = r2 in System of equations 5 as 
follows: 
{
(𝑤 − 2𝑟1)(−𝑟1 + 2𝑟1) = 0
0 = 0
 
This system can be simplified further as: 
𝑤 − 2𝑟1 = 0 
Which implies r1* = r2* = w/2. Now, consider a = 2. Part b is immediate from Corollary 
1.  
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.  
Part a. Based on Proposition 1 and 2, it is straightforward that r1* is higher for 
asymmetric case. r2* is also higher as it is less than 1 for the symmetric case, however it 
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should be higher than 1 in asymmetric case, since r2* in asymmetric case is always 
between a-1 and a. 
Part b. Based on Proposition 1 and 2, at a = 1, φ1 = 2rlog(2) and 2r1 – 1 –  2r1log(r1) in 
case II and III respectively. At a = 2, φ1 = r and 1 in case II and III respectively. Note 
that in both cases, at a = 2, φ1 is higher. 
Based on Proposition 1 and 2, at a = 1, φ2 = 2rlog(2) and 2r1 – 1 –  2r1log(r1) in case II 
and III respectively. At a = 2, φ1 = r2log(2) and r2 – 1 + r2log(2) in case II and III 
respectively. Note that in both cases, at a = 2, φ2 is smaller. 
Part c. Decreasing 2 at a = 2 is straightforward. At a = 1, 1 = 4w2log(2)/9. At a = 2, 1 
= w2/4. Therefore 1 decreases at a = 2.   
PROOF OF COROLLARY 5.  
When a ≥ 2, based on Theorem 1, there are two cases as follows: First, based on Lemma 
3, if w ≤ ŵa (Case I), then 𝑟1
∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑤
2
, 1) ≤
𝑤
2
=  𝑟2
∗. For the second case, if w > ŵa 
(Case III), based on Lemma 2, r1* + r2* > a > 2. Based on Theorem 1, r1* ≤ 1. 
Therefore, r2* > 1 > r1*.  
PROOF OF LEMMA 6A.  
Case I. I show that if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ (a+K−1)r1, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟2
𝑎+𝑘−1
 
.In this case no one chooses to be active in firm 2 and passive firm 1 as follows: 
When c ≤ r2 / a (i.e. r2-ac ≥ 0), state PA is preferable than being passive at both firms. 
Also state PA is preferable than being active at both firms when c ≥ r1/K (r2-ac ≥ r1 + r2 - 
ac - cK). As r2/a ≤ r1(a+K-1)/a ≤ r1 ≤ r1/K, there is no c, which satisfies above conditions. 
Then, I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑘)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −
 𝑎𝐶, 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑘)) ≥ 0}. 
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Note for any A, B, C and D, if max(B,D) >  C, then Pr{max(A,B) > max(C,D)} = 
Pr{max(A,B) > D}. Therefore, I have: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 –  𝐶 ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)  ≥
0)} =  𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
)}. As r2 ≤ (a+K−1)r1, therefore r1 ≥ (r1 + r2)/(a + 
K). Then I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤  𝑟1} =
𝑟1. For firm 2, 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} =
𝑃𝑟{𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥
𝑟1 –  𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
r2
𝑎+K−1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
r1 +r2
𝑎+K
)}. 
Since r2 ≤ (a+K−1)r1, 
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
≤ 
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
. Now I have the following: 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤
 
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
} =
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
 .     
Case II. In this case no one chooses to be active in one firm and be passive in the another 
firm as follows: When c ≤ r2 / a (i.e. r2-ac ≥ 0), state PA is preferable than being passive 
at both firms. Also state PA is preferable than being active at both firms when c ≥ r1/K 
(r2-ac ≥ r1 + r2 - ac - cK). As r2/a ≤ r1/K, there is no c, which satisfies above conditions. 
Using the same logic, state AP is never chosen. Then I have the following: 𝜑1 =
𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝑘)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0} =  
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝑘
. For firm 2, 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −
 𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0} =
 
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
. The probabilities of being active for the remaining four cases are as follows (the 
details of prove for these cases are available in a longer version of Appendix): 
- if (
𝑎
𝐾
)r1 < r2 ≤ a , then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) =  
𝑟1
𝐾
 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =  
𝑟2
𝑎
 . 
- if r1 ≤ K and a < r2, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) =  
𝑟1
𝐾
  and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =  1 . 
- if r1 > K, r2 > a + K – 1 and r1 + r2  > a + K, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) =  𝜑2
∗(𝒓) = 1 . 
- if r1 > 1 and r2 ≤ a + K – 1, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) =  1 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =  
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
 .  
PROOF OF LEMMA 6B.  
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Case III. I show that if r1 ≤ 1 and r2 ≤ (
𝑎+𝑘−1
𝐾
)r1, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟1 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
 . 
In this case no one choose to be active in firm 2 and passive in firm 1 as follows: 
When c ≤ (r2 – r1) / (a-1) (i.e. r2-ac ≥ r1-c), state PA is preferable than state AP. Since r2 ≤ 
(
𝑎+𝑘−1
𝐾
)r1, c ≤ r1/K. Also state PA is preferable than being active at both firms when c ≥ 
r1/K. Therefore, there is no c, which satisfies above conditions. Then I have the 
following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 0}. 
Therefore, I have: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 –  𝐶 ≥ 0) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)  ≥ 0)} =
 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
)}. As r2 ≤ (
𝑎+𝑘−1
𝐾
)r1, therefore r1 ≥ (r1 + r2)/(a + K). 
Then I have the following: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤  𝑟1} = 𝑟1. 
For firm 2, 
𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝑟1  +
𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 0)} = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 –  𝐶) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑟1  +
𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 0)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  
r2
𝑎+K−1
)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝐶 ≤  
r1 +r2
𝑎+K
)}. Since r2 ≤ (
𝑎+𝑘−1
𝐾
)r1, 
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
≤ 
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
. Now I have the following: 𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
} =
r2
a+K−1
 .    
Case IV. Since r1 > 1, no one chooses state PP. Then I have the following: 𝜑1 =
𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 0)} 
= 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟1 –  𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶}. 
Therefore, I have: 𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟1 –  𝐶 ≥ 𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)  ≥ 𝑟2 −
 𝑎𝐶)} =  𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 >  𝑟1/𝐾) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟2−𝑟1
𝑎−1
)}. As r1 / K ≤ 
𝑟2−𝑟1
𝑎−1
, then I have the following: 
𝜑1 = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 ≤  𝑟1) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
)} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐶 ≤  𝑟1} + 𝑃𝑟 {𝐶 ≤  
𝑟1 +𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾
} = 1 +
𝑟1
𝐾
−
𝑟2−𝑟1
𝑎−1
. For firm 2,  
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𝜑2 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶, 𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾)) ≥ 𝑟1 –  𝐶} = 𝑃𝑟{(𝑟2 −  𝑎𝐶 ≥
𝑟1 –  𝐶) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑟1  + 𝑟2 –  𝐶(𝑎 + 𝐾) ≥ 𝑟1 –  𝐶)} = 𝑃𝑟 {(𝐶 >  r1/𝐾) 𝑜𝑟 (𝐶 >  
r2−r1
𝑎−1
)}. As r1 / 
K ≤ 
r2−r1
𝑎−1
, I have the following: 𝜑2 =
𝑟2−𝑟1
𝑎−1
. The probabilities of being active for the 
remaining five cases are as follows (the details of prove for these cases are available in a 
longer version of Appendix): 
- if (
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝐾
)r1 < r2 ≤ 𝑎r1, and r1 ≤ 1, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 𝑟1  (1 +
1
𝐾
) −
𝑟2−𝑟1
𝑎−1
 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟2−𝑟1
𝑎−1
 . 
- if 𝑎r1 < r2 ≤ a, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟1
𝐾
 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟2
𝑎
 . 
- if r1 ≤ K, r2 > r1 +a – 1 and r2 > a, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟1
𝐾
 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) = 1 . 
- if r1 > K, and r2 > a + K – 1, then 𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) = 1 . 
- if r1 > 1, r2 ≤ a + K – 1, and (
𝑎+𝐾−1
𝐾
)r1 > r2, then  𝜑1
∗(𝒓) = 1 and 𝜑2
∗(𝒓) =
𝑟2
𝑎+𝐾−1
 . 
 
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Chapter 3  
3 Airline Switching Revenue with Price-Guarantees 
Many airlines permit ticket holders to change the time of their flight by paying a 
switching fee. For an airline, selecting a switching fee is an important strategic decision 
for two reasons. Firstly, it is a supplementary but considerable revenue item for firms 
with a narrow profit margin. Secondly, it significantly impacts their operational planning. 
Knowing that a low or high fee could cause operational challenges, such as unsold 
capacity or lost sales, the question that arises is what fee should be set for switching.  
I model a single firm, which delivers two comparable services over two sequential 
periods. The price of the service in the second period is lower and I deal with a 
theoretical case where switching customers pay a switching fee, but get reimbursed the 
price difference. This is an extension of the current airlines’ switching practice and 
money-back guarantees, a common practice in many industries (such as consumer 
electronics). I analyze the firm’s revenue function and derive the optimal switching rate 
(proportion) between two periods.  
I demonstrate that the uncertainty in switching behaviour of customers drives the firm’s 
optimal switching policy. When this uncertainty increases, the firm should impose a 
higher switching fee. Furthermore, I present that the optimal switching fee is increasing 
in resource prices. Next, I numerically analyze the joint decisions of two service prices 
and the switching fee. This analysis shows that the optimal switching fee is increasing in 
the size of the low-price capacity. 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years we have seen a growing trend of airline passengers demanding more 
flexible travel arrangements. This may, in part, be a consequence of dynamic pricing, 
where customers have come to expect daily or hourly airfare updates, and may also, in 
part, be due to a general demand for greater consumer flexibility. This trend, however, 
increases the firms’ uncertainty in capacity and resource planning. Given customers’ 
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willingness to change the service consumption time, firms aim to control these negative 
impacts by imposing a switching or change fee. A second type of fee is the cancellation 
fee, which is applied when a ticket holder decides to completely cancel the service. These 
ancillary fees have recently provided a better opportunity for firms to collect higher 
revenues. Switching fees provide more revenue than cancellation fees since customers 
typically still derive some value from switching tickets.9 Notice that the current practice 
is mainly focused on switching from ‘low’ to ‘high’ preference flights, where the 
customer in addition has to pay the difference in fare. 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the total ancillary revenue collected 
from switching and cancellation fees for U.S. airlines has been growing over the past six 
years (in '000): $915,231 (2007), $1,668,748 (2008), $2,373,019 (2009), $2,297,377 
(2010), $2,380,157 (2011), $2,554,658 (2012).10 Since 2009, these ancillary revenues 
have accounted for more than 3% of U.S. airlines’ revenue, and it is expected that this 
percentage will continue to rise in the future.11 Furthermore, according to an article in the 
Wall Street Journal, many airlines allegedly can barely survive without these fees, even 
when they successfully operate at 99% capacity level.12 Despite the emerging importance 
of ancillary revenue, its role as a source of revenue and its significance for airlines’ 
dynamic pricing has not yet been clarified in operations research and revenue 
management literature. Moreover, as Gallego & Sahin (2010) point out, many firms are 
not using ancillary fees properly and this is a problem not limited to the aviation industry.  
                                                 
9
 URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204563304574318212311819146.html; accessed: 
2015–8–8. 
10
 URL: www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/subject_areas/airline_information/reservation_ 
cancellation_change_fees/index.html; accessed 2013-05-01. 
11
 URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204563304574318212311819146.html; 
accessed: 2015–8–8. 
12
 URL: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303296604577450581396602106; accessed: 
2015–8–8. 
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Airlines have different policies for switching fees. For U.S. domestic flights, some 
airlines, such as Jet Blue, Alaska and AirTran, do not charge their passengers for 
switching; while others, such as Virgin America and Hawaiian Airlines, impose a 
switching fee of around $100, and some others, such as US Airways and Delta, charge 
even higher fees. This distinction in switching fees policies also exists in the case of 
international flights. Unless these fares' impacts on optimal dynamic pricing are well 
understood and the design of these fees is optimized, the prescriptions based on even 
sophisticated revenue management systems may not be beneficial for firms. As 
mentioned, under the current practice, the switching is generally from a low to a high 
price flight where customers must, in addition, pay the fare difference. 
Regarding the same flight (for a particular departure date, time and fare class), some 
airlines such as Air Canada or American Airlines do offer fare guarantees, but mostly on 
the same day of purchase. These fare guarantees are used by various price-tracking tools 
to refund customers when prices drop. For example, Yapta.com and Tingo.com track the 
prices before and after purchasing airline tickets and hotel bookings, respectively. As of 
October 25th, 2013, Yapta and Tingo have reportedly reimbursed around $250,000,000 
and $720,000, respectively.13 There is a similar price tracking tool in the auto rental 
industry.14 If the secondary price drops more than the switching fee, these tools alert the 
ticket holder and either provide a reimbursement or tell ticket holders exactly who to 
contact and what to say to obtain the refund. The application of these tools highlights the 
growing importance of managing switching revenues within different enterprises. 
Moreover, these tools demonstrate that the customers' abilities to search for better rates 
have been significantly improved. 
I would like to highlight that the focus of this study is on the switching to a different 
flight or date. In this case, most companies charge a change fee in addition to the fare 
                                                 
13
 URLs: www.yapta.com and www.tingo.com; accessed 2013–9–9. 
14
 URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-car-
companies-squirm-your-money.html; accessed: 2015–8–8. 
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difference when customers want to switch to a different flight. What I analyze in this 
paper is the effect of introducing the change fee and reimbursement of difference in fare 
when customers switch to a lower priced flight. The reimbursement of difference in fare 
is currently not a common airline industry practice. Our approach is, however, similar to 
Gallego & Sahin (2010) who investigate the benefits of designing partial refundable fares 
that do not exist currently: I am analyzing this issue to investigate the implications of 
allowing for fare difference reimbursement. Since customers are price sensitive, I present 
a hypothetical model that alleviates the burden for customers to change their flight. 
Furthermore, the practice of price match guarantee has been deployed in many 
industries, such as consumer electronics, which protects customers against price 
fluctuations over a specific period of time. It is worthwhile to refer to some airlines that 
offer restrictive versions of this service. For example, Jet Blue and IndiGo (India's largest 
domestic airline as of September 2015) retains the difference in fare in a credit shell for 
customers for a couple of months.15 American Airlines roll-overs ticket holders to a 
lower fare if this fare was not offered at the time of original booking.16 In this essay, I 
study a single-leg flight, not considering a return flight. Also, I do not include fare classes 
where higher fares classes have right to switch, i.e., analysis is within one fare class. 
I analyze the impact of switching fee on firms’ operating revenues and investigate how 
and when imposing these fees is beneficial to firms. When the firm charges a relatively 
low switching fee, this increases the rate of switching and creates more opportunities for 
collecting revenue. In addition, the firm can collect more revenue indirectly by replacing 
the switching ticket holders with waiting list customers during high-price periods. On the 
other hand, while high switching fees would increase ancillary revenue, they also 
constitute an opportunity cost to the firms. The higher the switching fee, the less 
                                                 
15
 URLs: http://www.jetblue.com/travel-agents/lower-fare; http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/ 
india-business/Refund-blues-after-cancellation/articleshow/2199454.cms; http://www.firstpost.com/ 
business/spicejet-has-highest-load-factor-at-92-indigo-retains-a-third-of-market-in-august-2442248.html; 
accessed 2015-10 -10. 
16
 URL: www.aa.com/i18n/agency/Booking_Ticketing/Reissue_Rollovers/rollover_lower_fare.jsp; 
accessed 2013-10-25. 
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switching behaviour. This may lead to a demand shortage in low-price periods and, 
ultimately lost sales due to capacity rationing in high-price periods. Therefore, net profits 
may start to diminish if switching fees are high. This trade-off between ‘the cost of lost 
demand and unsold capacity’ and ‘direct and indirect revenue from switching’ is the key 
to understanding the firm's optimal switching fee strategy. Recognizing the growing 
importance of these supplementary fees for firms, I aim to investigate the optimal 
switching fees based on airlines' demands and operational factors. To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to consider revenue management analysis with the 
presence of switching fee as a source of ancillary revenue for firms.  
I consider a monopoly firm that sequentially delivers a high-price service and a low-price 
service over two periods. The price gap between two periods triggers demand leakage, 
which is based on demand sensitivity to price. In this study, I assume customers switch 
from the high-price period to the low-price period. For example, when prices drop for a 
flight, ticket holders compare the difference between the prices of the original (first) 
ticket and the subsequent (secondary) ticket, plus the switching fee. If a ticket holder 
decides to change the date and the price difference is acceptable based on his or her 
criteria, he or she pays the fee. The cost of switching is added to the secondary ticket 
price and increases the total expected cost of the ticket. I assume customers generally 
decide to switch because they are price-sensitive. They track prices to find the best rate 
(Gorin et al. 2012), since they are aware that firms are adjusting prices on everyday items 
several times a day. In addition to this monetary incentive, in many situations, such as 
illness, rescheduled meetings and family trips, passengers change their travel 
arrangements without any monetary benefits. I consider all of these personal or carrier 
obligations as non-monetary incentives. In contrast to the situation in this essay, I will 
isolate time uncertainty as the different motivation behind switching fee in Essay 3, i.e., 
in Essay 2 the model captures those customers who change regardless of switching fee, 
but in Essay 3, customers only change due to plan change. Investigating the impact both 
incentives have on the behaviour of ticket holders as well as waiting list customers, I 
analyze how a firm should design a switching fee to maximize total revenue over two 
periods. With reference to switching fees, I later numerically illustrate how firms should 
update markdown pricing strategies, as well.  
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The main contributions of this paper are highlighted in the following points. Firstly, I 
demonstrate that the uncertainty in switching behaviour of customers drives the firm’s 
optimal switching policy. When this uncertainty increases, the firm should impose a 
higher switching fee. Secondly, I present that the optimal switching fee is increasing in 
resource prices. Thirdly, my numerical analysis demonstrates that by increasing the 
capacity size of the low-price service, the firm can impose a higher switching fee and 
collect more revenue. Finally, I observe that when a firm faces higher demands, it 
imposes a lower switching rate on average, but on a larger switching ticket holder 
population. This ultimately generates higher revenue for the firm.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
There are some streams of research that relate to this work. The demand leakage and 
fencing customers between market segments, by imposing a switching fee, have been 
studied in literature (see Zhang & Bell (2012) and references therein). The switching fee 
in this study can be seen as a time-based market segmentation mechanism in which a firm 
differentiates customers based on their rights to change the time of their consumption.  
A more closely related study that considers customers’ flexibility on consumption by 
designing a partial refundable fee is Gallego & Sahin (2010) in which customers pay a 
smaller up-front payment to have the right to cancel their tickets. The authors verify that 
partially refundable tickets result in a higher consumer surplus than low-to-high pricing 
based on non-refundable and fully refundable fares. Partially refundable fares are also 
socially optimal. My article has the same motivation: paying a small fee to gain the right 
on one aspect of the service consumption. However, compared with the previous study 
where the customers pay the fee to have a right to cancel the consumption, in my model, 
customers pay the fee to change the consumption time.  
Many assumptions of my framework, such as the firm's sequentially decreasing pricing 
policy, customers arrivals in the market, and resource capacity rating, follow Liu & Ryzin 
(2008), and the related literature in capacity rationing, including Xie & Shugan (2001), 
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and Nasiry & Popescu (2012). Alternatively, I consider two extensions: first, I allow the 
capacity rationing over two resources with a distinct demand for both resources. Second, 
I assume a stochastic switching behaviour for ticket holders.  
In addition to switching and cancellation fees, airlines also collect revenue from add-on 
services and auxiliary items such as luggage fees or onboard snacks and beverages 
purchases (for a classification of ancillary services please check Vinod & Moore 2009). 
The idea of generating supplementary revenue from these services/items has been 
highlighted in revenue management literature. Two papers are motivated by charging 
baggage fees: Allon et al. (2011) and Shulman & Gengu (2012). These studies consider 
how a firm should offer an ancillary service (baggage delivery) along with the main 
service. Although this study belongs to the ancillary revenue stream of research, it 
differentiates itself from the above studies by focusing on ancillary fees, such as 
switching fee and not add-on services or auxiliary items. 
3.3 Model 
A monopoly firm delivers two comparable services with corresponding capacities 
(resources) Ci and corresponding prices pi, i = 1,2, where p1 ≥ p2. For example, consider 
an airline operating weekly flights from Toronto to New York, where there is a ‘sale’ 
period (week) for flights in week 2. I normalize capacity size in the first period to 1, i.e., 
C1 =1, and consider demand to be continuous. The market sizes (potential demand) in 
each period are distinct and both consist of a large customer population. The booking 
system is sequential and planned over two booking periods such that the firm first 
accommodates the demand of service 1 (in booking period 1), and then accommodates 
the demand of service 2 (in booking period 2). This policy triggers demand leakage from 
period 1 to period 2. Unmet demand leaves the market at the end of each period and the 
service of resources 1 and 2 are delivered sequentially after the two booking periods. The 
firm maximizes total revenue over two periods by choosing the switching fee at the 
beginning of period 1.  
The sequence of events is as follows: At the beginning of period 1, the firm announces p1 
and the switching fee, ps. The firm observes the demand for resource 1, D1, and 
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accommodates it fully when D1 ≤ 1, and partially when D1 > 1. At the beginning of period 
2, the firm announces p2 and observes demand for resource 2, D2, plus a demand leakage 
from market 1 to market 2. To focus mainly on the impact of switching customers on 
firm’s revenue and to keep the analysis tractable, I assume the excess demand (waiting 
list) of resource 1 and 2 leave the market at the end of each period.17 Notice that, I am 
considering a deterministic demand setting in order to isolate the effect from the 
switching fee, but one can consider it as an average or expected demand. Figure 5 
demonstrates various demand streams and Figure 6 represents the sequence of events.  
 
Figure 5: Demand streams in two booking periods 
In this study, the demand leakage accounts for switching demand, Ds, which represents 
the switching ticket holders; a portion of period 1 ticket holders who prefer to switch 
from resource 1 to resource 2. The higher the fee, the lower the switching portion of 
ticket holders between resource 1 and resource 2 (and vice versa). Also, I assume this 
switching proportion can be random to capture the uncertainty associated with the 
behaviour of switching customers. This uncertainty is generated from schedule changes 
or other personal circumstances of ticket holders, especially business travelers.  
Considering the two above assumptions, I denote switching rate (proportion) by Θ, which 
is defined as follows: 
Θ = 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) 𝜀 
                                                 
17
 In addition to other extensions, in the third essay of this thesis, I will include the waiting list customers. 
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where θ(ps) is a continuously differentiable from 0 to A and decreasing general function 
and ε is a  price independent random variable defined on the range [0,1], with cumulative 
distribution function F(.) and the probability density function f(.)18. In addition, I assume, 
𝑑2𝜃
𝑑𝑝𝑠
2 ≤ 0, since most of switching customers are business travelers who are less sensitive 
to switching rate variations at low values. In order to assure that positive switching 
demand is possible for some range of ps, I require θ(A) = 0, i.e., A represents a critical 
threshold of ps at which the switching rate vanishes, where 0 << A. A reasonable level for 
A is p1 since any switching fee greater than p1 motivates ticket holders to forfeit their 
ticket and join D2 without paying the switching fee. 
θ(ps) denotes the switching rate between resource 1 and resource 2 without uncertainty. I 
would like to highlight that the term ‘rate’ represents the ‘proportion’ of ticket holders. If 
a switching customer successfully purchases a unit of capacity in market 2, he or she pays 
p2 + ps and is reimbursed p1. Otherwise, the ticket holder keeps the original ticket. The 
switching demand is defined by: 
𝐷𝑠  = 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) 𝜀 min(1, 𝐷1)  
 
 
Figure 6: The sequence of events 
                                                 
18
 I define ε to capture the uncertainty in switching behaviour using the setting in Petruzzi and Dada 
[1999]. The multiplication implies the independence of monetary and non-monetary incentives as well. 
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In this study, I assume that, when a resource is insufficient to satisfy demand, the limited 
supply is rationed based on the first-come-first-served practice. Also, all switching 
customers and original demands are arrived randomly during the booking period. The 
accommodation level19, denoted by q, can be given by the ratio of available capacity in 
period 2, C2, to the total demand in this period, 𝐷2 + 𝐷𝑠, namely, 
                                     𝑞(𝑝𝑠) = {
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝐶2
𝐷2+𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝜀𝐷1
, 1) , 𝐷1 < 1
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝐶2
𝐷2+𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝜀
, 1) , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                              (1) 
Since C2 can be lower than the total demand in period 2, in the above equation, a 
minimum function is considered to ensure 0 < q ≤ 1. Notice when D1 < 1, the total 
demand in period 2 is 𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝜀𝐷1, and when D1 ≥ 1, the total demand in this period is 
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝜀. The above formula is derived from these bases and consistent with the 
definition of accommodation level in Liu and van Ryzin (2008). 
There exists a relationship between the switching rate of period-1 customers, Θ, and the 
accommodation level at period-2 resource, q. A lower switching rate indicates a higher 
accommodation level for this resource (and vice versa). There exists a unique threshold 
on Θ, denoted by Θ̂𝑞, such that Ds + D2 = C2. In other words, when Θ ≤ Θ̂𝑞, q = 1 and all 
period 2 customers are accommodated, and when Θ > Θ̂𝑞, q < 1 and period 2 customers 
face capacity rationing, Θ̂𝑞 is solved for Θ based on the following equation: 
Θ̂𝑞 =
{
 
 
0,                                                   𝑖𝑓 𝐶2  ≤ 𝐷2 
𝐶2 −𝐷2
𝐷1
,                 𝑖𝑓 𝐷1 ≤ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷2 < 𝐶2
𝐶2 − 𝐷2,                                        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
I assume there is no demand leakage from market 2 to market 1 since customers mostly 
look forward to transferring their demand, and a service with a higher price would not be 
                                                 
19
 Note that the term “accommodation level” is different from the common term in airline industry, “load 
factor”. Load factor for a single flight can be calculated by dividing the number of passengers by the 
number of seats. Accommodation level evaluates the operational success in terms of demand, and load 
factor evaluates the operational success in terms of capacity. 
73 
 
attractive, in general, to low-price customers. To focus on switching behaviour and to 
keep the model parsimonious, I prevent leakage from the low-price period to the high-
price period. 
The total revenue for the firm is the original revenue for two resources plus the switching 
revenue: 
Π(𝑝𝑠) = 𝑝1𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1) + 𝑝2𝐷2𝑞(𝑝𝑠) + (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1)Θ𝑞(𝑝𝑠)        (2) 
where q(ps) is given by equation (1). The first term in (2), , denotes the 
revenue collected in period 1. The next two following terms in (2) denote revenues 
collected in period 2, i.e., the second term,
 
𝑝2𝐷2𝑞(𝑝𝑠), represents the revenue from the 
original demand for period 2, and the third term, (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1)Θ𝑞(𝑝𝑠), 
represents the revenue from switching customers. Notice that in (2), the capacity size of 
resource 1, C1, is represented by number 1, and the capacity size of resource 2, C2, is 
embedded in 𝑞(𝑝𝑠). Also, since demand of resource 1, D1, is deterministic, the minimum 
function, 𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1), is constant as well. I denote the optimal switching fee by 𝑝𝑠
∗. 
3.4 Analysis of the Optimal Switching Rate in Symmetrical 
Case 
I first consider the symmetrical case, in which the sizes of two resources are constant 
over time, i.e., . Later, I relax this assumption and study the impact of 
asymmetric capacities in two periods. I also assume D2 > D1. This assumption implies 
that, since the price drops in the second period, the demand for the second period is 
higher than the demand in the first period when the potential markets are independent and 
equal in size. Next, I consider the firm’s optimal decision, 𝑝𝑠
∗. 
Defining  
𝑧 =
1 − 𝐷2
𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
 
the accommodation level can be simplified as follows: 
p1 min 1, D1( )
121  CC
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𝑞(𝑝𝑠) = {
                                          1, 𝜀 < 𝑧
1
𝐷2 +𝑚𝑖𝑛(1, 𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝜀
, 𝜀 ≥ 𝑧
 
The expected revenue can be formulated based on (1) for three cases:  
• When D1 ≤ 1, and D2 ≤ 1, it be given by, namely: 
𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)] = ∫ (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
+     ∫
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢 + 𝑝2𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢        (3) 
The above equation depends on θ(ps), as well as f(.). The first integral represents a firm’s 
expected revenue when the accommodation level is one, i.e., the available capacity in 
period 2 is higher than total demand in this period. Also, the second integral represents a 
firm’s expected revenue when the accommodation level is lower than one, i.e., the 
available capacity in period 2 is lower than total demand in this period. Notice that the 
terms inside the first integrals, (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠) and  
((𝑝𝑠+𝑝2−𝑝1)𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢+𝑝2𝐷2)
𝐷2+𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
, are 
derived from equation (2). These terms represent firm’s revenue function in this equation 
for un-capacitated and capacitated cases, respectively. In this case, the population of 
switching customers is represented by 𝐷1𝜃. 
• When D1 ≤ 1, and D2 > 1, the expected revenue is given by: 
𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)] = ∫
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢 + 𝑝2𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
1
0
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 
Notice that, in this case, the accommodation level is always lower than 1. Also, 
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
<
0, therefore, the first integral in (3) vanishes and the second integral in (3) is simplified as 
presented above.  
• When D1 > 1, and D2 > 1, the expected revenue is given by: 
75 
 
𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)] = ∫
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢 + 𝑝2𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
1
0
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 
In this case, the population of switching customers is represented by 𝜃. Next, I study the 
properties of optimal switching fee under stochastic switching behaviour. 
Proposition 1  The optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, exists and is unique. 
I would like to highlight that the existence and uniqueness of optimal switching fee hold 
for all three cases of D1 and D2. Next, I present how to derive the optimal switching fee 
for two following cases of D2, D2 ≤ 1, and D2 > 1. 
Proposition 2A  If 𝐷2 ≤ 1, the optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, is the solution to the following 
equation: 
[(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)]∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢
+ ∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0 
Proposition 2B  If 𝐷2 > 1, the optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, is the solution to the following 
equation: 
∫ (
min(1, 𝐷1)𝑢
𝐷2 +min(1, 𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
0
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2 +min(1,𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0 
 
The optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, satisfies above equations, which depends on θ(ps), as well 
as f(.). Next, I study the relationship between demand and the optimal switching fee,
 
𝑝𝑠
∗. 
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Corollary 1  The optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, is increasing in D1 and D2.  
When D1 increases, it generates a larger ticket-holder population for flight 1 and a larger 
population of switching customers accordingly. Therefore, the firm can charge a higher 
switching fee. When D2 increases, however, the switching customers have to compete for 
flight 2 tickets with more flight 2 customers, thus intensifying the competition among 
customers for this flight. Consequently, the firm can set a higher switching fee to 
discourage customers to switch in order to decrease intensity of competition. In general, 
Corollary 1 demonstrates that when facing higher demands, the firm allows a lower 
switching rate on average, but on a larger switching ticket holder population. This 
ultimately generates higher revenue for the firm. Next, I examine how the optimal 
switching fee is affected by the original and markdown price, p1 and p2. 
Proposition 3   The optimal switching fee is decreasing in markdown price p2 and 
increasing in original price p1.     
When the price of a resource increases, switching customers should pay a higher fee for 
switching from this resource to another resource. This can be addressed by a higher cost 
of losing customers for a more pricy resource. However, as the markdown price goes up, 
they pay a lower switching fee, since the price gap between the two resources goes down. 
Notice that one may argue that switching to a more valuable resource should be more 
costly for customers. Proposition 3, however, does not support this argument. Next, I 
examine how the optimal switching fee is affected by size of resources. 
Proposition 4   The optimal switching fee is decreasing in C1 (or C2).     
Notice that I normalize the capacity C1 and C2 to 1. By increasing the capacity size, 
which is the unit of analysis, D1 and D2 will be lower. In the next section, I numerically 
analyze this result further. 
In this study, I analyze how a firm should manage its revenue when facing a stochastic 
switching rate with a capacity constraint. One may wonder, under a more simplified and 
classic scenario of a deterministic switching rate without capacity constraint, which 
switching fee maximizes a firm’s total revenue. For this case, define, 𝑝𝑠
𝐷𝑈, the optimal 
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switching fee which maximizes solely deterministic and un-capacitated revenue, given 
by:  
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝐷1 
Note that, under a deterministic and un-capacitated case, the first and the second terms of 
a firm’s revenue function, given by (2), are constant and independent of a switching fee. 
Next, I study the properties of this optimal switching fee and the relationship between 
optimal switching prices under different scenarios.  
Proposition 5A  𝑝𝑠
∗ ≥ 𝑝𝑠
𝐷𝑈.  
Proposition 5B  The asymptotic limits of the optimal switching fee with respect to 
demand is given by 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝐷2→0
 𝑝𝑠
∗ = 𝑝𝑠
𝐷𝑈and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝐷2→∞
 𝑝𝑠
∗ = 𝐴.   
The limited available resources, as well as the uncertainty in ticket holders’ switching 
behaviours, drive the firm to impose a higher switching fee. Therefore, the optimal 
switching fee in the stochastic and capacitated case is greater than the deterministic and 
un-capacitated case. Next, I study the value of the optimal switching fee when the 
demand in the second period (D2) increases to the highest point or decreases to the lowest 
point. Proposition 5 simplifies the previous results for the extreme cases of D2. Notice 
that when D2 approaches zero, there is no limit on capacity allocation. Moreover, the 
uncertainty in switching behaviour becomes less critical for the firm. Therefore, the 
stochastic capacitated problem can be simplified to the deterministic un-capacitated case. 
I would like to highlight that Proposition 5 is in agreement with Corollary 1. When 
demand goes to infinity, the firm can impose the highest possible fee; however, the 
optimal switching fee never goes higher than A, since imposing any price higher than A 
does not generate extra benefit for the firm. 
In Proposition 5, I compare the optimal switching fee for a deterministic un-capacitated 
case with a stochastic capacitated case. This result makes one wonder what happens in 
the other two remaining cases, i.e., deterministic capacitated case and stochastic un-
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capacitated case? Under the stochastic un-capacitated case, the firm’s revenue function 
given by (2) can be simplified as: 
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝐷1𝜀 
Notice that the firm's expected revenue is given by: 
∫ (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1
1
0
𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝐷1 
which is equal to the firm’s revenue under a deterministic un-capacitated case. Now, 
consider a deterministic capacitated case. When 𝑞(𝑝𝑠) = 1, the firm's revenue function 
is: 
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)min(1, 𝐷1) 
and when 𝑞(𝑝𝑠) < 1, the firm's revenue function is: 
𝑝2 +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)min(1, 𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
𝐷2 +min(1, 𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
 
Note that the denominator of the ratio in the above function is decreasing in switching 
fee, and the numerator of the ratio represents the firm’s revenue function under a 
deterministic un-capacitated case. This implies that the optimal switching fee under a 
deterministic capacitated case is higher than the optimal switching fee under a 
deterministic un-capacitated case. Considering all four cases, the optimal switching fee is 
increasing in uncertainty of switching behaviour only for a capacitated case, while, 
ceteris paribus, this fee is always higher under a capacitated case versus an un-
capacitated case. 
3.5 Pricing with Switching Fees - Numerical Illustration 
In this section, I study two cases as follows. In the first example, I numerically find the 
optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, for a specific problem. Then I extend my findings by analyzing 
how, for the same problem, the firm should make decisions that jointly treat its 
markdown pricing policy p2 (given the original price p1), and the switching fee, ps. 
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3.5.1 Example 1: Optimal Switching Fee 
In the first analysis, I assume the ticket prices in the first and the second periods, p1 and 
p2, are exogenous (p1 and p2 can also be seen as the optimal prices to Equation (2) 
without including switching revenues). Also, I assume demand in each period is given 
by: , for . 
The sequence of analysis is as follows: Given , , p1, and p2, the firm selects the 
optimal switching fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, to maximize its revenue, which is specified by Equation (2). I 
study two scenarios for ε: (1) a deterministic case in which ε = 0.5 and (2) and extreme 
stochastic case in which ε follows a Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5. Note that, in both 
cases, E(ε) = 0.5, to analyze the impact of uncertainty in switching behaviour of ticket 
holders. 
With respect to the switching rate, I consider the following:  
𝜃(𝑝𝑠) = 0.8 − 0.0025 𝑝𝑠. 
Notice that in the above setting, when the switching fee is zero, the expected switching 
rate is E(ε) 𝜃(0) = 0.5 × 0.8 = 0.4. Also, for a high switching fee (for example above 
$300), the expected switching rate is negligible. The choice of the above coefficients 
depends on these bases. In this analysis, I also study the impact of the size of capacity on 
joint pricing decisions for specific values of  and . The following analysis reports 
on 17 cases, spanned by 
(𝐶1, 𝐶2) ∈
{
(50, 50), (100, 100), (200, 200), (300, 300), (400, 400), (500, 500), (50, 450), (100, 400),
(200, 300), (300, 200), (400, 100), (450, 50), (250, 100), (250, 400), (100, 250), (400, 250), (250, 250)
}.  
The magnitudes of C1 and C2 belong to the range [50, 500], and the ratios of C1 and C2 
belong to [1/9, 9], which covers a sufficiently wide range of possible values of C1 and C2. 
I find this selection of parameters to be sufficient for analyzing the firm's switching fee 
pricing decision, 𝑝𝑠
∗, based on (2). Notice that the first six cases demonstrate a symmetric 
case; the second six cases demonstrate a situation in which the sum of capacities equals 
ii pD  500 2,1i
1C 2C
1C 2C
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500; the next four cases represent a situation in which one capacity is 250 and the second 
is at a relatively low or a high level; and the last case represents a centre point. The 
results of the 17 cases are summarized in Table 6.  
I observe that the numerical example also demonstrates some of the results discussed 
previously. For example, consistent with Proposition 1, a unique optimal switching fee 
exists for all 17 cases. Moreover, as mentioned in Proposition 5, the optimal switching 
fee never goes lower than the optimal switching fee under deterministic and un-
capacitated case. Notice that the firm’s revenue under the deterministic and un-
capacitated case is: 
Table 5: Optimal switching fee for two cases of ε: left (ε = 0.5) and right (ε follows a 
Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5). 
 
 
Π(𝑝𝑠) = 𝑝𝑠(0.8 − 0.0025 𝑝𝑠)𝐷1 
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which is maximized at 𝑝𝑠
∗𝐷𝑈 = 160. Besides, as discussed by Proposition 3, the optimal 
switching fee is increasing in markdown price p2 and original price p1. Finally, the 
optimal switching fee is decreasing in size of capacity. I also observe the following 
results: 
First, I find that, in most cases, the firm sets the switching fee higher than the price 
difference between two periods. The only exception is when the size of the 
first resource is extremely low and the size of the second resource is extremely high. 
Such pricing policy prevents customers from switching solely for monetary incentive. 
When ticket holders switch, however, for non-monetary reasons, monetary incentives still 
paly a role in the switching behavoiur. These results show that, in most cases, switching 
cutomers pay significantly higher prices in total (p2 + ps) than the original ticket price, p1.  
I also observe that the switching fee increases as the uncertainty in the switching 
behaviour (standard deviation of ε) increases. The firm sets a higher switching fee to 
offset the cost of uncertainty in customer behaviour. Note that this result is partially 
discussed in Proposition 3A. Finally, the firm’s expected revenue significantly depends 
on the switching fee (Figure 7). Changing the switching fee can lead to approximately 
10% variation in the firm’s expected revenue. This impact is more significant when 
capacity is adequate.  
 
Dp = p1 - p2( )
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Figure 7: Firm's expected revenue, E(π), left (ε = 0.5) and right (ε follows a Bernoulli 
distribution with p = 0.5). 
 
3.5.2 Example 2: Joint Optimal Switching Fee and Markdown Price 
To focus better on the dynamics between original prices and switching fee, in this 
numerical example, I consider an endogenous demand setting for the markdown resource. 
I assume the ticket price in the first period, p1, is exogenous; p1 can also be seen as the 
optimal price to Equation (2) considering the first period exclusively.  
The sequence of analysis is as follows: Given C1, C2, and p1, the firm selects the optimal 
price of the second resource, , and switching fee, , to maximize its revenue, which is 
specified by Equation (2). Notice that updating the price of the second period, , also 
changes the demand in the second period, D2. I analyze the firm's joint pricing decisions 
 based on (2). The results of the 17 cases are summarized in Table 7. I observe 
the following results: 
First, in some case the switching fee increases as the uncertainty in the switching 
behaviour (standard deviation of ε) increases. This result is different from Corollary 2. To 
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hedge against uncertainty in customer behaviour in these cases, the firm allocates more 
resources to the original demand of the second resource by setting a lower markdown 
price, and allocates fewer resources to switching customers by setting a higher switching 
fee. Note that in this scenario, the firm benefits from a stable demand (D2) to deal with 
the unstable demand (𝜃). 
Also, I notice that a higher capacity size results in a lower price , which is intuitive; a 
more available resource should be priced lower in the market, and a less available 
resource priced higher. Next, I realize that the switching fee decreases in C2 and increases 
in C2. These findings are also intuitive and consistent with previous findings.  
Table 7: Optimal pricing for two cases of ε: left (ε = 0.5) and right (ε follows a 
Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.5). 
 
 
Finally, I observe that the optimal switching fee is lower when it is set jointly with the 
markdown price. When the firm updates only switching fees, it cannot generate extra 
2p
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revenue from the original demand of the second resource and, therefore, must deal solely 
with switching customers in order to generate similar revenues. These dynamics push the 
firm to impose a higher switching fee. 
3.6 Discussion 
This study focuses on the benefits of managing revenues from switching customers, a 
phenomenon having recently becomes very significant for many industries such as 
airlines. As discussed, managing ancillary revenue not only supports a firm with a narrow 
profit margin, but also could improve customer relationship through providing more 
options for their consumption. Many industries, such as consumer electronic retail, 
provide money-back guarantees to customers, even over future dates (for a certain time 
frame). This practice is used as a marketing tool to generate higher sales.20 In this study, I 
consider a similar scenario in which a hypothetical airline might want to use marketing 
tool as a marketing strategy to attract price-sensitive customers. The proposed case has 
already been implemented by some airlines. As airlines are exposed to various marketing 
and pricing strategies, we would not be surprised to see airlines also offering price-
guarantees across dates and flights. This study contributes by highlighting some of the 
operational aspects to take into consideration for these marketing and pricing strategies.  
I considered a monopoly firm that sequentially announces prices over two periods. The 
customers track prices and this behaviour triggers demand leakage between two periods. 
The firm seeks to find the optimal switching rate, but the existence of original demand 
complicates the analysis for the firm. It is not clear whether the firm should allow a low 
or a high accommodation rate for switching customers. I demonstrate that the uncertainty 
in switching behaviour of its customers drives the firm’s optimal switching policy. When 
this uncertainty increases, the firm should impose a higher switching fee. Moreover, the 
optimal switching fee is increasing in the price of resource.     
                                                 
20
 URL: http://www.nytimes.com/allbusiness/AB4353479_primary.html; accessed 2015–10–10. 
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The managerial insights are that firms could generate higher revenues by segmenting the 
market and designing ancillary fees for each segment separately. For example, business 
travelers have a higher switching rate for non-monetary reasons than do other passengers. 
Airlines can assess their prices according to their estimate of the likelihood that 
customers from each market segment will change itinerary. The market can also be 
segmented based on seasons or geographic regions, and so on. Firms predicting the 
behavior of customers should forecast customer reaction to ancillary fees, as well—even 
more critical because firms need to take into consideration long-term market competition. 
A strict pricing policy regarding switching and cancelation might send customers to a 
competitor. This may partly explain why some airlines, such as Southwest Airlines, have 
been successful in acquiring higher market shares by designing more suitable ancillary 
fees for customers.21  
Finally, I would like to emphasize that firms should not follow pricing strategies that sub-
maximize their ancillary revenues. Although some airlines are reportedly more successful 
in generating higher ancillary revenues, these revenues should be considered as a portion 
of total revenue structure and be managed for a higher total profit and market 
performance. 
This study on change fees can be extended to answer future research questions. For 
example, how are the results affected by differences between duopoly and monopoly 
markets? What if customers partially behave strategically? Many ex-ante asymmetric 
firms occasionally adjust these fares to position themselves advantageously in market 
competitions. Combining data sets from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 
future studies could investigate under which scenarios modifying ancillary fares would be 
detrimental or beneficial to firms. An extension can also consider multiple fare classes 
where higher fare classes have no switching fee. This is similar to Gallego and Sahin 
(2010) where they consider non-refundable, partial refundable and full refundable tickets. 
Finally, I would like to emphasize that the change fees also generate revenue for the price 
                                                 
21
 URL: http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/08/20/southwests-expanding-international-
service-will-lift-its-growth-in-the-coming-years; Accessed 201–10–10. 
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tracking industries, such as Yapta. Future research might explore how airlines should 
manage their relationship with these parties, and how the revenue that is generated 
through these services should be shared with these price-tracking parties. 
I would like to highlight some of the other industries for which this model and results 
might apply. For example, banks or cellphone providers experience an identical problem 
in managing their switching revenues when homeowners decide to change their mortgage 
plans or when cellphone users change their mobile plans. I would like to highlight that 
above industries does not have similar capacity contrints discussed here for airline, but 
the results extend to these industries since I consider the non-capacitatated case as well. 
In all of these cases, firms should impose an appropriate fee to find the best allocation of 
their limited resources to different streams of demand, keeping in mind that the related 
ancillary revenues should be collected to maximize their total profit.  
 
 
3.7 Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The total revenue is given by equation (2) is a function of D1 and D2. There are there 
cases as follows: 
- Case I (D1 ≤ 1 and D2 ≤ 1) In this case, the expected revenue is given by: 
𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)] = ∫ (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
+     ∫
((𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢 + 𝑝2𝐷2)
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 
Deriving the first derivative of above function with respect to ps and using Leibniz 
integral rule, I have the following results:  
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𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
= [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)]∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢
+∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
= 0 
where 𝜃′(𝑝𝑠) is the derivative of 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) with respect to ps. (Considering 
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(∫ 𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃)
𝑏(𝜃)
𝑎(𝜃)
𝑑𝑥) format for Leibniz integral rule, for the first integral, for 
example, I have the following terms: 
𝑥 = 𝑢, 𝜃 = 𝑝𝑠, 𝑎(𝜃) = 0, 𝑏(𝜃) =
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
, 𝑓(𝑥, 𝜃) =  (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢𝑓(𝑢). I 
use similar analogy for next Leibniz integral rule calculations.  
 
- Case II (D1 ≤ 1 and D2 > 1) In this case, the expected revenue is given by: 
𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)] =  ∫
((𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢 + 𝑝2𝐷2)
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
1
0
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 
Deriving the first derivative of above function with respect to ps and using Leibniz 
integral rule, I have the following results:  
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
= ∫ (
𝐷1𝑢
𝐷2+𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
0
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠−𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2+𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0. 
 
- Case III (D1 > 1 and D2 > 1) In this case, the expected revenue is given by: 
𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)] = ∫
((𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢 + 𝑝2𝐷2)
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
1
0
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 
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Deriving the first derivative of above function with respect to ps and using Leibniz 
integral rule, I have the following results:  
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
= ∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
0
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0 
The three above cases are summarized in Proposition 2.  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
I assume if there is more than one switching fee, which generates the same amount of 
revenue for a firm in equation (2), the firm always prefers the lowest one. Through doing 
this, the firm can motivates more customers to purchase a ticket. 
Considering the results in Proposition 2, I calculate the limits of the first derivative of the 
expected revenue with respect to ps, when it goes to zero and infinity. Based on 
Proposition 2, when D2 > 1, 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
= ∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2 +min(1, 𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
0
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2 +min(1,𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
= 0 
Note that: 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→0
 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
> 0 since 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→0
 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) > 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→0
 𝜃′(𝑝𝑠) < 0. Also,  𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→𝐴
 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
< 0 
since 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→𝐴
 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) = 0. As 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 is a continuous function, this implies that there exist at 
least a ps, such that 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 = 0. 
 
𝜃(𝑝𝑠) is non-negative and decreasing in ps and 𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) is non-positive and decreasing in 
ps. Therefore, (
𝑢𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
𝐷2+min(1,𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) is decreasing in ps since the first derivative of this ratio 
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with respect to is (
𝑢𝜃′(𝑝𝑠)(𝐷2+min(1,𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢(1−𝑢))
(𝐷2+𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1,𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢)2
) ≤ 0. Also, (
𝑢(𝑝𝑠−𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
(𝐷2+min(1,𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢)2
) is 
decreasing in ps, since the numerator of the ratio, 𝑢(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2, is increasing in 
absolute value in ps, but the denominator of the ratio, (𝐷2 +min(1, 𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢)
2, is 
decreasing in ps. Therefore, ∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2+min(1,𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
0
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠−𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2+min(1,𝐷1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 is 
also decreasing in ps. This implies that there is a unique ps, such that 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 = 0. 
When D2 ≤ 1,  
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
= [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)]∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢
+∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
= 0 
Note that: 
𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→0
 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
> 0 since 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→0
 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) > 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→0
 𝜃′(𝑝𝑠) < 0. Also,  𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→𝐴
 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
< 0 
since 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑝𝑠→𝐴
 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) = 0. Notice that the first integral is zero when 𝑝𝑠 → 𝐴. As the 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 
is a continuous function, this implies that there exist at least a ps, such that 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 = 0. 
In previous case, I have already shown that the second integral in 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 is decreasing 
in ps. Now I will show that the first integral is decreasing in ps as well. 
 
𝜃(𝑝𝑠) is non-negative and decreasing in ps and 𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) is non-positive and decreasing in 
ps. Therefore, ∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢 and [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)] are decreasing in ps. 
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As a result, [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)] ∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢 is also decreasing in ps. 
This implies that there is a unique ps, such that 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 = 0.  
 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
Based on Proposition 2, in a general case, 𝑝𝑠
∗ is given by: 
[(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)]∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢
+ ∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0 
In this equation, 𝑝𝑠
∗ is an implicit function of D2. Lets call the above integral as 𝑅′. Notive 
that the optimal switching fee is the solution of the implicit function 𝑅′, i.e., 𝑅′= 0.  
Using implicit differentiation, the derivative of this function with respect to D2 is given 
by: 
𝑑𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝐷2
= −
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝐷2
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 
[Proof of above equation. We have 𝑅′(𝑝𝑠
∗, 𝐷2) = 0. Therefore, 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝐷2
𝑑𝐷2
𝑑𝐷2
+
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝐷2
= 0, 
which simples to: 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝐷2
+
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝐷2
= 0]. 
Using Leibniz integral rule, I have the following results:  
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝐷2
= (
1 − 𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
) (
1 − 𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
) 𝑓 (
1 − 𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
) [(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)(1 − 𝐷2) − 𝑝2𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)] 
+∫ (
𝑢
(𝐷2+𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢)3
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠)(𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢) + (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2 − (𝑝𝑠 −
𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢)𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 > 0.  
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Now, Based on Proposition 1, 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝𝑠
< 0. Therefore, 
𝑑𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝐷2
> 0.  
For the same logic, I have the following: 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝐷1
= (
1 − 𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
)(
𝜃(𝑝𝑠)(1 − 𝐷2)
(𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠))
2 )𝑓 (
1 − 𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
) [(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)(1 − 𝐷2) − 𝑝2𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)] 
+∫ (
𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
(𝐷2+𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢)3
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠)(𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢)(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)(𝐷2 − 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢))𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 > 0.  
Now, Based on Proposition 1, 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝𝑠
< 0. Therefore, 
𝑑𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝐷1
> 0.  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
The deterministic and un-capacitated switching revenue is given by:  
𝑅𝑈𝐶 = (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝐷1 
Therefore, 
𝜕𝑅𝑈𝐶
𝜕𝑝𝑠
=  (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝
𝑠
) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) and 𝑝𝑠
𝐷𝑈is the solution for this 
equation: 
(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝
𝑠
) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) = 0 
Notice that (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝
𝑠
) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠) is decreasing in 𝑝𝑠 since the second derivative 
with respect to 𝑝𝑠 is negative i.e.,  
2𝜃′(𝑝
𝑠
) + (𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′′(𝑝
𝑠
) < 0 
This implies that 𝑝𝑠
𝐷𝑈is the unique solution for the deterministic and un-capacitated 
switching revenue. Now, given that: 
 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
= [(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)] ∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢 + ∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2+𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
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Therefore, 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝐷→0
 
𝜕𝐸[Π(𝑝𝑠)]
𝜕𝑝𝑠
= 𝑝𝑠
𝐷𝑈. Since, 
𝑑𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝐷
> 0 based on Corollary 1, i.e., optimal 
switching fee is increasing in demand, therefore, 𝑝𝑠
∗ > 𝑝𝑠
∗𝐷𝑈.  
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Based on Proposition 2, in the general case, 𝑝𝑠
∗ is given by: 
[(𝑝𝑠 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠)]∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢
+ ∫ (
𝑢
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
(𝜃(𝑝𝑠) +
(𝑝𝑠 − 𝑝1)𝜃
′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2 + 𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 = 0 
In this equation, 𝑝𝑠
∗ is an implicit function of p1. Lets call the above integral as 𝑅′. Using 
implicit differentiation, the derivative of this function with respect to D2 is given by: 
𝑑𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝑝
1
= −
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝
1
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝𝑠
 
Using Leibniz integral rule, I have the following results:  
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝1
= −𝜃′(𝑝𝑠) ∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢 + ∫ (
𝜃′(𝑝𝑠)𝐷2
𝐷2+𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)𝑢
)
1
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 > 0.  
Now, Based on Proposition 1, 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝𝑠
< 0. Therefore, 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝1
> 0.  
For the same logic, I have the following: 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝2
= −𝜃′(𝑝𝑠) ∫ 𝑢𝑓(𝑢)
1−𝐷2
𝐷1𝜃(𝑝𝑠)
0
𝑑𝑢 < 0.  
Now, Based on Proposition 1, 
𝜕𝑅′
𝜕𝑝𝑠
< 0. Therefore, 
𝑑𝑝𝑠
∗
𝑑𝐷1
< 0.  
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Proof of Proposition 4 
I normalize the capacity C1 and C2 to 1. Therefore, by increasing the capacity, I have a 
lower demand in equation (2). Based on Corollary 1, the optimal switching fee is 
decreasing in size of capacities.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Managing Change Revenue with Presence of Time-
Uncertain Customers 
 
4.1 Introduction 
According to a recent survey by the travel website Airfarewatchdog of more than 6,100 
travelers, 38% of respondents picked the change and cancellation fee when asked to name 
the fee they most hated.22 Many travel weblogs and consumer review websites advise 
passengers on how to avoid paying these fees by carefully planning their travels ahead of 
time or by purchasing protective travel insurances. Despite all of these efforts by 
consumers to prevent extra charges, based on the latest data from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics,23 the airlines’ revenue generated in the first quarter of 2015 from 
cancellation and change fees increased more than 21% over the revenue generated during 
the same period in 2012.  
Firms gain incremental profit from charging change fees. Customers, however, respond 
strategically to change fees; that is, they are not certain about their future travel plans and 
they consider the risk and associated costs of having to make changes in their travel 
plans. Most of the change and cancellation fees are generated from ticket holders affected 
by external factors, such as personal matters, business meetings, illness, and so on.24 In 
contrast to the situation in Essay 2, I isolate time uncertainty as the different motivation 
behind switching fee in this essay, i.e., in Essay 2 the model captures those customers 
                                                 
22
 URL: http://www.latimes.com/travel/la-fi-mo-most-hated-passenger-charge-bag-fees-20140124-
story.html#axzz2s0EyY6er; accessed 2015-09-09. 
23
 URL: www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/subject_areas/airline_information/reservation_ 
cancellation_change_fees/index.html; accessed 2015-08-08. 
24
 URL: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204563304574318212311819146.html; 
accessed: 2015–8–8. 
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who change regardless of switching fee, but in Essay 3, customers only change due to 
plan change. Consider a traveler flying from Atlanta to Paris, who can purchase her ticket 
early and pay a lower airfare of $1,000, but she may still be uncertain about her future 
travel plan if she purchases her ticket early. She speculates that the ticket price will 
increase to $1,400 later. Furthermore, she anticipates that there is a 25% chance her travel 
plan will change in the future. When her uncertainty materializes close to the travel date, 
she may have to pay a change fee of $300 to rebook her ticket based on her final travel 
schedule. Although she receives a discount from purchasing early, her expected cost from 
purchasing early is 0.75 × $1,000 + 0.25 × ($1,000 + $400 + $300) = $1,175.  
In this chapter, I study the following research questions: What are the effects of imposing 
a change fees on travelers’ early purchase incentives? Although a higher change fee 
might discourage customers from purchasing tickets early, how can change fees be 
beneficial for the airline? How should airlines set the base ticket prices for flights after 
imposing a change fee? I explore how a firm should manage change fees and service 
prices to maximize revenue.  
I consider a monopolistic firm that offers two sequential services, Service 1 and Service 
2, over two periods. For example, consider the previous Atlanta to Paris flight, with a 
Friday departure and a Saturday departure. On Monday, only the Friday flight is available 
for purchase, but on Wednesday, both Friday and Saturday flights are available for 
purchase. The firm allows customers to change their initial service choice by paying a 
change fee; for example, a customer who bought the Friday flight on the Monday might 
on Wednesday change for the Saturday flight by paying a change fee (in addition to any 
incremental mark-up premium). In this paper, I investigate how the firm should maximize 
its revenue by selecting the best change fee. Customers are heterogeneous with respect to 
their willingness to pay for the service. Moreover, they should decide whether to 
purchase Service 1 early at a lower price or wait for Service 2 to prevent paying the 
change fee. However, they have type uncertainty; that is, at the beginning, they are not 
certain whether they will need Service 1 or Service 2. I model type uncertainty as the 
proportion of customers who will experience a change in demand from Service 1 to 
Service 2. Customers consider their type uncertainty, service price, premium mark-up 
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price and change fee when deciding to buy early or late. Without imposing any 
distributional assumptions, I demonstrate how a revenue-maximizing firm should select 
the change fee and how it should set the service price and the change fee jointly. I would 
like to highlight that I am looking at a single-leg flight, not considering a case with a 
return flight in this essay. Also, I do not consider a contingent plan depending on the 
customer’s eventually realized time preference since airlines do not consider these plans 
in practice. This might be in contrast with models in economics and organization theory 
where firms provides different pricing plans based on customers’ realized types. 
This paper makes the following contributions. First, I find that when customers are 
“almost” certain about their types in the future, low-valuations customers might also 
purchase the service, but if their type changes, they will not pay the change fee and mark-
up premium for Service 2. Second, when customers are not “very certain” about their 
types, I observe that only high-valuation customers purchase Service 1 in the first period. 
These results suggest that, in this case, the firm should select a relatively low change fee 
and incentivize all customers to purchase in period 1. This result may seem 
counterintuitive, but is anecdotally consistent with policies of industries that have 
comparatively small or negligible change fees, such as car rental (where customers more 
frequently change their travel plans). Third, although one might expect that by increasing 
the change fee the demand for Service 1 shrinks, I show that increasing the change fee up 
to a certain level leads to higher revenues for the firm. Finally, I demonstrate that when 
the firm sets the service price and the change fee simultaneously, the optimal service 
price is decreasing in the type uncertainty of customers. However, the optimal change fee 
is actually increasing in the type uncertainty of customers.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
In this section, I provide a review of relevant literature in strategic behaviour, valuation 
uncertainty and ancillary revenues in operations management and management science. 
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This work contributes to both the strategic customer behaviour research and 
type/valuation uncertainty literature by studying the interplay between customers’ 
strategic waiting decision and their type uncertainty. The literature that considers 
strategic customers includes Aviv and Pazgal (2008), Elmaghraby et al. (2008), Zhang 
and Cooper (2008), Su and Zhang (2008), and Cachon and Swinney (2009). These papers 
consider strategic waiting behaviour, but not valuation uncertainty. Cachon and Swinney 
(2009) show that retailers should order less when dealing with strategic consumers than 
with myopic customers. Su and Zhang (2008) study how various supply chain contracts 
can achieve quantity and price commitments. Considering two types of pricing strategies 
including a contingent markdown policy and preannounced fixed-discount policy, Aviv 
and Pazgal (2008) find out that a fixed-discount policy, in general, outperforms 
contingent pricing under strategic customer behaviour. Contrary to these studies, in this 
chapter, I consider consumers are not perfectly aware of their type. This uncertainty is an 
integral part of my model and is generated specifically by external factors, not firms’ 
pricing decisions. 
Customers’ strategic delay in purchasing due to valuation uncertainty is studied in the 
revenue management literature. Ozer and Phillips (2012) state that, when a customer 
plans to buy a ticket (for instance, for an art event that will take place in the next few 
months), she may not even be certain about her future personal situation, such as health, 
family issues, or mood. Anderson and Wilson (2003) indicate that use of revenue 
management without consideration of strategic customer behaviour results in 
significantly reduced revenues. Xie and Shugan (2001) and Dana (1998) analyze advance 
purchase discounts to motivate customers purchasing early. Other studies consider selling 
capacity options; for example, Gallego and Sahin (2010), Yu, Kapuscinski and Ahn 
(2005). These papers demonstrate that selling capacity options can improve revenues 
significantly over advance purchase discounts. Moreover, advance selling will be 
deployed only when capacity is not very scarce. Koenigsberg, Muller, and Vicassim 
(2008) prove that offering a last-minute discount is beneficial when customers are 
uncertain about whether such deals will be offered. Moreover, optimal prices should 
increase over the two periods. Savva and Papanastasiou (2014) develop a model 
integrating uncertainty in quality, where users wait reviews of others. They demonstrate 
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that this social learning interaction increases the ﬁrm's ex ante expected proﬁt. Dilme and 
Li (2014) consider a profit-maximizing monopolist seller with K identical goods to sell 
before a deadline. At each point of time, the seller posts a price and the quantity available 
but cannot commit to future offers. Over time, potential buyers with different reservation 
values enter the market. They show that prices decline smoothly over the time period 
between sales and jump up immediately after a transaction occurs. This chapter 
incorporates the results of some of these studies. However, I explicitly investigate how 
firms should manage ancillary revenues dealing with time-uncertain customers.  
Motivated by applications from apparel retailing, Liu and van Ryzin (2008) study a seller 
who deliberately under-stocks a product to create a shortage risk for customers. In their 
model, the seller pre-announces a single-markdown pricing policy over two periods: a 
premium in period 1 and a discounted price in period 2. As a result, under-stocking 
motivates high-valuation customers to purchase early at a premium price. Similar to this 
study, customers are heterogeneous with respect to their willingness to pay and are 
present at the store from the beginning all at once. Under these assumptions, authors 
present that with a sufficient large number of high-valuation customers in the market, it is 
optimal for the firm to have a rationing policy, otherwise, the firm should serve all 
customers at the discounted price. In this chapter, I consider two resources and an 
opportunity for customers to change between two resources by paying an ancillary fee. 
Moreover, in my setting, as presented by Gallego and Sahin (2010), an early discounted 
price is offered by airlines to motivate customers to purchase early. 
Gallego and Sahin (2010) consider the case in which valuation for a service is not fully 
realized until the end of the selling season. They consider a two-period model in which 
customers can purchase partially refundable tickets; that is, paying a fixed fee in period 1 
provides buyers the right to purchase the service at a lower price than the spot price in 
period 2. Gallego and Sahin (2010) highlight that partially refundable fares can be viewed 
as real options. In other words, purchasing a partially refundable fare pays buyers back 
when the realized valuations in period 2 are exceeding the spot price. Furthermore, 
Gallego and Sahin (2010) present that partially refundable fares are social optimal and 
significantly improve firms’ expected revenue over current pricing strategies, which are 
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mainly based on refundable and nonrefundable fares. My research differs in that I 
consider two services, and customers in this study have type uncertainty with respect to 
these services. I introduce a change fee that provides ticket holders the right to change 
their service. The change fee also gives an opportunity for firms to increase their revenue 
over a best pricing strategy, which is solely based on main service optimal pricing. 
 
4.3 Model Description 
A revenue-maximizing firm introduces a Service 1 (S1) in period 1, and Service 2 (S2) in 
period 2. Both services have a base price of p. Only S1 is available for purchase in period 
1. In period 2, both S1 and S2 are available for purchase and the firm allows customers 
who have bought S1 to change to service S2 by paying a change fee, ps. Both services are 
delivered sequentially after period 2. For example, consider an airline selling tickets on 
Monday and Wednesday for an Atlanta to Paris flight, with a Friday departure and a 
Saturday departure. On Monday customers can only buy airfare for a Friday departure, 
while on Wednesday customers can buy airfare for both Friday and Saturday departures. 
The firm charges an incremental mark-up premium Δp in period 2, Δp ≥ 0. The premium 
is applied to both S1 and S2 and represents the “cost” for offering services closer to the 
delivery date. The base price is exogenous in this chapter and I assume the firm is 
committed to the above pricing policy.  
The market consists of time-uncertain customers who originally seek service S1. 
However, in period 1, they are uncertain if they ultimately will need S1 or S2. In period 
2, they realize their true types. Here, I refer to type as to which service (S1 or S2) is 
needed by customers. Customers’ willingness-to-pay (or valuation) v for the service is 
distributed independently and identically with cumulative distribution function F(v), 
defined over the range [0, V], where V > p + Δp. In period 1, a customer chooses to either 
purchase S1 (ticket holders), or wait until period 2 to realize her type (waiting customer). 
The type of a customer follows a Bernoulli distribution with probability θ, where θ 
represents the probability that a customer no longer demands S1 but instead demands S2 
in period 2. This segment of customers with type change in period 2 represents those who 
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request a change in their travel dates because of personal or business matters. As a result, 
a customer expects to keep valuing S1 as before with probability 1 – θ. I consider a 
stylized setting in which all consumers have the same θ. Although one may consider that 
consumers may have different θ, here we can view θ as an average probability across all 
consumers. In period 2, all customers (ticket holders and waiting customers) realize their 
true types, and are divided into two groups based on their realized types. I assume θ, F(v), 
and Δp are common knowledge to both firm and customers from the beginning. I would 
like to highlight that in period 1, customers are aware that if their type will be changed in 
period 2, the firm will offer S2 in period 2.  
I consider a market that consists of a large customer population. All customers arrive at 
the beginning of period 1 and they have unit demand. I assume there is no limit on the 
service capacities for S1 and S2. In the ensuing analysis in this chapter, I normalize the 
size of market to 1. I would like to note the normalization of total potential demand does 
not change the conclusion of this chapter and it is not contrary to the above assumption 
that customers have unit demand; it only brings convenience in model development. 
Customers take into consideration service prices, premium, change fee, and the 
uncertainty associated with their type change when deciding to buy S1 in period 1, to 
wait until period 2 and buy S1 or S2 (depending on their realized type), or not to buy at 
all. I would like to highlight that in this essay, I consider cases where θ ≤ 0.5, this is, the 
primary focus of this study is S1 customers (not on S2 customers) and switching from S1 
to S2 and customers who are primary interested in S2 are not part of the model. A 
broader model would include a self-selection between two flights. Also, the firm can 
offer S2 to in period 1, but since θ ≤ 0.5, no customer is interested in buying S2 early. 
The firm seeks to maximize revenues by choosing the best change fee, while the 
customers maximize their expected utilities by choosing to buy S1 in period 1, waiting 
until period 2 to buy either S1 or S2, or not buying at all. The sequence of events is as 
follows: in period 1, the firm offers S1, and announces the service price p, the change fee 
ps, and the premium Δp. After which customers choose to either purchase the S1 or wait 
until period 2 to realize their type. In period 2, the firm offers both S1 and S2 and 
changes the service price to p + Δp for both services. All customers realize their “true” 
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type and act as follows: a ticket holder with type change pays the change fee and 
purchases S2 (or possibly simply forfeits her sunk cost p for S1 and leave), but a ticket 
holder without type change keeps her original purchase S1. A waiting customer can 
purchase S1 or S2 based on her type without paying the change fee (but at the marked-up 
price p + Δp). See Figure 8 for the sequence of events. 
 
 
Figure 8: Sequence of events 
 
A customer compares her expected payoff from purchasing S1 in period 1 and following 
scenarios against her expected utility from waiting for more certainty through purchasing 
in period 2. Note that when the type of a ticket holder changes in period 2, her utility is v 
– p – Δp – ps if she changes to Service 2, and it is – p if she doesn’t change. In this case, 
if her valuation for service 2 is not high enough––that is, when v < Δp + ps––her not 
purchasing of Service 2 and leaving the market generate a higher utility because paying 
extra change and premium fees are too costly for her. The group with low valuation (v < 
Δp + ps) represents buyers without change option (BWOO) who might purchase S1 in 
period 1 in the hope of keeping their original types. If their types, however, change in 
period 2, they leave the market and lose their tickets. On the other hand, when a customer 
has a high valuation––that is, when v ≥ Δp + ps––she ultimately purchase S1 or S2 based 
on her type and never leaves the market. This group represents buyers with change option 
(BWO).  
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A customer purchases S1 in the first period if v – p ≥ 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ max (v – p – 
Δp – ps, – p) ≥ v – p – Δp. The first condition simply indicates that the customer’s 
valuation should be higher than the service price. The second condition represents a 
strategic customer who purchases the service if she expects a higher utility from 
purchasing S1 early in period 1 rather than waiting until period 2. See Figure 9 for more 
details regarding customer’s decision tree. 
 
 
Figure 9: Two-Period decision model 
 
The firm’s expected net revenue is given by: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) =  𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠)(𝜃(𝑝 + 𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑝) + 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠)(𝜃𝑝 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑝)
+ 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠)(𝜃(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) + (1 − 𝜃)(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)) 
= 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝) + 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)           (1) 
where 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂 is the probability of being a buyer with change option, 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂 is the 
probability of being a buyer without change option, and 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠) is the probability of 
being a waiting customer. All these probabilities are dependent on the change fee. Notice 
Period	1	 Period	2	
1 – θ	
Bu
y	n
ow
	
W
ait	for	more	certainty		
θ	
v – p	
max(v – p – Δp – ps, – p)	
v – p – Δp 	
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that, on average, a buyer with change option pays 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝), a buyer without change 
option pays 𝑝, and a waiting customer pays 𝑝 + ∆𝑝.  
Next, I present how customers with heterogeneous willingness-to-pay in the market react 
to different levels of change fees set by the firm. In general, I expect that customers with 
high valuation purchase early and those with lower valuations wait until they realize their 
valuation. I will show that there are two scenarios based on the proportion of customers 
with type change: a low θ case, when 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, and a high θ case, when 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. I will 
present that firm’s revenue function has different formats in these two cases and will 
formally summarize the mathematical details for two cases in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, 
respectively. 
4.3.1 High Probability of Type Change 
First, I study the case where customers have a high chance of type change; that is, when θ 
is high (𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
). Given a change fee, I investigate how customers act differently based 
on their valuations. In general, I expect that, in this case, customers are more willing to 
wait than the low θ case. I formally summarize customers’ reactions to change fees in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1  When 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, a customer in period 1 acts as follows:  
- Case I: if v > p + θ (Δp + ps) and ps  ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then she buys in period 1 
(purchase in period 1). 
 
- Case II: if v > Δp + p and ps  > Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then she waits until period 2 (purchase 
in period 2). 
 
- Case III: otherwise, she leaves the market (no purchase). 
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Figure 10: Numerical illustrations of customers’ decisions based on different change 
fees, for θ = 0.4, p = $1000, Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right) 
 
Proposition 1 states that when θ is high, there are three types of customers in the market: 
non-buyers, waiting customers and buyers with option. In this case, since there is a high 
chance for changing customers’ type in period 2, no one buys without change option in 
period 1. Moreover, high-valuation customers still wait until period 2 if ps is high as in ps  
> Δp (1 – θ) / θ, and they buy in period 1 if ps is low as in ps  ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ. Also, all 
buying customers behave in the same way: either all of them purchase S1 early when the 
change fee is low or all of them wait when the change fee is high. Therefore, no potential 
customer purchases S1 without change the fee option. Figure 10 presents the numerical 
illustrations of customer decisions based on different change fees, for θ = 0.4, p = $1000, 
Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right). 
To illustrate Proposition 1, consider our example of a traveler flying from Atlanta to 
Paris. Assume that she anticipates the chance of her travel plan changing to be greater 
than 
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
=
400
400+1000
≃ 0.286. For example, assume there is 40% chance her travel plan 
change in future, i.e., θ  = 0.4. In this case, according to Proposition 1, when ps = 0, she 
purchases her ticket in period 1 when v > p + Δp θ = 1000 + 400 × 0.4 = 1160. 
Otherwise, she leaves the market. In general, there are two cases over ps as follows:  
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First, when ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ = 400 × 0.6 / 0.4 = 600, she buys early in period 1 if v > p 
+ θ (Δp + ps) = 1160 + 0.4 ps, and leaves the market otherwise. For example, when ps = 
300, if v > 1160 + 0.4 × 300 = 1280, she buys S1 early in period 1. Second, when ps > Δp 
(1 – θ) / θ = 600, she does not buy S1 early, but rather waits if v > p + Δp = 1400, and 
leaves the market otherwise. 
The firm anticipates the strategic customers’ behaviour with respect to their type 
uncertainty, and maximizes its total revenue by choosing the best change fee. I defined 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) as the ﬁrm’s revenue in terms of ps in (1). The firm’s revenue can be expressed in 
terms of ps for high θ case as follows: 
 
Lemma 1  When 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, the firm’s expected revenue is given by, 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = {
(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)))            𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑠 ≤
∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
𝜃
(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝))                                             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒              
 
 
For the high θ case, the revenue function is continuous; however, there are two regions 
over ps. I would like to highlight that 𝑝𝑠
∗ ≤ 𝑝. This is because if the firm set the change 
fee higher than the service price, canceling S1 and purchasing S2 generates higher 
utilities for ticket holders with type change. For any θ < 0.5, there are low and high type 
change cases, that is, θ can be lower or higher than 
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. Notice that, at extreme case 
where θ = 0.5, there should not be a high type change case. This implies that 
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
≤ 0.5, 
which simples to Δp ≤ p. Therefore, with respect to Δp and p, I consider the premium 
price is not higher that the service price. This result is reasonable since it is very rare that 
the firm increase the service price by more than 100%. One might wonder, when the 
proportion of customers with type change is high, can the firm get benefit from this high 
rate of type change by setting a high change fee. I will analyze this case in Corollary 1. 
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Corollary 1 when 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, firms should set the change fee such that ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, 
to induce all potential customers purchase early. 
Corollary 1 states that, when a high proportion of customers change from S1 to S2, the 
firm should never set a high change fee. Notice that in the high θ case, when ps is high, as 
in ps > Δp (1 – θ) / θ, the revenue function is independent of ps. This implies that it is 
never beneficial for the firm to set a change fee higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ for the high θ 
case. 
In addition, a high change fee will force all buyers to wait, generating no benefit for the 
firm. Customers react to the firm’s policy of setting a high change fee until the second 
period to avoid paying the change fee. Therefore, it is not beneficial for the firm to set a 
high change fee and risk provoking customer speculation. Gaining more revenue by 
reducing the change fee might seem counterintuitive but proves beneficial when a high 
proportion of customers make a change. This result is anecdotally consistent with the 
current practice in the auto rental industry, where a significant proportion of customers 
never show up.25 
Referring back to the flight from Atlanta to Paris, let us assume two cases where 
travelers’ valuations are uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500 and between 0 and 
3000, respectively. Furthermore, for both above cases, consider two values of θ = 0.3 
(dashed line) and θ = 0.7 (dotted line), where p = $1000, Δp = $400. Figure 11 present 
the firm’s expected revenue for two above cases. Interestingly, in both figures, I observe 
that a firm can generate high revenues by imposing a low change fee when the proportion 
of customers with type change is high. Moreover, the firm’s expected revenue increases 
in the proportion of high-value customers. Finally, these results suggest that change fees 
significantly impact a firm’s expected revenue. For example, when travelers’ valuations 
are uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500 and θ = 0.3, selecting a wrong change fee 
might leads to more than 15% revenue loss. 
                                                 
25
 URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-car-
companies-squirm-your-money.html; accessed: 2015–8–8. 
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Figure 11: Firm’s expected revenue for θ = 0.3 (dashed line) and θ = 0.7 (dotted 
line), p = $1000, Δp = $400, v is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500 (left) and 
between 0 and 3000 (right) 
 
A special case is when θ = 0. Based on Lemma 1, the firm’s expected revenue is given 
by: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = 𝑝 (1 − 𝐹(𝑝)) 
which is independent of ps and represents the revenue of the monopolistic firm posting 
price p for the service. The revenue functions introduced in this study are extensions to 
this classical and popular revenue management setting in pricing and supply chain-
contracting problems. Let PM be the optimal monopolistic service price for a single 
service. In this section, I consider that the service price p is an exogenous parameter. In 
Section 4.4, however, I consider p as a decision factor and investigate how the firm 
should set the service price and the change fee together. Next, I present how to derive the 
optimal change fee for high θ case. First, I define ls as the solution of 𝑝𝑠 to the following 
equation: 
                   
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)                     (2) 
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Note that the optimal change fee cannot be inside the second region of change fee in 
Lemma 1. 
Proposition 2 If 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, then the optimal change fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, is found as follows: 
𝑝𝑠
∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
0                       𝑖𝑓  𝑙𝑠 ≤ 0                        
𝑙𝑠                      𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑙𝑠 ≤
∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
𝜃
∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
𝜃
        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                        
 
 
Proposition 2 indicates how a revenue-maximizing firm sets the optimal change fee when 
time-uncertain and heterogeneous customers present in the market for high θ case. 
Proposition 2 defines a specific change fee, 𝑙𝑠, given by solution of (2). This proposition 
states that, depending on the proportion of customers with type change, the optimal 
change fee should be equal to the solution of (2), the specific change fee, 𝑙𝑠, when it is 
within the lower region of change fee in Proposition 1, i.e., 0 ≤ 𝑙𝑠 ≤
∆𝑝(1−𝜃)
𝜃
. When ls is 
outside the lower region of change fee in Proposition 1, the optimal change fee is equal to 
the boundary of the region which is closer to ls. This result holds for the general 
customers willingness-to-pay distribution, F(v). 
I would like to highlight that the focus of the foregoing analysis is on the change fee, ps, 
and the mark-up premium, Δp, is fixed. Similar to the change fee, firm can also select the 
mark-up premium endogenously as a decision factor (I will consider the base service 
price, p, in Section 4.4 as a decision factor as well). I demonstrate that the firm always 
selects the change fee from the first case of Lemma 1 and we observe the change fee, ps, 
is always with the mark-up premium, Δp, in the firm’s revenue function. I will show in 
Lemma 2 that this is also the case for the low probability type change case, i.e., in low 
probability type change case, I will demonstrate that the firm always selects the change 
fee from the first and the second cases of Lemma 2 and the change fee is always with the 
mark-up premium in the firm’s revenue function for this case as well. This implies that 
the sum of the change fee and the markup price creates the optimal solution. There, 
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however, there is no unique pair of optimal change fee and the mark-up premium that 
maximize the firm’s revenue; that is, there are more than one pair of optimal change fee 
and the mark-up premium that maximize firms’ revenue, but the optimal sum of the 
change fee and the mark-up premium, as the solution, is fixed and unique for all of these 
pairs. 
4.3.2 Low Probability of Type Change 
Next, I present the case in which the change rate is low (𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
). Given a change fee, I 
investigate how customers act differently based on their valuations. In general, I expect 
that, in low θ case, customers are more willing to buy S1 early than the high θ case. I 
formally summarize customers’ reactions to change fees in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3  When 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, a customer in period 1 acts as follows:  
- Case I: if v > p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps  ≤ p / (1 – θ) – Δp, then she buys (with option) in 
period 1 (purchase period 1). 
- Case II: if v > Δp + ps, and p / (1 – θ) – Δp < ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then she buys (with 
option) in period 1 (purchase period 1). 
 
- Case III: if p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp + ps, and p / (1 – θ) – Δp < ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then 
she buys (without option) in period 1 (purchase period 1). 
- Case IV: if p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ, and Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps, then she buys (without 
option) in period 1 (purchase period 1). 
 
- Case V: if v > Δp / θ, and Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps, then she waits until period 2 (purchase 
period 2). 
 
- Case VI: otherwise, she leaves the market (no purchase). 
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Figure 12: Numerical illustrations of customers’ decisions based on different change 
fees, for θ = 0.15, p = $1000, Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right) 
When the probability of type change is low, 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, based on Proposition 3, there are 
four different cases of customers in the market: waiting customers, buyers without option, 
buyers with option, and non-buyers. Interestingly, Proposition 3 states that, when the 
change fee is higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ, then customers with high valuations (v > Δp / θ) 
never buy in period 1 but instead wait until period 2, but customers with lower valuations 
(p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ) buy without option in period 1. Figure 12 presents the numerical 
illustrations of customer decisions based on different change fees, for θ = 0.15, p = 
$1000, Δp = $200 (left) and Δp = $400 (right). 
Existence of high-valuation waiting customers with low-valuation buyers in period 1 may 
seem counterintuitive. Notice that, in this case, the change fees are high. Therefore, it is 
less risky for high-valuation customers to wait and not pay a high change fee, knowing 
that waiting until period 2 can still generate high utilities for them even after they pay the 
premium in period 2. In other words, waiting until period 2 and paying the premium fee 
rather than a change fee generates higher utilities for high-valuation customers. 
Low-valuation customers in period 1 do not have the benefit of generating high utilities 
from waiting, because their valuations are not high enough to cover the premium in 
period 2. They purchase without option in period 1 as they count on a low chance of 
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changing their type. However, they are aware that, if their type changes in period 2, they 
should leave the market. Proposition 3 also states that when the change fee is low, no one 
waits in period 1, high-valuation customers buy with option in period 1, and low-
valuation customers leave the market.  
To illustrate Proposition 3, consider again our example of a traveler flying from Atlanta 
to Paris when θ  < 
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
≃ 0.29. In this case, according to Figure 12, when ps = 0, she 
purchases her ticket in period 1 when v > p + Δp θ = 1000 + 400 × 0.25 = 1100. 
Otherwise, she leaves the market. In general, there are three cases of ps as follows: First, 
when ps ≤ p / (1 – θ) – Δp = 1000 / 0.75 – 400 = 933, she buys early in period 1 if v > p + 
θ (Δp + ps) = 1100 + 0.25 ps, and leaves the market otherwise. For example, when ps = 
300, if v > 1100 + 0.25 × 300 = 1175, she buys S1 early in period 1. I would like to 
highlight that, in my analysis, I consider the possibility of having a change higher than 
the service price. In practice, firm never charge a change fee higher than the service price 
since all ticket holders with type change can directly purchase S2 at lower price without 
paying the change fee. 
Second, when p / (1 – θ) – Δp < ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, (that is when 933 < ps ≤ 1200), she 
purchases her ticket in period 1 when v > p / (1 – θ) = 1333. Note that if v ≤ ps + Δp = ps 
+ 400, she buys as a BWOO and when v > ps + 400, she buys as a BWO. When v < p / (1 – 
θ) = 1333, she leaves the market.  
Third, when ps > 1200, if v ≤ p / (1 – θ) = 1333, then she leaves the market, and if 1333 
<v ≤ Δp / θ = 1600, she buys as a BWOO, and if v > 1600, she waits in period 1. 
Notice that in both low θ case and high θ case (discussed in Section 4.3.1), no customers 
with valuation lower than p + θ Δp consider the service, even in the absence of a change 
fee. Also, in both cases, when the change fee is low, customers only consider the service 
if their valuation is greater than the expected price in period 2, i.e., v > p + θ (Δp + ps). 
When the change fee is high, they consider the service only when v > p / (1 – θ) for the 
low θ case. However, this threshold on customer valuation is independent of θ for high θ 
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case. When the change fee is high, they consider the service when v > Δp + p for the 
high θ case. 
The firm anticipates the strategic customers’ behaviour with respect to their time 
uncertainty, and maximizes its total revenue (original and ancillary revenue) by choosing 
the best change fee. I defined 𝜋(𝑝𝑠) as the ﬁrm’s revenue in terms of ps in (1). The firm’s 
revenue can be expressed in terms of ps for low θ case as follows: 
Lemma 2  When 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, the firms expected revenue is given by,  
𝜋(𝑝𝑠)
=
{
  
 
  
 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)))                                                 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑠 ≤
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
− ∆𝑝                           
(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
))     𝑖𝑓 
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
− ∆𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑠 ≤
∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
𝜃
 
(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹 (
∆𝑝
𝜃
)) + 𝑝 (𝐹 (
∆𝑝
𝜃
) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
))                                   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                             
 
For the low θ case, the revenue function is continuous; however, there are three regions 
over ps for low θ case. Next, I show how to derive the optimal change fee. First, similar to 
high θ case, I define ls as the solution of 𝑝𝑠 in equation (2) as follows: 
                   
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)                      
and us as the solution of 𝑝𝑠 to the following equation: 
                                  
1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
𝑓(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
= 𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝                                    (3) 
One may consider ls and us as two specific change fees, a lower change fee, and a higher 
change fee, respectively. Note that the optimal change fee cannot be inside the third 
region of change fee in Lemma 2. Next, I provide an explicit condition on the optimal 
change fee solution for the low θ case. 
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Corollary 2 For the low θ case, 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, the optimal change fee, 𝑝𝑠
∗, is found as 
follows: 
– If p ≤ PM (1 – θ), 𝑝𝑠
∗, is given by: 
𝑝𝑠
∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
− ∆𝑝                𝑖𝑓  𝑢𝑠 ≤ 0                                        
𝑢𝑠                              𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑢𝑠 ≤
∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
𝜃
                 
∆𝑝(1 − 𝜃)
𝜃
                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                         
 
– If p > PM (1 – θ), 𝑝𝑠
∗, is given by: 
𝑝𝑠
∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
0                       𝑖𝑓  𝑙𝑠 ≤ 0                        
𝑙𝑠                      𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑙𝑠 ≤
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
− ∆𝑝
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
− ∆𝑝       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                        
 
Corollary 2 indicates how a revenue-maximizing firm sets the optimal change fee when 
time-uncertain and heterogeneous customers present in the market for the low θ case. 
Corollary 2 defines a threshold on the service price and states that when the service price 
is lower than this threshold, as in p ≤ PM (1 – θ), the optimal change fee should be higher 
than its corresponding threshold, as in 
𝑝
1−𝜃
− ∆𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑠
∗. We can consider 𝑢𝑠 as a specific 
higher change fee given by solution of (3) and it should be within the second regions of 
change fee in Lemma 2, that is, 
𝑝
1−𝜃
− ∆𝑝 ≤ 𝑢𝑠 ≤
∆𝑝(1−𝜃)
𝜃
. In this case, when us is outside the 
second region of change fee in Lemma 2, the optimal change fee is equal to the boundary 
of the region which is closer to us. Corollary 2 also states that when the service price is 
higher than above threshold, as in p > PM (1 – θ), the optimal change fee should be lower 
than its corresponding threshold, as in 
𝑝
1−𝜃
− ∆𝑝 > 𝑝𝑠
∗. We can consider 𝑙𝑠 as a specific 
lower change fee given by solution of (2) and it should be within the first regions of 
change fee in Lemma 2, that is, 0 ≤ 𝑙𝑠 ≤
𝑝
1−𝜃
− ∆𝑝. In this case, when ls is outside the 
lower region of change fee in Lemma 2, the optimal change fee is equal to the boundary 
of the region which is closer to ls. This result holds for the general customers willingness-
to-pay distribution, F(v). Finally Corollary 2 states that, the firm should balance between 
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service price and change fee, and should not set both at high levels or low levels 
simultaneously.  
I would like to investigate what is the value of the optimal change fee if the service price 
is set at the optimal monopolistic service price, i.e., p = PM. As I discussed, this 
represents a case in which no customers demand change (θ = 0) or in which the firm 
maximizes its main and ancillary revenues separately for technical or operational issues. I 
will present based on Corollary 2, the optimal change fee lies within the lower cases of 
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. I observe that the firm should never set a very high change fee 
when the service price is equal to the optimal monopolistic service price. The results hold 
for both high and low θ cases; that is, If p = PM, then 𝑝𝑠
∗ = 𝑙𝑠. Notice that when 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑙𝑠, 
based on Propositions 1 and 3, only true buyers purchase the service in period 1. I will 
later present whether the introduction of the change fee impacts on the service price and 
how, in this case, the firm should maximize the total revenue jointly based on service 
price and change fee.  
Corollary 3 The optimal change fee is decreasing in p, θ and Δp.  
Corollary 3 extends the results of Corollary 2 and states that by increasing the service 
price or the premium, the firm should select a lower change fee. Moreover, the firm 
should set a lower change fee when the population of customers with type grows. In the 
next section, I analyze how the firm should select the service price in conjunction with 
the change fee. 
4.4 The Firm’s Joint Service Pricing and Change Fee 
Decision 
In this section, I study how the firm should maximize its revenue by simultaneously 
selecting the change fee and the service price. Define (p*, ps*) as the set of optimal 
service price and the change fee that maximizes the total revenue for the firm. First, I 
show how to derive (p*, ps*) given PM, θ and Δp, and then I analyze the properties of this 
set.  
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Lemma 3 If Δp ≤ PM, the set of optimal service price and change fee, (p*, ps*), is not 
unique. This set satisfies the following condition: 
p* = PM + (ps*+ Δp)(1 – θ). 
When the premium is lower than the optimal monopolistic service price, and the firm 
selects both the service price and the change fee, the optimal service price should be set 
higher than the optimal monopolistic service price; that is, p* ≥ PM. Notice that, in this 
case, ps* is selected at its low value in Corollary 2, i.e., 𝑝𝑠
∗ = 𝑙𝑠. Having both the 
premium and the optimal change fee at levels lower than their corresponding thresholds 
motivates the firm to set the service price higher than the optimal monopolistic service 
price. 
Moreover, Lemma 3 indicates that there are multiple optimal change fees as well as the 
service prices. Although none of these solutions (joint optimal change fees and service 
prices) are dominated by other solutions, the firm might select a specific solution based 
on other factors in the market. For example, an extremely high change fee or a service 
price might encourage customers to stay in the market (even though it does not affect 
their expected utilities). In this case, the firm may eliminate these extreme rates from the 
set of possible optimal service prices and change fees. Finally, I would like to highlight 
that, when the premium is lower than the optimal monopolistic service price, all ticket 
holders are true buyers and no conditional buyers stay in the market. Next, I study the 
case in which the premium is higher than the optimal monopolistic service price. 
Lemma 4 If Δp > PM, the set of optimal service price and change fee, (p*, ps*), is unique 
and can be found as follows: 
p* = PM (1 – θ), and ps* =0. 
 
When the premium is higher than the optimal monopolistic service price, and the firm 
selects its service price and change fee together, the optimal service price should be set 
lower than the optimal monopolistic service price, i.e., p* ≤ PM. Moreover, the firm 
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should allow all ticket holders to freely change between S1 and S2 if they want to do so. 
This is because the premium is extremely high and the firm cannot impose either high 
change fees or high service price. Note that, the high premium in period 2, motivates 
more customers to purchase early. Moreover, contrary to the low premium case, there are 
buyers without change option in the market, as well. 
Corollary 4 Keeping all other factors the same, the optimal service price increases in PM 
and decreases in θ, and the optimal change fee decreases in PM and increasing in θ. 
Corollary 4 outlines how the joint optimal service price and change fee vary based on the 
optimal monopolistic service price as well as the proportion of customers with type 
change. Interestingly, Corollary 4 suggests a different result than Corollary 3 with respect 
to the change fee: When the firm simultaneously selects both rates, a larger population of 
customers with type change motivates the firm to impose higher change fees.  
I numerically analyze the set of optimal service price and change fee, (p*, ps*), for a case 
in which v is uniformly distributed between 0 and V. A higher V implies a higher 
proportion of high-valuation customers. In our example of the traveller from Atlanta to 
Paris, Δp = 400. The following analysis reports on eight cases, spanned by: 
(𝑉,𝜃) ∈ {
(250, 0.2), (500, 0.2), (1000, 0.2), (1500, 0.2), (2000, 0.2),
(250, 0.8), (500, 0.8), (1000, 0.8), (1500, 0.8), (2000, 0.8)
} 
The numerical results are summarized in Table 6. I highlight the following trends with 
respect to the set of optimal service price and change fee. First, I observe that when the 
firm sets service price and change fee together, both fees are increasing in V. This is an 
intuitive result. Firm can charge higher fees when there are a higher proportion of high-
valuation customers in the market.  
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Table 6: The set of optimal service price/change fee for different V and θ. 
 
 
 
 
Also, I notice that the optimal service price and the optimal change fee are decreasing in 
θ. As I discussed, when the risk of type change increases, customers are less willing to 
buy early to prevent paying the change fee. Furthermore, the service price can be higher 
or lower than the premium, however, the optimal change fee is always lower than the 
premium. When the proportion of high-valuation customers increases, the optimal change 
fee will be close to the premium.  
Next, the sum of the service price and the change fee in most cases are less than V/2, 
except when V is very high and θ is very low. When there are many high-valuation 
customers in the market, the firm can charge high change fees, especially when there is a 
low chance of the type change. Notice that the optimal service price and the change fee 
are increasing at a rate higher than V. 
Finally, I numerically analyze the impact of the markdown premium on the optimal 
service price and the change fee. Assume v is uniformly distributed between 0 and 2500. 
I compare two cases of Δp = 400 and Δp = 800 and consider a full range of θ. The results 
are presented in Figure 13. I observe that the optimal service price is decreasing in Δp. 
Interestingly, the optimal change fee is decreasing in Δp for low values of θ and 
increasing in Δp for high values of θ. 
(p*, ps*)   
Δp = 400 
V 
250 500 1000 1500 2000 
θ 
0.2 (100, 0) (200, 0) (410, 50)* (870, 250)* (870, 250)* 
0.8 (25, 0) (50, 0) (390, 50)* (640, 50)* (640, 50)* 
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Figure 13: Numerical illustrations of optimal service price (left) and change fees 
(right) for different θ, V = 2500, Δp = $400 (solid line) and Δp = $800 (dashed line). 
 
4.5 Discussion 
In this study, I consider a monopolistic firm that generates ancillary revenues by allowing 
customers with type uncertainty to change between services offered by the firm. 
Although the firm maximizes revenue by imposing optimal ancillary fares, strategic 
customers maximize utilities by responding to these fares. Knowing that the introduction 
of an ancillary fee might distract customers from purchasing the Service 1, I investigate 
how the firm should introduce such a fee in this study. Also, it is not clear whether the 
firm should modify its pricing policy after charging its customers a change fee. I derive 
analytically each market player’s best reaction to the other to prescribe the characteristics 
of firm/customer interaction equilibrium.  
My results in Chapter 4 suggest that the firm should consider the change fee in its pricing 
policy and receive benefits from this fee. Although imposing the change fee might 
distract customers away from purchasing early, I find that it is beneficial for the firm to 
increase the change fee up to a threshold. I show that this threshold is a function of the 
level of customer uncertainty, the optimal monopolistic price and the variability of the 
price. Increasing the change fee beyond that threshold is, however, harmful for the firm, 
and the firm should be very thoughtful in this regard.  
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Ancillary fees do more than simply add to the profit margin; many industries, such as 
airlines, face massive expansion in demand in many regions of the world, requiring huge 
investment in different sections of the business. This trend requires access to additional 
monetary resources for strategic business expansions. However, based on a report by 
Brian Pearce, IATA's Chief Economist, the aviation industry’s average 1990-2012 global 
net profit margin was 0.0%.26 Furthermore, as he addresses in the report, airline investors 
earned almost nothing in the past. This challenge highlights that having an extra source of 
revenue is critical not only for the short term but also for the healthy financial future of 
these industries. 
The customer uncertainty level plays an important role in how the firm should design a 
change fee. This result indicates that when this uncertainty is very high, the firm should 
never set a high change fee. This is anecdotally consistent with the current practice in the 
auto rental industry, where the change fees are minimal.27 As I discussed, a high change 
fee will force all buyers to wait, generating no benefit for the firm.  
The optimal monopolistic service, PM, also has a significant impact on the change fee. 
When firm jointly selects the service price and the change fee, it is never optimal for the 
firm to impose a high change fee. The variability of the service price is also critical to the 
design of the change fee. I find that it is harmful for the firm to set a high change fee 
when customers face a huge premium. This suggests that, although the firm should 
exploit the ancillary revenue, it should design change fees wisely, along with other fees. 
A tradeoff between all fees is necessary when customers face multiple fees. Finally, I 
demonstrate that when the firm sets the service price and the change fee simultaneously, 
the optimal service price (with change fee) is increasing in the optimal monopolistic 
service price and decreasing in the proportion of customers with type change; however, 
                                                 
26
 URL: https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Aviation-Advocacy-Economics-2013-
July.pdf; accessed 2015-09-09. 
27
 URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-car-
companies-squirm-your-money.html; accessed: 2015–8–8. 
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the optimal change fee is decreasing in the optimal monopolistic service price and 
increasing in the proportion of customers with type change. 
Notice that, in this chapter, the revenue function has 𝑥 (1 − 𝐹(𝑥)) structure.  The 
𝑥 (1 − 𝐹(𝑥)) represents the revenue of a service provider selling a product at price x. 
There has been a stream of literature regarding the unimodality of this revenue function 
configuration. A well-known result is that, if F is increasing generalized failure rate 
(IGFR), the revenue function is unimodal (Lariviere 2006). For an IGFR F, the price 
elasticity of demand is weakly increasing for all x such that 𝐹(𝑥) < 1. Many distributions 
such as Uniform, Normal and Weibull are IGFR. Please refer to Mihai and Prakash 
(2013) for a thorough summary of the necessary conditions to ensure the unimodality of 
the revenue function. As they highlight it, having the IGFR property is tremendously 
valuable in supply chain and revenue management literature.  
This is one of the first studies to explicitly explore the effects of change fee in revenue 
management. Some firms have started to realize the importance of ancillary revenue as a 
reliable source––especially as global market competition continuously increases and 
profit margins tighten. I hope this study addresses some of the calls from practitioners to 
take into account this new source of revenue in their analyses and contributes to the 
literature, which has long advocated beneficial revenue management models. 
 
4.6 Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
This proposition corresponds to high θ case, i.e., 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. In part A, part B, and part C 
of this proof, I analyze the necessary conditions for three cases in which a customer 
leaves the market in period 1, waits in period 1, and buys in period 1, respectively. 
Part A: This case presents two scenarios in which a customer leaves the market: First, v ≤ 
p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps  ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, and second if v ≤ Δp + p, and ps  > Δp (1 – θ) / θ. 
I study these two scenarios respectively. 
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Scenario A1: consider v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps  ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ: I add a condition to 
this scenario and analyze all possibilities for this condition.  
A11: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps: A customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if 
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, 
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies 
to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤  Δp / θ. Notice that in this case since v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps  ≤ p / 
(1 – θ) – Δp, thus, v ≤ p + θ (Δp + p / (1 – θ) – Δp) ≤ p + θ (p / (1 – θ)) ≤ p / (1 – θ) which 
contradicts p / (1 – θ) < v ≤  Δp / θ condition above. Therefore, no one choose to purchase 
early in this situation. 
A customer waits in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from waiting in 
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and 
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < v – p – Δp, which simplifies to v > Δp / θ > Δp / (Δp / (Δp + p) 
> Δp + p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait in this 
scenario. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market. 
 
A12: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if 
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, 
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p 
– Δp, which simplifies to p + θ (Δp + ps) < v, which contradicts v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps) 
condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this situation. 
A customer waits in period 1 under this scenario if the expected utility from waiting in 
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and 
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) < v – p – Δp, which says v > p + Δp. Notice, however, 
based on the above case, v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps) < p + θ (Δp + Δp (1 – θ) / θ) < p + Δp, which 
contradicts an assumption of Proposition 1, which is 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. Therefore, no one 
chooses to wait early in this situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the 
market.  
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Scenario A2: Now, consider the second scenario for waiting, i.e., v ≤ Δp + p, and ps  > Δp 
(1 – θ) / θ. I add a condition to this scenario and analyze all possibilities for this 
condition.  
A21: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps: A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if 
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, 
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies 
to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤  Δp / θ. The first condition p / (1 – θ) < v can be written as follows by 
substituting the lower bound of θ: p / (1 – Δp / (Δp + p)) < v, which is p +Δp < v. This 
contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in 
this scenario. 
A customer waits in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from waiting in 
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and 
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < v – p – Δp. The first condition contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps condition 
above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this situation. As a results, all 
customers in this case leave the market. 
 
A22: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. In this case, a customer buys early when (1 – θ)(v – p) + 
θ (v – p – Δp – ps) ≥ v – p – Δp, which implies that 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. This contradicts the 
condition in the above case. Also, since v ≤ Δp + p, no one waits in period 2, therefore, in 
this case, all customers leave the market in period 1. 
 
Part B: This case presents a scenario in which a customer waits in period 1 in the market: 
v > Δp / θ, and ps  > Δp (1 – θ) / θ. I add a condition to this scenario and analyze all 
possibilities for this condition. 
 
B1: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps: A customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if (1 
– θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies to p / 
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(1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. Notice that in this condition contradicts v > Δp / θ, and ps  > Δp (1 – 
θ) / θ condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this situation. 
A customer leaves in period 1 under this scenario if the expected utility from leaving in 
period 1 is greater than purchasing and waiting in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp < 0 and (1 – 
θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < 0, which simplifies to v < p / (1 – θ) < p / (1 – Δp / (Δp + p)) < Δp + 
p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this 
situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market. 
 
B2: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. In this case, a customer buys early when (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ 
(v – p – Δp – ps) ≥ v – p – Δp, which implies that 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. This contradicts the condition 
in the above case. Also since v ≤ Δp + p, no one waits in period 2; consequently, in this 
case, no customer leaves the market in period 1. As a results, all customers in this case 
wait in period 1.  
 
Part C: This case considers when a customer buys in period 1, that is, if the expected 
utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, i.e., (1 – θ)(v 
– p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p – Δp, which 
simplifies to p + θ (Δp + ps) < v and ps ≤  Δp (1 – θ) / θ. Note that theses conditions 
complete the conditions in previous cases.  
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The firm’s objective function is given by: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝) + 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) 
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For 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, based on Proposition 1, when ps ≤ Δp (1 – θ) / θ, customers are buy the 
service early if v > p + θ (Δp + ps) (Case I), or leave the market otherwise (Case III). 
Notice that, there are no buyers without change option in this case. 
Therefore, we have the following: 
 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 0, 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))  
and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 0 + 0
= (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) 
 
For 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, based on Proposition 1, when Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps, customers are either leave 
the market (Case III) or wait in period 1 (Case II) if v > Δp + p. Again, there are no 
buyers without change option in this case. 
Therefore, we have the following: 
 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 0,  𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)  
and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = 0 + 0 + (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝))(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) 
= (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝)). 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
Based on Lemma 1, for 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, when Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps,  
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + ∆𝑝))  
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Notice that, in this case, the firm’s revenue function is independent of change fee. This 
implies that any change fee higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ is dominated by ps = Δp (1 – θ) / θ. 
Therefore, the change fee should never be higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
First, based on Corollary 1, a firm never sets a change fee higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ. 
Therefore, based on Lemma 1, the firm’s expected revenue is given by: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) 
I assume F is IGFR, therefore, the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal. Checking the 
F.O.C. with respect to ps , I have the following: 
𝜃 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝))) + 𝜃 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝))  (−𝑓 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝))) = 0 
which simplifies to equation (2) as follows: 
                   
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) 
I labeled the solution of (2) with respect to change fee as ls. Therefore, ls is the optimal 
change fee since it satisfies the F.O.C. for the firm’s expected revenue. Note that when ls 
is negative, since the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal, the optimal change fee is zero. 
Furthermore, when ls is greater than Δp (1 – θ) / θ, the optimal change fee is Δp (1 – θ) / 
θ, because the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
This proposition corresponds to the low θ case, i.e., 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. In part A, part B, and part 
C of this proof, I analyze the necessary conditions for three cases in which a customer 
leaves the market in period 1, waits in period 1, and buys in period 1, respectively. 
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Part A: This case presents two situations in which a customer leaves the market: First, if v 
≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps  ≤ p / (1 – θ) – Δp , or if v ≤ p / (1 – θ), and ps  > p / (1 – θ) – Δp.  
 
A1: I first consider v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps  ≤ p / (1 – θ) – Δp: I add a condition to this 
scenario and analyze this situation under all possibilities. 
A11: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if 
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, 
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies 
to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤  Δp / θ. Notice that in this case, since v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps), and ps  ≤ p / 
(1 – θ) – Δp, therefore, v ≤ p + θ (Δp + p / (1 – θ) – Δp) ≤ p + θ (p / (1 – θ)) ≤ p / (1 – θ) 
which contradicts p / (1 – θ) < v ≤  Δp / θ condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to 
purchase early in this scenario. 
A customer waits in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from waiting in 
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and 
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < v – p – Δp, which simplifies to v > Δp / θ > Δp / (Δp / (Δp + p) 
> Δp + p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in 
this situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market. 
 
A12: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if 
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, 
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p 
– Δp, which simplifies to p + θ (Δp + ps) < v, which contradicts v ≤ p + θ (Δp + ps) 
condition above. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this situation. 
A customer waits in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from waiting in 
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and 
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) < v – p – Δp, which sets a condition on θ, 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. 
Notice, however, this contradicts an assumption of Proposition 1, which is 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. 
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Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this scenario. As a results, all customers in this 
case leave the market.  
 
A2: Now, consider the second situation, i.e., v ≤ p / (1 – θ), and ps  > p / (1 – θ) – Δp: 
I add a condition to this situation and analyze this scenario under all possibilities for this 
condition.  
A21: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if 
the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, 
i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies 
to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. This contradicts v ≤ p / (1 – θ) condition above. Therefore, no 
one chooses to purchase early in this situation. 
A customer wait in period 1 under this scenario if the expected utility from waiting in 
period 1 is non-negative and greater than purchasing in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp > 0 and 
(1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < v – p – Δp, which simplifies to v > Δp / θ > Δp / (Δp / (Δp + p) 
> Δp + p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this 
situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market. 
 
A22: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. In this case, v > Δp + ps  > Δp + p / (1 – θ) – Δp > p / (1 
– θ) which contradicts v ≤ p / (1 – θ) condition in case 1B. Therefore, v cannot be greater 
than Δp + ps and the second condition (v > Δp + ps) does not exist. 
Summarizing all different scenarios, in above cases all customers leave the market in 
period 1. 
 
Part B: Next consider a situation in which a customer waits in period 1 in the market: v > 
Δp / θ, and ps  > Δp (1 – θ) / θ. I add a condition to this scenario and analyze this situation 
under all possibilities. 
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B1: First, assume v ≤ Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this situation if (1 
– θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies to p / 
(1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ. This contradicts v > Δp / θ, and ps  > Δp (1 – θ) / θ condition above. 
Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this scenario. 
A customer leaves in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from leaving in 
period 1 is greater than purchasing and waiting in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp < 0 and (1 – 
θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < 0, which simplifies to v < p / (1 – θ) < p / (1 – Δp / (Δp + p)) < Δp + 
p, which contradicts v ≤ Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses to wait early in this 
situation. As a results, all customers in this case leave the market. 
 
B2: Now, assume v > Δp + ps. A customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if (1 
– θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p – Δp, 
which simplifies to 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. Notice, however, this contradicts an assumption of 
Proposition 1, which is 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
. Therefore, no one chooses to purchase early in this 
situation. 
A customer leaves in period 1 under this situation if the expected utility from leaving in 
period 1 is greater than purchasing and waiting in period 1, i.e., v – p – Δp < 0 and (1 – 
θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) < 0, which contradicts v > Δp + ps above. Therefore, no one chooses 
to leave in this scenario. As a results, all customers in this case wait in period 1.  
 
Part C: Next, consider a situation in which a customer buys early in period 1. There are 
two cases here: First, I have the following: A customer purchases in period 1 under this 
situation if the expected utility from purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater 
than waiting, i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (– p) > v – p – Δp, 
which simplifies to p / (1 – θ) < v ≤  Δp / θ.   
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Second, a customer purchases in period 1 under this scenario if the expected utility from 
purchasing in period 1 is non-negative and greater than waiting, i.e., (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v 
– p – Δp – ps) > 0 and (1 – θ)(v – p) + θ (v – p – Δp – ps) > v – p – Δp, which simplifies 
to p + θ (Δp + ps) < v and ps ≤  Δp (1 – θ) / θ.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
The firm’s objective function is given by: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝) + 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠)(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) 
For 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, based on Proposition 3, when ps ≤ p/ (1 – θ) – Δp, customers are buy the 
service early with change option if v > p + θ (Δp + ps) (Case I), or leave the market 
otherwise (Case VI). Notice that, there are no waiting customers and buyers without 
change option in this case. 
Therefore, we have the following: 
 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠) = 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 0, 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))  
and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 0 + 0
= (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) 
 
Now, for 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, based on Proposition 3, when – Δp + p / (1 – θ) < ps ≤ Δp / θ – Δp, 
customers are either leave the market when v ≤ p/ (1 – θ) (Case VI) or buy with change 
option when Δp + ps < v (Case II) or without change option p/ (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp + ps (Case 
III) in period 1. Notice that, there are no waiting customers in this case. 
Therefore, we have the following: 
 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠) = 0, 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝), 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1−𝜃
) 
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and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝑝(𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) + 0
= (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) 
 
Now, for 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, based on Proposition 3, when – Δp + p / (1 – θ) ≤ ps, customers are 
either leave the market when v ≤ p/ (1 – θ) (Case VI) or wait when Δp / θ < v (Case V) or 
buy without change option p/ (1 – θ) < v ≤ Δp / θ (Case IV) in period 1. Notice that, there 
are no buyers with change option in this case. 
Therefore, we have the following: 
 𝜙𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑝𝑠) = 1 − 𝐹 (
∆𝑝
𝜃
), 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 0, 𝜙𝐵𝑊𝑂𝑂(𝑝𝑠) = 𝐹 (
∆𝑝
𝜃
) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1−𝜃
) 
and the firm’s expected revenue is simplified to: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹 (
∆𝑝
𝜃
)) + 𝑝(𝐹 (
∆𝑝
𝜃
) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) + 0
= (𝑝 + ∆𝑝)(1 − 𝐹 (
∆𝑝
𝜃
)) + 𝑝(𝐹 (
∆𝑝
𝜃
) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) . 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 
First, the optimal monopolistic service price, PM, maximizes the classical expected 
revenue for a seller with a single resource: 𝑝(1 − 𝐹(𝑝)). Since F is IGFR, 𝑝(1 − 𝐹(𝑝)) is 
unimodal and PM satisfies the F.O.C. with respect to service price as follows: 
(1 − 𝐹(𝑝)) − 𝑝𝑓(𝑝) = 0 
which can be rearranged to: 
1 − 𝐹(𝑝)
𝑓(𝑝)
= 𝑝 
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Second, I focus on my study of a firm with two resources, which maximizes its expected 
revenue based on the change fee. I would like to highlight that based on Lemma 2, a firm 
never sets a change fee higher than Δp (1 – θ) / θ. This is because the firm’s expected 
revenue is independent of change fee when Δp (1 – θ) / θ < ps. Therefore, the optimal 
change fee should be within the first region of change fee when ps ≤ p/ (1 – θ) – Δp (low 
change fee case), or the second region of change fee when – Δp + p / (1 – θ) < ps ≤ Δp / θ 
– Δp (high change fee case).  
 
In low change fee case, based on Lemma 2, the expected revenue is given by: 
𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = (1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))) (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) 
I assume F is IGFR, therefore, the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal. Checking the 
F.O.C. with respect to ps, I have the following: 
𝜃 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝))) + 𝜃 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝))  (−𝑓 (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝))) = 0 
which simplifies to equation (2) as follows: 
                   
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) 
 
I labeled the solution of (2) with respect to change fee as ls. Therefore, ls is the optimal 
change fee when it is within the low change fee case since it satisfies the F.O.C. for the 
firm’s expected revenue in this case. 
 
In high change fee case, based on Lemma 2, the expected revenue is given by: 
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𝜋(𝑝𝑠) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) + 𝑝 (𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
))
=  (1 − 𝜃) (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
) (1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)(1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) 
Notice that the first part of objective function is independent of change fee. I assume F is 
IGFR, therefore, the firm’s expected revenue is unimodal in this case, as well. Checking 
the F.O.C. with respect to ps, I have the following: 
𝜃 (1 − 𝐹(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝)) + 𝜃(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝)  (−𝑓(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝)) = 0 
which simplifies to equation (3) as follows: 
                   
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) 
I labeled the solution of (3) with respect to change fee as us. Therefore, us is the optimal 
change fee when it is within the high change fee case since it satisfies the F.O.C. for the 
firm’s expected revenue in this case. 
Now, I would like to investigate under which scenarios the optimal change fee lies within 
the low change fee case and within the high change fee case. Notice that the boundary of 
two cases are at – Δp + p / (1 – θ) = ps. Also, the slope of the firm’s objective function is 
the same for both change fee cases and is given by: 
𝜃 (1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) + 𝜃 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)  (−𝑓 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) 
Therefore, whenever this slope is negative, since objective functions in both change fee 
cases are IGFR, the optimal change fee should be within the low change fee case and 
whenever this slope is positive, the optimal change fee should be within the high change 
fee case. Notice that, however, if we substitute x = p/ (1 – θ) the slope of the firm’s 
objective function has the following structure: 
𝜃(1 − 𝐹(𝑥)) + 𝜃𝑥 (−𝑓(𝑥)) 
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and for x = PM, we have  
𝜃(1 − 𝐹(𝑃M)) + 𝜃𝑃M (−𝑓(𝑃M)) = 0 
since, as we discussed above, PM satisfies the following F.O.C. condition. 
(1 − 𝐹(𝑝)) − 𝑝𝑓(𝑝) = 0 
This implies that whenever p/ (1 – θ) is less that or equal to PM, the slope of the firm’s 
objective function at – Δp + p / (1 – θ) = ps is negative, and the optimal change fee lies 
within the low change fee case. On the other hand, whenever p/ (1 – θ) is higher PM, the 
slope of the firm’s objective function at – Δp + p / (1 – θ) = ps is positive, and the optimal 
change fee lies within the high change fee case. 
When ls (or us) are outside their region of change fee in Propositions 1 (or 3), the optimal 
change fee is equal to the boundary of the region that is closer to ls (or us) since I assume 
customers’ valuation follows an IGFR distribution.  
 
Proof of Corollary 3 
The optimal monopolistic service price, PM, satisfies the following condition: 
1 − 𝐹(𝑝)
𝑓(𝑝)
= 𝑝 
Now consider the low and high change fee regions for low θ case, which are discussed in 
Corollary 2. The optimal change fees in both cases satisfy their corresponding optimality 
conditions: 
For low change fee case: 
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) 
and for the high change fee case: 
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1 − 𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
𝑓(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)
= 𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝 
This implies that based on Corollary 2, either we have: 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) = PM, or 𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝 = 
PM. Since PM is constant, it is immediate that the optimal change fee is decreasing in p, 
Δp and θ.  
 
Proof of Lemma 3 and 4 
Part A: First, I show that if 𝜃 ≤
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, then the optimal service price should be one of two 
following service prices: 𝑝 and 𝑝 and if 𝜃 >
Δ𝑝
Δ𝑝+𝑝
, then the optimal service price is 𝑝.  
Consider two cases for analyzing service price as follows: Δp / θ – Δp < ps (high case) 
and ps ≤ Δp / θ – Δp (low case).  
 
For the low case ps ≤ Δp / θ – Δp, when (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) > p, Based on Lemma 2, I 
have: 
𝜋(𝑝) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) ?̅?(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) + 𝑝(𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) = 
= (1 − 𝜃) (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)(1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) + 𝜃(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝) (1 − 𝐹(𝑝
𝑠
+ ∆𝑝)) 
Taking the F.O.C. with respect to p, I have: 
(1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) − 𝑝 (𝑓 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) = 0 
which is rearranged to: 
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1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃)
𝑓 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃)
=
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
 
I label the solution for the optimal price in above formula as 𝑝.  
Now, for the low case ps ≤ Δp / θ – Δp, where (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) < p, based on Lemma 1 
and Lemma 2, I have: 
𝜋(𝑝) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) ?̅?(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) 
Based on the condition of unimodality discussed in Lariviere (2006), the optimal service 
price should satisfy the following conditions: 
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) 
We label the solution for the optimal price in above formula as 𝑝, which should be 
feasible in above region.  
 
Now, consider the high service price case Δp / θ – Δp < ps. When (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) > p, 
based on Lemma 2, I have: 
𝜋(𝑝) = (𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝)) ?̅?(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) + 𝑝(𝐹(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)) 
which is the same revenue function discussed in previous case. Therefore, the service fee 
is 𝑝. Now, when (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) < p, 
𝜋(𝑝) = (𝑝 + ∆𝑝) ?̅?(𝑝 + ∆𝑝) 
However, since ps never satisfy this condition based on Corollary 1, we can ignore this 
case. 
 
Part B: I present that if ps ≤ PM – Δp, then 𝑝∗ = 𝑢, and if ps > PM – Δp, then 𝑝∗ = 𝑙. 
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The optimal monopolistic service price, PM, satisfies the following condition: 
1 − 𝐹(𝑝)
𝑓(𝑝)
= 𝑝 
and any customer with valuation lower than PM leaves the market and any customer with 
valuation higher than PM purchases the service. 
Consider two cases of discussed in Part A as follows: Δp / θ – Δp < ps and ps ≤ Δp / θ – 
Δp. The optimal service price in both cases, satisfy their optimality conditions: 
For the low case: 
1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃)
𝑓 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃)
=
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
 
and for the high case: 
1 − 𝐹(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
𝑓(𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝))
= 𝑝 + 𝜃(𝑝𝑠 + ∆𝑝) 
Notice that at the boundary of two cases, i.e., (ps + Δp) (1 – θ) < p, I have ps + Δp = v. 
This implies that whenever ps + Δp < PM, the optimal change fee lies within the lower 
case since PM demonstrates the same optimality structure, otherwise it lies within the 
higher case.  
 
Part C: Based on part A and Part B, I have the following: 
if p ≤ PM (1 – θ), 𝑝𝑠
∗ = 𝑢𝑠, otherwise, 𝑝𝑠
∗ = 𝑙𝑠. 
If ps ≤ PM – Δp, 𝑝∗ = 𝑝, otherwise 𝑝∗ = 𝑝. 
Let’s assume, the joint optimal decision is inside the second region of low θ case. 
Therefore, based on Part B: 
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−𝑓 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)
𝜃𝑝
1 − 𝜃
+ (1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
))𝜃 = 0 
However, I have shown that in Corollary 2 the slope at the boundary for two regions of 
change fee satisfies the same condition and should be equal to zero as follows:  
−𝑓 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
)
𝜃𝑝
1 − 𝜃
+ (1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
1 − 𝜃
))𝜃 = 0 
This implies that the joint optimal decision is not inside the second region of the low θ 
case. Therefore, the joint optimal decision only can be inside the first region of the low θ 
case or the first region of the high θ case. This summarized to: 
𝑝∗ = 𝑝 and 𝑝𝑠
∗ = 𝑝𝑠. Based on conditions of optimality in Part B, Lemma 1 and Lemma 
2, I have two necessary conditions corresponding the first region of the low θ case and 
the first region of the high θ case as follows:  
PM = p* + (ps* + Δp)(1 – θ). 
PM = p*/(1 – θ). 
Now, I will specify when the joint optimal decision should be inside the first region of 
the low θ case or when it should be inside the first region of the high θ case. The 
boundary of two cases can be specified as:  
p = PM (1 – θ) and ps = PM – Δp.  
Therefore, when PM > Δp, ps = 0. Knowing that p = (0 + Δp)(1 – θ), and p = PM (1 – θ), 
therefore, on the boundary, Δp = PM. The results discussed in Lemma 3 and 4 are 
immediate from above conditions.  
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Proof of Corollary 4 
Based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, the optimal service price is increasing in PM since p* 
is either 
p* = PM + (ps*+ Δp)(1 – θ). 
or 
 p* = PM (1 – θ), and ps* =0. 
 
It is also immediate that p* decreasing in θ. Furthermore, based on the results in Lemma 
3 and Lemma 4, the optimal change fee is decreasing in PM and increasing in θ.  
 
139 
 
Chapter 5  
5 Conclusion 
Many firms and organizations have allegedly optimized their core business function. 
However, they are constantly under extreme pressure, driven by external factors, to 
protect their narrow profit margins. For instance, while many airlines faces government 
taxes, fee and safety costs required by regulation, they cannot financially survive even 
when they successfully operate at 99% capacity level. Their need for supplemental and 
reliable revenues calls for performance optimization beyond the core business functions. 
The primary purpose of my dissertation has been to investigate the revenue management 
and pricing decisions of customer-based strategies that generate extra revenue for firms. 
Motivated by applications from online social media and the airline industry, over three 
different studies, I focused on the following research questions in this dissertation: How 
can firms effectively use customer-based pricing strategies to boost revenues? The results 
generated from this thesis lead to optimizing the performance beyond the core business 
functions. 
Three different model frameworks were developed in three chapters. In Chapter 2, I 
investigated the revenue sharing strategies of online social media and showed how these 
strategies shape the contribution levels of online users. I proposed a stylized model in 
which two online social media firms compete in the market by offering rewards to online 
users. Each firm could choose to be either generous in revenue sharing or save more for 
itself. The game consists of two steps: first, the OSMs announce their rewards for active 
users and, second, users choose their level of contribution with respect to each OSM and 
based on their preferences. I derived the revenue function for the firms and presented the 
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. 
In Chapter 3, I studied the switching behaviour of ticket holders in the aviation industry. I 
modelled a monopoly firm that sequentially announces prices over two periods for two 
identical resources. The customers track prices, and this behaviour triggers demand 
leakage between two resources when the price drops. The firm seeks to manage the 
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uncertain switching behaviour by setting the best change fee. In general, low change fees 
attract more customers to a service, but high change fees generate more revenue per 
switching ticketholder. It was not clear whether the firm should accommodate a low or 
high population of switching customers, as both resources have their own source of 
demand. I demonstrated that the uncertainty in switching behaviour of customers drove 
the firm’s optimal switching policy.  
In Chapter 4, I extended the model I introduced in Chapter 3 to include strategic 
customers with type uncertainty. I considered a monopolistic firm that generates ancillary 
revenues by allowing customers with valuation uncertainty to change between services 
offered by the firm. While the firm maximizes revenue by imposing optimal change fees, 
strategic customers maximize their utilities by responding to these fares. Knowing that 
the introduction of a change fee by firms can discourage customers from purchasing the 
service early, I investigated how the firm should impose such a fee. I analytically derived 
each market player’s best reaction in order to prescribe the characteristics of 
firm/customer interaction equilibrium.  
My results suggest that firms can benefit from imposing a change fee. Although imposing 
the change fee might discourage customers from purchasing early, I found that it is 
beneficial for the firm to increase the change fee up to a threshold. I proved that this 
threshold is a function of the level of customer uncertainty, the optimal monopolistic 
price, and the variability of the price. Increasing the change fee beyond that threshold is, 
however, harmful for the firm, and the firm should be very thoughtful in this regard.  
5.1 Managerial Insights 
The results in this dissertation provide many useful insights for industries interested in 
developing new customer-based initiatives to boost their revenues. Specifically, I studied 
two types of customer-based pricing strategies: revenue sharing programs in online social 
networks and change fees in airlines. First, I provide some insight into the revenue-
sharing programs.  
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5.1.1 Revenue Sharing programs 
I investigated revenue-sharing programs of online social media and showed how these 
programs shape the contribution levels of online users. Firms have two opposing 
strategies in dealing with active online users; they can either save advertising revenue or 
share it. I studied the trade-off between these two strategies. My results indicated that, in 
any asymmetric completion, users always select the more favourable firm whenever they 
decide to work exclusively for one firm. As I discussed, these results are consistent with 
observed online evidence. For example, all online celebrities opened their accounts with 
YouTube in the early stages of the medium's introduction. Moreover, some of my results 
are even observable for OSMs who do not compete based on revenue sharing programs. 
An example includes the ongoing challenge of Google+ to compete with Facebook. 
Many social media connoisseurs were highly optimistic about Google+ when it first 
emerged (and even used it exclusively) but over time realized that they should reopen 
their Facebook accounts  
These results indicate that a firm entering an online competition should investigate how 
online users position its online community relative to a competitor one. Even when there 
is a significant asymmetry between two firms, both firms should be aware of the fact that 
a market share still exists for the less favourable firm (or niche player). As I discussed, 
this explains why a large number of small websites now co-exist with dominant websites 
such as Facebook and YouTube.  
These results also make significant suggestions for small players in the market. A firm 
considered to be less favourable in the market could better position itself in online 
competition if it continuously improved the users’ perspective of its online community. 
For example, although the popularity of iTunes makes it a favourable service for artists, 
downloads from iTunes are readily available on an iPod (or other device), allowing fans 
easier access to music. These results suggest that small social media firms can compete 
with a dominant firm in the market by providing users with a service that has a higher 
utility. 
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In addition to market perception, the revenue generated by users’ contributions also has a 
significant impact on the outcome of online competition. Firms should have a clear 
assessment of true user contribution. As I discussed, if users’ contributions easily 
generate revenue, then both less favourable and dominant firms share high rewards and 
earn higher net revenues, as well. However, the more favourable firm can better exploit 
its advantage in this case by sharing a lower reward. On the other hand, when the 
monetary impact of contributions is too small, both firms follow a parsimonious strategy 
in sharing rewards. These results imply a bilateral relationship between the monetary 
values of users’ contributions and the rewards they receive; if users demand high 
rewards, they should deliver rewarding contributions. For example, some media-
streaming websites make substantial payments because the type or level of contributions 
delivered by their users helps to promote the website, which is in the best interest of the 
website as well as the advertising business.  
I have also found that, in order for firms to be successful, it is critical for them to strike 
the right balance between saving and sharing their revenues with active users. I observe 
that, at equilibrium, firms keep at least half of the marginal revenues for themselves and 
never share more than half of this incremental revenue with their active users. Moreover, 
when the asymmetry between two firms increases considerably, it might be optimal for 
the less favourable firm to completely shut down its rewards program. A higher level of 
asymmetry not only adversely affects the less favourable firm, but it can also generate 
monetary challenges for the more favourable firm, especially when the difference 
between the two firms is insignificant originally. 
In the digital world, the monetary impact of the contributions is too small. As previously 
discussed, the less favourable firms can compete with a dominant firm in the market by 
improving user perspective of its online community. When the monetary rewards are 
insignificant, this strategy is even more beneficial for the less favourable firm. My 
findings suggest that, in this case, the less favourable firm can generate higher revenues 
and, as a result, the firm can share higher rewards with active users. This trend has been 
observed recently in the ongoing competition between a dominant firm, YouTube, and a 
smaller online music service, Spotify. As Spotify’s user base continues to grow, the firm 
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pays increasingly higher reward levels to the artists who use its platform. Next, I 
summarize my findings regarding ancillary fees. 
5.1.2 Ancillary Revenue 
In this thesis, I focused on the benefits of managing revenues from switching customers. 
As I discussed, ancillary fees have recently become very significant for many industries, 
such as airlines. Managing ancillary revenue supports a firm with a narrow profit margin 
to boost its revenue. For example, Airlines will allegedly need to raise funds to invest in 
34,000 new aircraft for expansion ahead for emerging markets until 2030.28 Collecting 
ancillary fees can financially support airlines for this market expansion which requires 
$4.5 trillion investment. Furthermore, ancillary revenue improves customer relationship 
through providing more options. Many industries, such as consumer electronics retail, 
provide money-back guarantees to customers far into the future (for a limited time). This 
practice is used as a marketing tool in generating higher sales. In Chapter 3, I considered 
that a hypothetical airline which might want to use this as a marketing strategy to attract 
price-sensitive customers. The proposed case has already been implemented by some 
airlines. As airlines are exposed to various marketing and pricing strategies, I would not 
be surprised to see airlines also offering price guarantees across dates and flights. This 
paper has contributed by highlighting some of the operational aspects of these marketing 
and pricing strategies to take into consideration. 
This thesis provides the managerial insights for firms to generate higher revenues by 
segmenting the market and designing ancillary fees for each segment separately. For 
example, for non-monetary reasons business travelers have a higher switching rate than 
other passengers. Airlines, for instance, should have a good estimate of the likelihood of 
a customer from each market segment changing her itinerary and should assess their 
prices accordingly. The market can also be segmented based on seasons, geographic 
regions, and so on. In addition to predicting the behaviour of customers, firms should 
                                                 
28
 URL: https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Aviation-Advocacy-Economics-2013-
July.pdf; accessed: 2015–8–8. 
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forecast their reactions to ancillary fees. This is even more critical because firms need to 
take into consideration long-term market competition, as well. A strict pricing policy 
regarding switching and cancelation might send customers away to a competitor. This 
could partly explain why some carriers, such as Southwest Airlines, have been successful 
in acquiring higher market shares by designing more suitable ancillary fees for 
customers. Finally, I would like to emphasize that firms should not follow pricing 
strategies that sub-maximize their ancillary revenues. Although some airlines are 
reportedly more successful in generating higher ancillary revenues, these revenues should 
be considered as a portion of the total revenue structure and be managed for a higher total 
profit and market performance. 
I would like to highlight some other industries to which my model and results might 
apply. For example, banks or cellphone providers experience an identical problem in 
managing their switching revenues when homeowners decide to change their mortgage 
plans or when cellphone users change their mobile plans. In all of these cases, firms 
should impose an appropriate fee to find the best allocation of their limited resources to 
different streams of demand, knowing that the related ancillary revenues should be 
collected to maximize their total profit. 
In Chapter 5, I considered customer uncertainty in dealing with a future booking. As 
discussed, this uncertainty plays an important role in how the firm should design a 
change fee. This finding indicates that when this uncertainty is very high, firms should 
never set a high change fee. This is anecdotally consistent with what is the current 
practice in the auto rental industry, in which the change fees are minimal.29 As I 
discussed, a high change fee forces all potential buyers to wait, and this generates no 
benefit from change fees for the firm.  
I made a connection between my results and models studying a single seller in the 
market. As discussed, the original price of a service, which is captured in my model 
                                                 
29
 URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/your-money/autoslash-a-rate-sleuth-makes-rental-car-
companies-squirm-your-money.html; accessed: 2015–8–8. 
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through the optimal monopolistic service, PM, also has significant impact on the change 
fee. A higher service price represents a more premium market. My results suggest that 
when the service price and the change fee are set simultaneously, it is never optimal for 
the firm to impose a high change fee. Finally, the variability of the service price is also 
critical to the design of the change fee. I find that it is harmful for the firm to set a high 
change fee when customers face a huge premium. This suggests that, although firms 
should exploit ancillary revenue, they should design change fees wisely and along with 
other fees. A tradeoff between fees is necessary when customers should pay multiple 
fees. Finally, I demonstrated that when the firm selects the service price and the change 
fee simultaneously, the optimal service price (with change fee) increases in the optimal 
monopolistic service price and decreases in the proportion of switching customers; 
however, the optimal change fee decreases in the optimal monopolistic service price and 
increases in the proportion of switching customers. 
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